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Abstract 
 
Why have some economically-active militaries of autocratic regimes gained more 
autonomy vis-à-vis their civilian elite as a consequence of economic liberalization 
processes adopted in 80s and 90s, whereas others have remained subordinate to civilian 
control? This dissertation examines the impact of economic liberalization since 1980s on 
civil-military relations (CMR) in autocratic regimes. Prior to liberalization, the centrally-
planned governments of Egypt, Iran, and China utilized their militaries to implement 
economic development projects. Post-liberalization, these militaries expanded into new 
economic sectors like finance, banking, and trade. The expansion impacted the balance of 
CMR differently in each case. Egypt’s military took over the state, the China’s People’s 
Liberation Army retreated to the domain of defense, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps became a coalition-maker. This research argues that the modes and pace of 
liberalization in general, and privatization specifically, are crucial to understanding CMR 
variations. Aspects of liberalization led to varied capitalist development projects, which 
conditioned the empowerment or disempowerment of militaries. If liberalization and 
privatization fostered economic competitiveness, militaries had fewer opportunities for 
enhancing their autonomy. Whereas if incomplete liberalization and rapid privatization did 
not lead to the establishment of a competitive economy, militaries had more opportunities 
to expand their autonomy.  
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Introduction: Bridging the Gap: Economic Liberalization and Civil-Military 
Relation 
 
The Puzzle 
The implementation of economic liberalization policies in the final decades of the 
twentieth century provided an alternative path for development in closed economies that 
relied on central planning. The political science literature has examined the consequences 
of economic liberalization on domestic politics and economies. However, a more specific 
question on the impact of such policies on economically-active militaries, and their control, 
in autocratic regimes has not received much scholarly attention. In my dissertation, I 
identify a puzzling outcome in terms of economically-active militaries behavior in 
liberalizing economies. I explain why some economically-active militaries of autocratic 
regimes have gained more autonomy vis-à-vis their civilian elite as a consequence of 
economic liberalization processes adopted since 1980s, whereas others have remained 
subordinate to civilian control. More specifically, in these three states, similar economic 
policies led to different outcomes for civil-military relations: near-total military autonomy 
in Egypt but much less in Iran and not at all in China. Why? 
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By analyzing three aspects of control, i.e. political, functional, and social control, I 
argue that the specifics of liberalization and privatization impacted the control of forces 
differently in each case. If haphazard economic liberalization and rapid privatization fails 
to establish a competitive market economy, the economically-active militaries are more 
likely to amass political power. Additionally, the militaries turn into economic interest 
groups and likely outcomes are decreased functional and social controls. If a gradual 
economic liberalization and private sector development fosters economic competitiveness, 
economically-active militaries have fewer opportunities to amass political power. 
Additionally, there are less incentives for militaries to operate as economic actors as well. 
Hence, the functional and social controls either increase or remain the same.  
Therefore, in three cases under study, fluctuations in the power of economically-
active militaries vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts were a function of states’ capacity to 
establish a competitive economy. In a relatively competitive economy, militaries had 
higher incentives to limit their activities to the domain of defense since carrying out both 
tasks of defense and economic production effectively were costly. Therefore, they were 
more dependent on civilians and could not increase their political autonomy. This was the 
case of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.  Conversely, in economies characterized by 
cronyism, militaries were able to maintain their economic activities and to pressure the 
government for more economic and political gains. This was the case of the Egyptian 
Armed Forces. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ trajectory took the middle-
ground providing mixed outcomes: the IRGC established itself as an economic and 
political player but failed to take over the government completely. Additionally, in states 
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where economically-active militaries established themselves as economic interest groups, 
functional capabilities and social controls declined.  
Motivation 
Following the emergence of the modernization discourse after the Second World 
War, autocratic regimes in several Middle Eastern and Asian countries assigned their 
militaries the dual role of state defense and socio-economic development. The success of 
revolutionary armies in defeating conventional armies in China, Southeast Asian countries, 
Algeria, and Cuba drew attention to the role of militaries in combating domestic 
revolutionary armed groups. Simultaneously, US military assistance in Latin America 
underscored the role of local militaries in counterinsurgency, nation-building, and civic 
action; there was an increasing belief that “professional military expertise” could be 
utilized for domestic purposes, such as provision of internal security. A new perspective, 
known as new-professionalism, argued for interrelated nature of politics and military. This 
shift to the increasing politicization of militaries; it also resulted in militaries’ role-
expansion as governors of national development projects, particularly in states with weak 
civilian governments (Stepan 1986, 136-137).  
Latin American states were not the only countries that assigned development 
projects to their militaries. Other states across the developing world also adopted similar 
polices. Frequently, the outcome was the emergence of economically-active militaries that 
not only received official budgets for defense spending, but also generated extra-budgetary 
income via economic activities. In response to this development, the study of Civil-Military 
Relations (CMR) also focused on the role of militaries in modernization. Scholars such as 
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Levy (1971), Needler (1971), and Quinlivan (1999) examined the changing dynamics 
between civilians and militaries in modernizing economies. The focus, however, was on 
destabilizing effects of modernization and possibilities for militaries’ intervention in form 
of coup d’états.   
For example, Levy (1971) and Needler (1971) studied the likelihood of military 
coups d’états in modernizing states. Levy argued that the governments utilized careful 
military recruitment policies to reduce possibilities for military coups1. Similarly, Needler 
(1971) considered coups as likely consequences of deteriorating economic conditions: 
dominant classes, discontent from the process of modernization, used their militaries to 
stage a coup and retain the status quo. Although above-discussed studies focused on the 
interrelation of economic development and coups, they failed to examine the specific 
question of militaries’ economic role-expansion and their impact on local economies or 
politics. Furthermore, not only they took political control as the sole measure of civilian 
control, they also adopted a narrow definition of political control—coup d’états or overt 
military intervention. 
Coup-proofing literature was also primarily concerned with the question of coup-
d’états. The scholarly work that observed militaries’ economic power, did so in the context 
of examining the possibilities for coups. For example, Quinlivan (1999) discussed various 
coup-proofing strategies in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria by identifying strategies such as 
establishment of parallel militaries to counterbalance regular militaries or providing 
                                                
1	Specifically in form of palace coups 
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funding for militaries2 (Quinlivan, 1999: 135). Similarly, Makara examined the 
effectiveness of coup-proofing strategies in Arab states of Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bahrain, 
and Yemen. In states where parallel institutions or unequal distribution of material 
incentives divided militaries, defections were more likely (Makara, 2013: 334-335). 
Albrecht (2014) also compared the cases of Egypt and Syria and argued that those 
strategies that kept officers outside of the politics, and meanwhile enhanced their corporate 
autonomy, were more ineffective for the times of crisis (Albrecht, 2014: 37). The above-
discussed literature, among other things, underscored the economic aspect of military’s 
susceptibility to coups. However, it overlooked a systematic study of military’s economic 
role-expansion and its impact on domestic politics. 
While preventing coup-d’états is a significant sign of civilian control, the empirical 
evidence suggests that militaries’ intervention in politics takes various shapes, in addition 
to coups. Autocracies could be immune to coups and still be vulnerable to other forms of 
military influence such as military politicization by civilians or military’s interference in 
governance, such as foreign policy or economic policy decision-makings. Therefore, on 
the one hand, studies on the interrelation of economic development and civil-military 
relations focused on a narrow definition of military interferences. One the other hand, they 
did not treat those militaries engaged in developmental tasks as economic actors since they 
overlooked the implications of militaries’ economic-role expansion. My dissertation 
focuses on economically-active militaries specifically and treats them as economic actors. 
                                                
2	Quinlivan, Coup Proofing, 135. Other coup-proofing strategies included creation of multiple intelligence 
organizations for monitoring, exploitation of group loyalties (ethnic, religious, family), and fostering 
military professionalism.	
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In doing so, it also draws on recent literature that problematizes a sole focus on coups, and 
hence accounts for varied forms of military intervention in autocratic politics.  
More recently, scholars (Feaver 1999, Taylor 2003, Avant 2005, Epstein 2008) 
have theorized varied forms and aspects of control, expanding the CMR literature beyond 
the study of coup d’états. Brian Taylor, in his Politics and the Russian Army: Civil–Military 
Relations, 1689-2000 (2003), categorized some of those forms of interference that go 
beyond coup d’états. He classified military interventions as an actual or threat of use of 
force aiming at changing the executive; other forms of interference are military arbitration 
when militaries become mediators between legitimate civilian actors, and no military 
intervention for cases where an otherwise expected coup doesn’t occur (Taylor 2003, 7).  
Similarly, Feaver (1999) also highlights the multifaceted nature of civilian control 
by identifying coup d’état, military influence, civil military friction, and military 
compliance as four main dependent variables commonly considered by theoretical studies 
of CMR. Feaver explains that military institutions’ inclination to coups, i.e. the frequency 
and likelihood of military seizures of state power, has been the focal interest of classic 
literature, as in works by Huntington, Finer, Nordlinger, Bienen, Jackman. However, 
according to Feaver, there are other conceptual categories, such as military influence that 
acknowledge the degrees of political power militaries could exercise: arguing for a 
continuum as opposed to a coup versus non-coup dichotomy (Feaver 1999, 217-219). 
Epstein’s In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Postcommunist 
Europe (2008) is another work underscoring the importance of contextual differences in 
both understanding and conceptualizing military control and autonomy. The author 
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examined NATO’s role in reforming CMR in the socio-political context of post-communist 
legacies and transformations. Instead of military seizure of the state’s power—commonly 
seen in non-communist states—militaries in the post-communist states of Central and 
Eastern Europe struggled to remain autonomous and free from civilian interference. The 
Soviet legacy of military autonomy in return for subordination to civilian authority posed 
a challenge as democratic control required limiting militaries’ autonomy both functionally 
and normatively (politically). This process particularly required civilianizing the security–
military apparatus with democratic institutions, where civilians, instead of military 
personnel, would run ministries of defense, parliamentary defense committees, and would 
oversee the intelligence services, and the defense budget (2008: 109). The above-
mentioned studies provide a more nuanced understanding of the question of political 
control. These works highlight the sophisticated nature of civil–military interactions in the 
domain of politics, possibilities include: politicization of militaries by civilians, 
militarization of politics, or other forms of military interference such as occupying 
government positions. 
Furthermore, challenging the one-dimensional views that either focused solely on 
one aspect of political control or employed various aspects of control vaguely or 
interchangeably, Avant explains that the CMR literature often rests on different concepts 
of control (Avant 2005). Though many implicitly appreciate that what we mean by civilian 
control includes a military that is capable (functional control), responsive to leaders 
(political control), and serving societal values (social control), analyses tend to elevate one 
or another (2005: 5-6).  In analyzing the question of civilian control, specifically 
		 8	
privatization of security, Avant (2005) argues that “the control of force has been most 
stable, effective, and legitimate when all three aspects have reinforced one another – when 
capable forces have been governed by accepted political processes and operated according 
to shared values” (2008: 6). Hence, as discussed thus far, recent scholarly works have 
adopted a more sophisticated framework in understanding the concept of military control 
by underscoring various aspects of civilian control.  
In studying the role of economically-active militaries in China, Iran, and Egypt, I 
embrace this broader framework that moves beyond a study of coup d’états and takes into 
consideration various forms of military influence in politics. I focus on military influence 
as a continuum that manifests itself not only in the domain of politics, but also in the 
domains of society, and economy. Moreover, as mentioned before, the literature surveying 
militaries in autocratic regimes has failed to critically examine militaries’ political 
economy; it has not offered theoretical frameworks or hypotheses that would explain the 
consequences of militaries’ economic power not only on political control but also on 
military capabilities and social values. I take various types of intervention in politics, as 
well as functional and social controls into account. In doing so, I identify political economy 
variables that impact militaries economic behavior, and ultimately, explain the processes 
that sometimes increase the functional, political, and social power of economically active 
militaries and at other times have a reverse effect on those dimensions.  
A systematic study of economically-active militaries is imperative in understanding 
an unexplored dimension of military power. There is an emerging body of research 
examining militaries’ roles as economic actors, as well as case studies focusing on the 
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economic activities of militaries. These studies, primarily focus on the following issues: 
classification of different types of militaries’ economic activities (Brömmelhörster and 
Paes 2003, Mani 2007), contingent generalization on interrelation of militaries’ economic 
activities and civil-military relations (Alaggapa 2002, Mani 2007, Mani 2010), and case 
studies ( Mulvenon 2001, Siddiqa 2007).  
For example, Brömmelhörster and Paes’s collection provides a descriptive 
typology of militaries’ business activities classified as budgetary assistance, pensions 
welfare, developmental role, import substitution, economic opportunism, and opportunities 
for corruption for the cases of Argentina, Central American states, China, the DRC, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and Vietnam (2007: 681). Mani (2007) also offers a typology 
of militaries’ economic activities: institutional (benefiting the institution), spoils 
(benefiting the individuals), statist-institutional (state-led benefiting the institution), and 
statist-spoils (state-led benefiting individuals) (2007: 596). Two causal variables of state 
capacity (weak vs. strong) and military’s organizational nature (professionalization vs. 
parochial) determine the above outcomes. In strong states, militaries’ economic activities 
are directed by the state; in weak states, military’s organizational nature (professional 
versus parochial) determines the outcome (2007: 595). In a later piece, Mani (2010) 
explains that cultural, structural, and rational approaches could help us understand the 
reasons behind trajectories of civil-military relations regarding economically-active 
militaries but doesn’t offer testable hypotheses. 
Other studies such as Siddiqa’s Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy 
(2007), Cheung’s China’s Entrepreneurial Army (2001), Mulvenon’s Soldiers of Fortune: 
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The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military–Business Complex, 1978-1998 (2001) focus on 
individual case studies.  These case studies provide insights and testable hypotheses on the 
role-expansion of militaries for individual cases but do not provide comparative case 
studies. Other studies, such as Alagappa (2002) in his Coercion and Governance: The 
Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (2002), offered contingent generalization.  
In discussing militaries’ role-expansion in Asian states, Alagappa (2002), argued 
that what mattered was the scope of military’s participation in economic governance. A 
simple increase in the scope of participation (breath of participation in governance) in the 
socio–economic domain didn’t necessarily mean expansion of the military’s role. It was 
considered role-expansion only when it was linked to an increase in the military’s 
jurisdiction and decision-making power (32, 2002).  The role-expansion3 was a function of 
the weakness and illegitimacy of the governing elite and not a function of 
unprofessionalism. CMR patterns, hence, were determined by the interrelation of the 
following factors: 
“beliefs, interests, and power of administrative, military, and political institutions 
(bureaucracy, presidency, legislature, communist party), and military institutions 
(armed forces, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, and the security agencies) 
mediated by the beliefs and power of civil society and international society” 
(Alagappa 2002, 58).  
 
In the context of strong political institutions, the beliefs and values, norms and 
principles determined the CMR patterns. In institutionally weak states, the distribution of 
power among major actors and their interests, which were influenced by civil and 
international society, determined the outcome. Alagappa’s work is among very few studies 
                                                
3 Based on Stepan’s notion of new professionalism, i.e. militaries involvement in non-defense related tasks.    
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focusing on the causes behind militaries’ economic role-expansion. Similar to previous 
studies, however, Alagappa does not take into account varied aspects of control. Moreover, 
the causal explanation considers the impact of several variables, making it difficult to 
analyze the causal process and identify the most determinant variables.  
Building on above-mentioned works, my project takes a step further in comparing 
and contrasting cases in terms of the militaries’ power-expansion in politics, the militaries’ 
effectiveness, and changes in their values. I propose testable hypotheses leading to 
contingent generalizations regarding economically-active militaries’ political behavior, as 
well as their functional and social control. Furthermore, the above works mainly focus on 
organizational character, elite interactions, or domestic state capacity variables; they do not 
expand the underlying micro-mechanisms of militaries’ economic expansion or contraction 
under conditions of changing economic systems. While the literature of political science 
has examined the consequences of liberalization on domestic economies and on politics 
alike, it has not systematically examined the relationship between liberalization and 
economic activities of militaries in autocratic regimes. The literature also overlooks 
discussion of the changing conditions under which these militaries became economically-
active. The economic activities of militaries under central planning and import substitution 
policies had a different character and meaning compared to the liberalized economies of 
today. My research intends to breach this gap by examining militaries of China, Iran, and 
Egypt. 
Fist, centrally-planned economies of China, Iran, and Egypt all had economically-
active militaries and have experimented with state control over their militaries during the 
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phase of their nationalized centrally-planned economies. The liberalization programs in all 
three cases included trade liberalization, financial sector reforms to attract foreign capital 
and foreign direct investment, and a process of privatizing state-owned enterprises. As a 
consequence of these reforms, not only these militaries expanded their economic power, 
but also, in some cases, they succeeded to translate their economic power into political 
authority in the decades following the reforms. The economic liberalization also had 
varying impacts on the functional and social aspects of control. Together, these shifts 
translated into varying degrees of military influence. 
On certain occasions, militaries have profited from their power to engage in 
preferential bidding, tax evasion, smuggling, and unfair competition. Their economic 
expansion resulted in exercising different degrees of political power such as interfering 
with foreign policy decisions, electoral processes, or coup d’états. The functional control 
varies as well, with some militaries acquiring more capabilities and expanding their 
functional power while others’ capabilities have decreased. In terms of social control, some 
militaries have become self-interested institutions, pursuing or even prioritizing their 
corporate interests while others still maintain the values and ideologies of the societies they 
represent or adhere to the international humanitarian values. Despite the above-mentioned 
economic policy changes, the discipline has failed to analyze the impact of these changes 
on various patterns, as well as three aspects of CMR, i.e. political, functional, and social 
controls.   
While all three implemented liberalization policies, overall China has been most 
successful in maintaining or expanding civilian political control, as well as functional and 
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social control. In Iran, there is a balance of power between civilians and the Islamic 
Republic’s Guard Corps (IRGC); the IRGC has turned into a power bloc. The economic 
reforms have negatively impacted the functional capabilities of the military. With regards 
to the social values, the IRGC has remained loyal to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution 
but it has also become a self-interested corporate entity making decisions to serve its 
narrow economic interests. Its pursuit of narrow self-interest at times is in the expense of 
Iran’s national interests, i.e. the revolutionary developmental goals such as alleviating 
poverty. In Egypt, the military continued to monopolize its power during Hosni Mubarak’s 
regime and became a power broker during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. The functional 
control has not registered significant changes while liberalization has negatively impacted 
the social control since the military has become a self-interested corporate entity 
representing social values in conflict with the majority in the society.  
The dependent variable of civil-military relations varied as follows: the Chinese 
PLA divested its businesses and returned to barracks. Egypt’s EAF fought to maintain and 
expand its economic empire, and ultimately took an almost complete control of the state. 
The IRGC’s political leverage was not as extensive as the EAF’s, but unlike China, it has 
established itself as an accepted political player. Why? 
I argue that civilians’ ability to foster economic competitiveness and private sector 
growth conditioned and constrained militaries’ behavior, and subsequently the CMR. 
Particularly, incomplete liberalization or selective protectionism provided opportunities for 
economically-active militaries to capture state resources and provided them with enough 
leverage to translate their economic power into a political power. In the absence of 
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competition in the economy, economically-active militaries enjoyed an edge and could use 
their government linkages to their advantage, thus increasing military influence in the 
political domain; militaries became less dependent on their civilians because they could 
maintain their businesses in an uncompetitive economy, Where economic liberalization 
fostered decentralization of economic activity and competition, however, economically-
active militaries had fewer opportunities to capture state resources and transform their 
economic power into political influence. In more competitive economies, military 
businesses needed to maximize profit and out-compete other actors to gain success. 
Without selective protectionism, maintaining profitability for militaries became 
increasingly difficult, weakening their leverage over civilians and hence their potential 
influence.  
Moreover, economic liberalization that allowed for economic integration also 
generated more income, which allowed for increases in defense spending, which decreased 
the need for militaries to maintain businesses. This process improved the military’s 
capabilities and its incentives to remain subordinate. Conversely, unintegrated economic 
liberalization did not generate income that could be used for increases in defense spending, 
leading militaries to continue their focus on economic activity instead of focusing on 
improving their capabilities. In these instances, militaries turned into self-interested 
corporate entities pursuing institutional interests rather than adhering to the values of the 
society.  
This dissertation’s findings offer insights on how International/regional 
Organizations’, or United States’, economic policy recommendations impact the balance 
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of power between militaries and civilians in autocratic regimes, and what subsequent 
security implications of those changes are. A military’s economic role-expansion and their 
ability or inability to leverage their economic power into a political one is crucial in state’s 
political liberalization process, and ultimately possibilities for democratization.  Also a 
military’s economic role-expansion, if not in service of developmental goals, could impede 
economic development, as it has been in the cases of Iran and Egypt. Ultimately, in terms 
of security sector reforms, the findings underscore the importance of combining economic 
reforms and security reforms; it highlights the importance of coordination among 
developmental agencies in terms of recommendations they could offer to those developing 
states where the militaries have a history of economic activity. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first chapter outlines the theory, 
hypotheses, and methodology. It develops the theoretical framework based on capitalist 
development models that informed the selection of independent variables and generation 
of testable hypotheses. Then, it explains the process of case selection, the dependent 
variable of military control (political, functional, and social control) and its 
operationalization.  
The second chapter analyzes the reasons behind the willingness of China’s People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) to dissolve its economic empire following the civilian order in 
1998; it explains why, to the surprise of many, the PLA divested its enterprises and returned 
to barracks.  
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The third chapter focuses on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It 
aims at explaining why despite its success to considerably expand its both economic and 
political power, the IRGC nevertheless failed to completely dominate Iran’s economy and 
politics.  
The fourth chapter delineates the process of economic liberalization in Egypt and 
how it facilitated expansion of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) into the economy and its 
later success in transforming its economic power into political power: a complete 
government take-over. The final chapter wraps up the findings, suggests the policy 
implications of the findings, and offers recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2: Hypotheses on Economic Competitiveness and Civil-Military Relations 
 
Theory: Pathways to Capitalist Developments  
This dissertation (i) suggests that specifics of liberalization and privatization 
processes are crucial for understanding the variations in the balance of power between the 
civilian elite and militaries, and (ii) identifies variations in the degrees of political, 
functional, and social autonomies that militaries exercised prior to and after liberalization 
processes. The types of economic liberalization, and their outcomes, i.e. gradual 
liberalization coupled with reform of regulations and bureaucracy leading to 
competitiveness versus a rapid process of deregulation and privatization that hinders 
competitiveness, impact militaries’ political, functional, and social controls. This study 
formulates hypotheses by referring to capitalist development models developed by King 
and Szelenyi (2005) and by Harris’ (2013). The theory King and Szelenyi offer informs 
the selection of independent variables, and the subsequent formulation of testable 
hypotheses. 
King and Szelenyi, in their Post-Communist Economic Systems (2005), present 
three ideal types of capitalist development in Eastern Europe. Like the literature that argues 
for examining divergent capitalist projects (Hall and Soskice 2001), the authors articulate 
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the unique features of class, private-property formation, and market institutions in several 
post-communist states, and how they mitigated the privatization and liberalization. 
Capitalism from above, capitalism from below, and capitalism from without were three 
pathways of capitalist development that resulted in divergent capitalist systems. In 
capitalism from above, elites followed a neoliberal plan to transform a socialist economy 
into a capitalist one. The process enabled the nomenklatura to convert itself into a new 
capitalist class. Labeled as patrimonial capitalism, characteristics of capitalism from above 
have included patrimonial relationships and network-based economic activity. Capitalism 
from below emerged as a hybrid system of new actors, private property owners, and a 
market economy that kept operating alongside the old redistributive system. Hybrid 
capitalism was an outcome of capitalism from below where state-owned enterprises and a 
small private sector coexisted. Finally, capitalism from without, like capitalism from 
above, adopted neoliberal policies but with a significant difference. In this scenario, instead 
of privatization and empowerment of the older nomenklatura, states relied on foreign 
ownership and multinational corporations. Liberal capitalism was a system where market 
institutions had developed and there was a globally integrated economy (King and Szelenyi 
2005, 205-208).  
By utilizing capitalist developmental models, Kevan Harris, in his “The Rise of the 
Subcontractor State: Politics of Pseudo-Privatization in the Islamic Republic of Iran” 
(2013), also discusses the impact of state capacity and instructional competency on 
different forms of capitalist development. He adopts King & Szelenyi’s three models of 
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capitalist development4 to explain various periods of economic reform in Iran, comparing 
them to other cases in the developing world.  
In Harris’ account, the Iranian economy experienced all three forms of 
development, with Ahmadinejad’s privatization policies amounting to capitalism from 
above, and the consequent empowering of the IRGC. Similarly, Egyptian economic 
development took the path of capitalism from above, while China, in contrast, experienced 
capitalism from below and origination of a private sector operating parallel to the state 
sector. Harris’ work provides a basis for understanding the interaction of political and 
economic institutions in the cases under study.  Given the fact that the economic activities 
of militaries in China, Iran, and Egypt have been embedded in capitalist development 
projects, my research builds on King and Szelenyi (2005) and Harris’ (2013) framework 
to explain why, under conditions of varied capitalist development projects, militaries in 
each state have acquired different degrees of power in relation to civilians. 
I focus on the variables of economic liberalization and modes of privatization to 
examine (i) states’ ability to implement market mechanisms, and (ii) the process of private 
sector development, and (iii) the extent to which both of these conditions create a degree 
of competition in which militaries must operate. Subsequently, I test the interrelation of 
economic competitiveness and the question of military control. 
                                                
4 Harris, The Rise of Subcontractor State, 65-66. Capitalism from above leads to the engineering of a 
Weberian rational–bureaucratic state and the implementation of liberal policies resulting in export-oriented 
and foreign capital-intensive economic strategy. In the case of capitalist development from below, a coalition 
between technocratic elite and domestic bourgeoisie operating in a politically powerful state bureaucracy 
leads to the emergence of a “hybrid system of capital accumulation and mixed forms of property”, where the 
balance of power between the two groups has led to the emergence of a private sector co-existing with a big 
public sector. The outcome of privatization in the absence of a solid bureaucratic-institutional framework—
capitalism from above—has been states’ asset-stripping by the elite in power. 
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Explanatory Hypotheses: Competitive versus Uncompetitive Economies 
Hypothesis#1: If rapid or haphazard economic liberalization fails to establish a 
competitive economy, or does not facilitate private sector development, economically 
active militaries turn into economic interest groups. A likely outcome is increased 
autonomy in the political domain, and decreased functional and social controls.   
In other words, incomplete economic liberalization (or selective protectionism) 
conditions maintenance of economically active militaries as economic actors and increases 
their political leverage.  
Causal explanation: Rapid liberalization in the absence of market institutions and 
regulatory regimes, as well as the transfer of previously state-owned enterprises to private 
actors, provides an opportunity for existing networks of influence in the state to engage in 
asset-stripping. In transition economies, liberalization via transfer of both ownership and 
management of state-owned enterprises to private actors takes place under the conditions 
of weak economic institutions. Subsequently, due to weak regulatory regimes, existing 
networks of influence, in this case economically-active militaries, are able to further 
enhance their economic power and translate it into political leverage by becoming a 
pressure group impacting civilian decisions.  
Civilians’ Functional control over the military also decreases because militaries 
expand economically to support themselves or to simply generate profits. Since the state 
doesn’t increase defense spending, the military has an incentive to remain economically 
active. Moreover, rapid liberalization provides opportunities for transformation of 
military’s economic base into a political one. The military turns into an interest group; it 
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might still adhere to social values but self-interest takes precedent over social values.  
(Cases of Egypt and Iran).   
Hypothesis#2: If economic liberalization and private sector development establish 
a competitive economy, economically-active militaries have less incentive to operate as 
economic actors. The outcome is increased civilian control in the political domain. The 
functional and social controls either would increase or would not change. 
In other words, relatively thorough-going economic liberalization that establishes 
a competitive economy reduces incentives for militaries to engage in economic activities, 
which in turn leads to a decrease in militaries’ political leverage. 
Causal explanation: If the state carries out gradual economic liberalization, where 
state-owned enterprises are not rapidly transferred to the private sector but instead a new 
private sector emerges parallel to the public sector, the chances for economically-active 
militaries to enter the new private domain are slimmer. In other words, if the state engages 
in partial privatization—where it still retains either partial management or ownership of 
state-owned enterprises, outsources activities previously done by the state but doesn’t 
necessarily transfer them to the private sector, or engages in joint public–private ventures—
then privatization is gradual. Under these circumstances, the existing networks of influence 
have smaller windows of opportunities to engage in asset-stripping. This is because if the 
economic liberalization fosters competition, the economic space opens for new 
entrepreneurs to flourish, meaning the emergence of new businesses in those private sectors 
that are not dominated by the state.  
		 22	
In terms of the sectors dominated by the state, privatization is controlled and 
gradual, with private actors holding less power in relation to the state. Subsequently, the 
state faces the emergence of parallel public and private sectors where state and private 
actors engage in different kinds of economic activities. The best examples of these types 
of privatization are the cases of China during Deng’s leadership and continuing to the 
present (Gao 2014), and Iran during the presidency of Khatami (Harris 2013).  
If the state is generating income via economic liberalization, the probability for an 
increase in defense spending is higher. Therefore, there are improvements in militaries’ 
functional control as the military receives extra funds. A military’s incentive to engage in 
economic activities is also reduced. Moreover, gradual privatization doesn’t provide 
opportunities for asset-stripping. In this scenario, the military is more likely to remain loyal 
to the regime and uphold the values of the autocratic regime. (This was the case for China). 
Most Similar Systems Design 
Why did China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) divest its businesses and return 
to barracks following economic liberalization policies in the 90s, whereas Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) established itself and became a coalition-maker but 
Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) rose into political power? Despite the similarities these 
cases share in terms of military control prior to the economic liberalization, as a result of 
economic liberalization the EAF gained significant power—almost a complete government 
take-over. In China, on the other hand, liberalization consolidated civilian control over the 
PLA. In Iran, the IRGC entered into coalitions with the leading civilian elite. I aim to 
understand why seemingly similar policies led to such different outcomes. I argue that 
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when liberalization and privatization does not foster competitiveness, militaries have 
opportunities to expand their economic base, engage in stripping of state resources, and 
turn their economic power into a political power. In contrast, when liberalization and 
privatization assist establishment of a competitive economy, militaries have limited 
opportunities to transfer their economic base into a political one.  
By adopting a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) (Della Porta, 2008), my 
research utilizes a historical institutionalist approach and a method of process-tracing to 
provide a causal explanation for the impact of economic liberalization policies on civil–
military relations in the three cases of China, Iran, and Egypt. MSSD is used to rule out 
similarities and identify the points of divergence among the three case; the dependent 
variable is the civil-military control post-liberalization. Aiming to offer contingent 
generalization, I utilize the method of process-tracing to find critical processes by 
comparing historical cases (cited in George and Bennett 2005, 205). I look at those critical 
moments in history where policy choices changed the states’ economic trajectory in 
general, militaries’ economic power in particular, and ultimately their political leverage.  
  The countries under study share similarities in terms of civil–military relations prior 
to liberalization in the 1980s, as well as in their adoption of economic liberalization policies 
as a remedy for the economic constraints they faced. The balance of civil–military power 
subsequent to the liberalization, however, varies. Therefore, given similarities the cases 
shared with respect to their nationalization policies, their militaries’ role in economic 
development, and their adoption of economic reforms, what variables determined the 
divergent outcomes in civil–military relations (CMR) following liberalization?  
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Through process-tracing, this study will identify those market and state institutions 
that conditioned the interactions of civilian and military elites in autocratic regimes; it will 
also explain how the introduction of new market policies led to different types of capitalist 
development projects that provided opportunities for empowerment or disempowerment of 
militaries. In order to compare these three cases, this study adopts the comparative method 
of MSSD to rule out similarities and find the most determinant variable. Case selection 
focused on three theoretically relevant similarities in the domains of historical legacy, 
economic policy, and the militaries’ position in the society. Those similarities are the 
following: regime collapses via revolutions followed by the establishment of autocratic 
regimes, the adoption of a leftist economic orientation accompanied by central planning, 
an anti-imperialist discourse, the militaries’ ideological role as guardians of newly formed 
independent states or regimes, and finally the allocation of economic development tasks to 
militaries are similarities all cases share. In addition, all cases adopted similar economic 
liberalization policies: reforming exchange-rate systems, banking/financial sector, and 
privatization packages.  
Similarities: Cases of China, Iran, Egypt 
Table 1: MSSD, Similarities of China, Iran, and Egypt 
Similarities Iran China Egypt 
Historical 
legacies/ 
State 
Institutions  
Revolution 	  
(1979) 
	 
(1945) 
	 (1952) 
Establishment of Autocratic 
regime 
	 	 	 
Civilian autocracies 	 	  Monarchy 
 	 	 	 
Established autocracies (no civil 
wars/ not in transition) 
	 	 	 
Cultural  Anti-West rhetoric 	 	 	 
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In these three cases, the revolutions and implementation of economic liberalization 
policies occurred at different times. However, they share both the same international 
context and the same domestic ideologies. China experienced revolution in 1949, at the 
beginning stages of the Cold War. Egypt and Iran experienced revolutions and established 
new regimes in 1952 and 1979 respectively. Although their revolutions occurred in 
different times, all three happened during the Cold War and were similar in terms of their 
adoption of anti-western and anti-capitalist ideologies. In all three cases the revolutions 
brought left-leaning elites into power and were responses to a polarized international 
environment. In all three cases, the elite in power adopted centralized economic policies.  
In addition, all three states are established regimes with a strong state capacity to 
monitor their borders, and subsequently have not experienced civil war. Therefore, the 
literature related to states in transition, militaries in the process of state formation, as well 
as civil wars should be excluded from this study. 
Economics Centrally Planned Economy/ ISI 	 	 	 
Shadow Economies  	 	 	 
Existence of Private sector along 
with the public one, but dominance 
of State Owned Enterprises 
	 	 	 
Openness/Economic Reform 
Policy 
	  	 	 
Trade liberalization 	 	 	 
Exchange rate reform 	 	 - 
Militaries Assigning the militaries dual roles 
of defense and development 
	 	 	 
Ideologically oriented militaries 
(defending the ideology of state) 
	 	 	 
Militaries under civilian control 
prior to the liberalization policies 
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The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable (DV) is degree of civilian control over the armed forces 
measured along the three aspects of political, functional, and social control. The DV is a 
military’s political, functional, and social values both prior to and after economic 
liberalization processes in the eighties and nineties. Therefore, operationalization requires 
assessment of DVs both prior to and after economic liberalization.  
Political control. I base my measurement of a military’s political control on Brian 
Taylor’s (2003) definition: militaries’ involvement in politics includes “military 
intervention” and “military arbitration.” In the former case, intervention is “the use, actual 
or threatened, of force by members if the military, either alone or with civilian actors, in 
an attempt to change the executive leadership of the state” (Taylor 2003, 7). Hence, military 
intervention could be operationalized based on (i) coups, (ii) attempts/threats to coups, (iii) 
direct intervention in electoral processes or exercise of a veto-power over electoral results, 
(iv) the military assuming governmental positions, and (v) the military’s responsiveness to 
the government or at least to a faction of the civilian elite.  
According to Taylor (2003), military arbitration is “when multiple persons or 
groups claim to hold legitimate state power and the military is forced to decide from whom 
to obey orders” (Taylor 2003, 7).  Military arbitration is evidence of military interference 
in politics. However, in autocratic regimes, due to the absence of both institutional 
mechanisms of control and democratic norms, the line between militaries and civilians is 
blurred. The militaries are usually politicized and serve interests of a faction of the elite in 
power. Hence, drawing a clear distinction illustrating a shift from non-interference to 
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interference is difficult. Therefore, I will take arbitration as evidence of interference only 
when arbitration serves the corporate interests of the military rather than expressing the 
military’s responsiveness (or loyalty) to a particular political faction. In other words, the 
motivation behind military’s decision-making is important: if the military switches sides 
constantly, makes coalitions with various elite factions, in order to advance its economic 
interests, I will count it as military interference in politics.   
By assessing each military’s political autonomy, prior to and after economic 
liberalization I can identify whether there was a shift in the military’s political power after 
economic liberalization.  
 Functional control: Civilians have functional control of the military when it has  
“the capacity to create military power from a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, 
population size, and human capital.” As put by Brooks and Stanley, “A military’s level of 
effectiveness varies with the degree to which it is organized to make good use of these 
material and human resources” (Brooks and Stanley 2007, 9-13). In keeping with this 
definition, I use the following attributes to measure military effectiveness: (i) integration:  
the ability to ensure consistency in military activity, create synergies, and avoid 
counterproductive activities, (ii) responsiveness: the degree to which the state 
accommodates internal and external threats to prepare itself for armed conflict,  (iii) skill: 
preparation and motivation of military personnel to execute tasks in the battlefield, (iv) 
quality: capacity of the state to provide itself with weaponry. 
Based on Brooks and Stanley’s classification (2007, 15), some of the following 
indicators (given available data) are used to measure military effectiveness across time: (i) 
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Integration: consistency between tactics with broader political goals, consistency of 
training system of personnel with tactical concepts, logistics and operational plans support 
strategic objectives. (ii) Responsiveness: tactics designed to address weakness of 
adversary, modification of forces in response to new threats and challenges, rigorous 
internal monitoring system (intelligence gathering), officer selection. (iii) Skill: fluid 
assimilation of technology, highly motivated soldiers, proficiency in executing doctrines; 
assessing the education and training programs. (iv) Quality: Nature of weapons procured, 
ability to minimize trade-offs in mobility 
Social control: Social control refers to the values that underlie military activity. 
Based on Avant’s (2005) classification of various types of control, I assess social control 
in terms of changes in military values, i.e., adherence to social norms of the society (43). 
If militaries start operating based on narrow self-interest rather than an adherence to 
previously-established social norms and expectations, there is a change in the social 
control.  
DV Prior to and Post-Economic Liberalization 
Iran: I focus on sixteen years of liberalization policies since 1997; the policies were 
adopted during Khatami’s and Ahmadinejad’s presidencies (1997-2013). Rafsanjani’s 
presidency from 1989–1997 was marked by the politicization of the IRGC and its role-
expansion. That is the DV (prior) to the effective economic liberalization policies in 1997. 
Although Rafsanjani attempted to liberalize the economy, his policies did not succeed. The 
period of post-liberalization is identified with two changes under two presidencies: 
liberalization during Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005) when Iran faced the rise of a 
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private sector parallel to the public sector, and acceleration of liberalization since 2005 
following Ahmadinejad’s election when the state privatized rapidly and sold state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to private actors.  
DV (prior to liberalization): 1989 to 1997 (during Rafsanjani’s presidency), the 
IRGC was assigned an economic development role and was tasked to generate its own 
income. The IRGC was institutionally autonomous and politically subordinate to the 
civilians’ demands. It upheld the values of the 1979 Revolution. 
DV (post-liberalization): Since 1997, the IRGC began interfering in the politics but 
the quality and forms of intervention differed significantly under two presidencies of 
Khatami and Ahmadinejad. During Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005), the IRGC started 
interfering in the politics but not as extensively as in Ahmadinejad’s period (2005-2013). 
Its economic base did not expand and its interference in politics was a result of its 
politicized nature (linkages to the hardliner elite). Since 2005, however, following rapid 
liberalization and privatization policies of Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the IRGC turned into 
a political power block. The functional capabilities of the IRGC have not registered 
dramatic changes. Despite claiming to uphold the values of the revolution, the IRGC 
behaved as a self-interested institution. It still upheld the values of the Islamic Revolution 
and Iran’s theocratic ideology but it also, at times, acted as a corporate institution 
undermining national security, or hindering state’s developmental goals.   
One could argue that the IRGC gained power via political means and expanded its 
economic empire. There are also arguments regarding a symbiotic relationship between the 
IRGC’s political and economic power. However, this research marshals evidence to 
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illustrate how the increasing power of the IRGC was resulted from the types of 
privatization policies adopted since 1997 by Khatami’s and Ahmadinejad’s governments.   
Egypt: This section focuses on the aftermath of the economic liberalization that 
commenced post Sadat’s Camp David Accords (1978), and accelerated under Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime until the breakdown of his regime in 2011. The period prior to the 
liberalization coincided with Nasser’ rule; it was characterized by policies of central 
planning (1956-70). The liberalization policies coincided with Sadat’s (1970–81) and 
Mubarak’s (1981–2011) presidencies. Liberalization during Sadat’s period was marked by 
the adoption of Infitah (an open-door policy) but the process did facilitate the emergence 
of a real independent private sector and led to macroeconomic instability. The acceleration 
of the liberalization-privatization process in the aftermath of the Camp David Accords 
(early 80s), supported by international institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, however, produced new windows of opportunity for the 
capture of state resources by elite networks with linkages to the state. This process of rapid 
reform continued under Mubarak’s rule and led to the further expansion of the Egyptian 
Armed Forces in Egypt’s economic, and, later, political domains.  
DV (prior to liberalization): Since 1952 until 1978, and primarily during Nasser’s 
rule, the military was assigned an economic development role and was tasked to provide 
its own budget. It was politically subordinate and upheld the values of the revolution.  
DV (post-liberalization): Since late 1978 (post-Camp David), the military expanded 
its economic power. The capabilities increased primarily due to foreign aid. The military 
remained ideologically subordinate to the values of the regime. Since 1981, During 
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Mubarak’s rule (1981–2011), however, the military further expanded its economic power, 
as well as its political power and ultimately assumed the state’s control during and after 
the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. The military’s functional capabilities did not register radical 
changes. The military behaved as a self-interested institution; it took over the state 
primarily, maintained its economic interests, and expanded its businesses.   
China: Mao’s rule (1945–1976) was the period of economic centralization and 
military’s involvement in development projects. This period resembles Rafsanjani’s 
presidency in Iran and Nasser’s rule in Egypt. Liberalization started in 1979, during Deng’s 
rule, and led to the expansion of PLA businesses. This period was marked by the formation 
of the PLA’s economic conglomerates. Meanwhile, it was also noticeable for the spread of 
corruption and the engagement of the PLA in illegal activities such as smuggling. 
Following the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, however, a subsequent backlash among 
the Chinese Communist Party’s elite against liberalization and resulting purges in the 
military, China adopted a policy of reforming the PLA’s economic activities. The reform 
process, however, intensified in 1998 and led to the near eradication of the PLA’s economic 
power and the restoration of civilian supremacy in the economic domain.  
DV (prior to liberalization): From 1945, during Mao’s rule, the PLA was assigned 
the development task of rebuilding the country but also was expected to generate its own 
income. The PLA was institutionally autonomous and politically subordinate. It upheld the 
values of the revolution. 
DV (post-liberalization): Since 1979, during Deng’s rule (from 1979–1989), the 
military gained economic autonomy but was politically subordinate to the civilians. The 
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PLA commercialized and gained economic autonomy through the process of gradual 
privatization; China experienced the rise of a private sector parallel to the public sector. 
Since 1998, during Zemin’s rule, the PLA’s began divesting its businesses; the PLA 
became subordinate to the civilians in the political and social domains; its functional 
capabilities increased. 
Alternative Hypotheses 
The literature assuming globalization as an inevitable process (race-to-bottom 
literature) (Hirst 2009, Cerny 1995) or works such as Bunce and Wolchik’s (2010) on 
transnational norm diffusions  argue that the pressure of liberalization produces a race to 
the bottom, pushing states to liberalize their economic and political systems. Subsequently, 
the spread of democratization and the liberalization of domestic political systems, or 
international norm diffusion, should impact civil–military relations. The expectation in this 
race-to-the-bottom literature is democratization of civil–military relations with civilians 
gaining more autonomy vis-à-vis civilians.  
Alternative hypothesis#1: Changes in civilian control are dependent on the degree 
of political liberalization that states have undergone due to the spread of globalization. In 
states with a greater degree of political liberalization, militaries are politically less 
autonomous, culturally more democratic, and functionally more capable.  
Note: In line with the literature of democratization and political liberalization, the 
alternative hypothesis 1 would suggest a causal pathway whereby political liberalization is 
the most determinant variable in explaining civil-military relations.   
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Falsified if: (i) There is political liberalization but civil–military relations have not 
changed. (ii) There is no evidence of democratization but the political control of the 
military has decreased. Or there is political liberalization but the military has gained more 
political power. 
Regarding the professionalization thesis, Huntington’s (1957) concept of objective 
control underscores professionalization as an important factor determining civil-military 
relations. Based on Huntington’s professionalization thesis, once militaries 
professionalize, there should be an expectation for increased objective control, or increased 
civilian control, over militaries, regardless of economic liberalization.  
Alternative hypothesis #2: Changes in the civilian control are dependent on the 
degree of militaries’ professionalization. In states where militaries are professionalized and 
modernized, there is a lower likelihood for the military to interfere in politics. 
Falsified if: (i) military is professionalized but the degree of civilian control is the same or 
has declined. (ii) There is equifinality. There is increase in the degree of political control 
but the cause is another variable, meaning the professionalization is a development parallel 
to other variables that determined changes in the CMR. 
Data Collection  
In this study, I use processes-tracing to find the political critical junctions in each 
case. In order to identify the causal chains or causal mechanism between the independent 
and dependent variables (George and Bennett 2005, 206), method of process-tracing assists 
researchers in “figuring out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction 
with which simple principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to 
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generate the observed sequence of events.” (emphasize added, cited in George and Bennett 
2005, 206). Through process-tracing, the researcher assesses the alternative causal 
pathways to rule out equifinality; it allows the researcher to identify the causal process that 
determined the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005, 207). This study utilizes the 
method of process-tracing to rule out explanations based on political variables such as 
regime type, institutional engineering, or inter-elite relations. Instead, it identifies the 
economic variables as the most determinant causes in explaining the behavior of 
economically-active militaries.   
I use library research to gather data on IVs and DVs. I utilize Persian-language 
books published by Iranian economists on Iran’s economic trajectory, news sources such 
as Persian-language sources of BBC Persian Television, Deutsche Welle’s Persian service, 
Radio Farda, Radio Zamaneh, Entekhab newspaper, Roozonline, Rajanews, and others, as 
well as information available in the websites of the IRGC.   
I also use English-language newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal, Business 
Insider, The Washington Post, Public Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) Frontline and Tehran 
Bureau, The Cable News Network (CNN), Bloomberg (world news), Al-Monitor, and Al 
Jazeera. Reports by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), RAND Corporation, and the International 
Institute for Security Studies (IISS). 
These sources are used to find evidence of (i) economic policies, (ii) primary 
discussions among local economists or influential elites in the countries under study: 
criticisms, compliments, or recommendations, and (iii) statements made by state officials, 
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including the militaries, with regard to the militaries’ businesses, politics, or other aspects 
of control under study.
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Chapter 3: People’s Liberation Army’s Inability to Compete in China’s Competitive 
Economy and Divestiture in 1998 
 
Introduction 
Why did the People’s Liberation Army in 1998 relinquish its business holdings and 
submit to the civilians’ will, despite its ability to leverage its economic power for political 
gains? This chapter examines mechanisms behind the expansion and retrenchment of 
PLA’s businesses in the context of China’s economic trajectory. It argues that the pace of 
liberalization and modes of privatization in China created conditions whereby the drive for 
competitiveness via productivity improvements and export-promotion motivated firms’ 
behavior. In the context of a consensus over China’s need to modernize and integrate in 
the global economy, competitiveness was incentivized, which in its turn rewarded 
instrumental profit-maximizing behavior for firms. The PLA was not exempt from 
competitive forces. Its decision to return to barracks during the 1998 divestiture campaign 
was a consequence of both the state’s assertiveness in implementing market reforms and 
the PLA’s inability to run its businesses effectively in a competitive economy.  
The first section of this chapter outlines the Chinese economic trajectory that 
conditioned the PLA’s business expansion and later its contraction. The subsequent 
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sections explain the causal mechanisms—the impact of economic liberalization—on the 
variation in the dependent variables of political, functional, and social control. 
Economic Reform Processes and the PLA’s Economic Behavior  
The Chinese economic trajectory gradually departed from central planning, and 
assumed liberalization policies since 1978. China adopted an Open-Door Policy that 
combined a gradual trade liberalization with careful experimentation with reforming 
domestic institutions and regulatory frameworks. A significant consequence of this 
cautious liberalization has been China’s relative ability in fostering productive capacities 
of firms, encouraging competition, and relatively strengthening market mechanisms. 
Parallel to this process of economic reform, the Chinese Communist Party ordered the 
expansion of PLA businesses into new sectors, such as international trade and 
manufacturing. This economic role-expansion occurred under conditions of a liberalizing 
economy; the specifics of the PLA’s role-expansion reflects the overall characteristics of 
China’s economic liberalization. This section will explain Chinese economic trajectory and 
the process of the PLA’s economic role-expansion. 
China set the primacy of a state-led economic liberalization and adopted a reform 
strategy of “gradualism” (Chow 2004), “segmented deregulation” (Zweig and Zhimin, 
2007), or what became known as “socialist commodity economy” and ultimately “socialist 
market economy5”. In China, there emerged what King and Szelenyi (2005) would name 
“hybrid capitalism” or “capitalism from below”, a system of co-existence between the 
                                                
5 Vogel, Deng and Transformation of China, 682. A concept introduced by Jiang Zemin in 1992 to replace 
“planned socialist market economy”; it was introduced in the 14th Party Congress. 
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public and a growing private sector. New private property owners emerged gradually, and 
the market economy operated alongside the old redistributive system, which also became 
reliant on market mechanisms (King and Szelenyi 2005, 211). This hybrid system6 did not 
fully prevent clientalism but limited it significantly; it also facilitated a high capacity 
developmental state (Harris 2013, 66). This was a significant development since the PLA 
as an economic actor also operated in this increasingly competitive economy, and hence, 
had fewer opportunities to pressure the civilians for economic gains.  
The first aspect of economic liberalization was decentralization of authority over 
foreign trade via empowering non-central government actors, i.e. “provinces, 
municipalities, industrial sectors, and enterprises” (Song 2012, 74). This policy of trade 
decentralization broke the monopoly that state trading companies enjoyed. It allowed new 
state agencies, various levels of government, and industrial ventures to engage in trading 
(Chin 2007, 157).  To attract foreign capital, China permitted joint ventures’ formation or 
foreign-run businesses; it offered preferential treatment to foreign investors, such as 
allowing exports for hard currency, encouraging export by tax holidays, lowering tax rates, 
and reducing tariffs. It also encouraged modernization of infrastructure, and promoted 
flexible wage and labor policies, and less bureaucracy. In return, its SEZs were expected 
to receive foreign capital7, foreign management skills and new technologies (Marti 2002, 
                                                
6 Harris uses King and Szelenyi’s (2005) Capitalist Development Pathways typology for his argument.    
 
7 World Bank, Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows. For example, according to the World Bank data, the 
FDI inflows increased from $430 million in 1982 to $43.751 billion in 1998. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=CN 
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7-8). In accordance with this overall reform strategy, the Communist Party also sanctioned 
PLA’s extensive entrance into new economic domains, which led to both decentralization 
of PLA’s economic activities and joint-venture formation.  
In 1985, government and the military issued the ‘Provisional Instructions 
Concerning the Army’s Engagement in Production, Business and Foreign Trade’ that 
officially ordered the expansion of the military’s economic activities (Cheung 2003, 53). 
The decentralization strategy led to the establishment of the PLA business at lower levels 
of its organization, such as regional unit-level businesses. The PLA also began forming 
joint-ventures. Bickford (1994) categorizes PLA ventures into levels of (i) businesses 
mainly administered8 by General Logistics Department (GLD), (ii) collective enterprises 
of individual units, and (iii) joint ventures. Furthermore, extending beyond generating 
funds and operating in domestic market, these ventures entered the international domain, 
and operated under conditions of the market economy (Bickford 1994, 461). Newly-
established PLA firms also varied in their sizes. While regional and unit level firms were 
small or mid-sized, the PLA established 20 conglomerates until 1993 (Mulvenon 2001, 
104).  
Therefore, following decentralization and trade liberalization, the PLA businesses 
turned “from a relatively primitive system of farms and factories to a multi-billion-dollar 
international business empire of unit-, region-, and sector-based conglomerates, designed 
to centralize control of enterprises and exploit economies of scale” from 1978 to 1998 
                                                
8 Bickford, Chinese Military and Its Business Operations, 461. Although some were also run by the 
General Staff Headquarters and the General Political Department.  
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(2001, 136). The PLA firms consisted of ventures operating in diverse sectors of economy, 
were owned by various levels of military establishment (national, regional, or local units), 
and had different sizes (small, medium, or conglomerates). 
The striking outcome of the Chinese economic trajectory was the government’s 
support for proliferation of new economic actors that operated alongside its old public 
sector. In fact, the process of economic reform in China did not encompass rapid 
privatization programs common in many post-communist states, or in both Iran and Egypt. 
Along with strengthening of its local governments, China also reformed its public sector. 
With regard to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), however, the process of reform did not 
include an ambitious privatization plan; discussions on privatizing ensued in later stages of 
liberalization, mainly in the 90s. Support for the emergence of new economic actors along 
with a delayed process of SOEs’ privatization reduced opportunities for asset-stripping or 
capture of state resources in China by economic actors, including the PLA.  
 The initial policy of SOE reform focused on adopting “the responsibility system” 
in 1978—that was granting a selected number of SOEs autonomy9 in determining their 
plans for production, marketing, employment, and technological innovation (Huang 2012, 
99).  The reforms in the 80s gradually increased SOEs’ domain of responsibilities; they did 
not eliminate state ownership; instead, China adopted the “contract system” consisting five 
contract types with specified responsibilities and rights for the enterprises (Huang 2012, 
102). But, the process of privatization did not accelerate until the 90s, more specifically 
                                                
9 Chow, Economic Reform and Growth in China, 130. Under the responsibility system, SOEs paid fixed 
state taxes and had autonomy over their spending. 
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under Jiang Zemin’s10 leadership (1989-2002). In the 90s, the discussion centered on 
property rights11 reform; since 1994, a policy known as “emphasizing the big and 
liberalizing the small” (Huang 2012, 105) guided the state’s privatization plans; the 
government sanctioned the maintenance of 1000 SOEs via a shareholding system, whereas 
smaller and medium-sized SOEs were privatized (Huang 2012, 105-106). This strategy of 
gradual privatization limited the PLA’s opportunities to assume ownership of the SOEs.  
In China, unlike cases of Iran and Egypt, the process of privatization did not lead to transfer 
of SOEs to government-affiliated groups, such as crony-networks or the military. The 
overall outcome has been relative strengthening of the private sector and emergence of 
small economic actors. For example, half of China’s GDP in the early 1980s was produced 
by small or mid-sized firms in the service sector and the household farming agricultural 
sector. 40 percent of industrial production was by what could be accounted as small sized 
firms in industrially advanced states (Yusuf et al 2006, 52). This development impacted 
the PLA’s economic production as well. 
Throughout the process of reform, the PLA transformed itself from what Cheung 
calls “a military production complex” to “a military business complex” (Cheung 2001, 20).  
According to Cheung’s classification, PLA’s businesses encompassed army-owned 
companies (mainly in service sector), foreign trade companies, along with hotels and 
                                                
10 Mulvenon and Yang 2002, The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, 7. Run by Central Military 
Commission’s members, General Logistics Department is one of four general departments (Staff, Political, 
and Equipment) that engage in policy-making for the PLA.  
 
11 Huang, State-Owned Enterprise Reform, 105. The debate was divided into three strands—some linked 
SOE efficiency to full autonomy in decision-making, others argued for privatization or divestiture, while 
another group blamed inefficiencies on the uncompetitive environment, and not on ownership.  
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transportation businesses, military personnel centers, and hospitals (2001, 29-31). For 
example, by acknowledging the primacy of foreign trade, PLA’s central headquarters 
departments founded trading companies, such as Polytechnologies Ltd., China Xiaofeng 
Ltd., and Xinxing Corp. as PLA’s main trading bodies. Trade, however, was not limited to 
central headquarters; regional level companies were also eligible to trade. Military units in 
the regions began establishing small hotels, transportation companies, local stores, and 
hospitals (Cheung 2001, 29-30). 
PLA’s enterprises substantially grew in agriculture, industry and service sector. In 
agriculture, establishment of fisheries, animal husbandries, food crops, and cash crops 
extended PLA’s enterprises beyond historically limited agricultural production such as 
farming, fishing, or livestock breeding. In industry, PLA owed small or mid-sized firms in 
mining or manufacturing. These firms produced vehicles, pharmaceuticals, textiles, 
building materials, machinery, and chemicals. For example, 3700 factories were under 
PLA’s control by 1987 producing 62 percent of PLA’s total economic output value. In 
service industry as well, PLA ventures grew impressively in areas of hotel and boarding 
services, health services (hospitals), real estate, transportation, and technologies and 
communications among others (Mulvenon 2001, 86-95). 
Table 2: PLA’s Expansion into New Economic Sectors 
Industry Service Sector Agriculture Int’l Trade 
vehicles, 
pharmaceuticals, 
textiles, building 
materials, 
machinery, and 
chemicals 
hotel and boarding 
services, health 
services (hospitals), 
real estate, 
transportation, and 
technologies and 
communications 
fisheries, animal 
husbandries, food 
crops, and cash 
crops 
Polytechnologies 
Ltd., China 
Xiaofeng Ltd., 
Xinxing Corp. 
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Alongside decentralization and cautions privatization, China also adopted an 
export-oriented strategy. This strategy, incentivized by a foreign exchange rate policy, 
empowered local governments and private enterprises to engage in international trade and 
exports (Song 2012, 74). Subsequently, non-central government bodies and non-state 
actors had to learn to adapt to new circumstances of the international markets. Not only the 
reform facilitated origination of economic actors that were not linked to the central 
government, it allowed them to assume responsibilities as traders; their success depended 
on their performance and their profitability rather than selective protectionism. The PLA’s 
businesses also operated in this gradually liberalizing economy; their survival, similar to 
other economic actors, depended on their ability to compete with an emerging private 
sector. 
 Regardless of size or their ownership, all PLA enterprises also began pursuing 
profitability instead of merely generating fund for the military. Since 1985, with the 
decision of the Central Military Commission, PLA’s mission was altered:  instead of 
protecting the state from a possible nuclear attack, PLA was assigned the task of aiding the 
civilian economy.  In the context of demobilization of PLA soldiers, and general emphasis 
on self-employment and productivity, PLA both reintegrated its discharged soldiers in 
businesses and focused on profitability as a goal (Karmel 1997, 105-107). PLA’s focus on 
profitability was an offshoot of Chinese governments’ continued support for marketization 
and increased competitiveness.  
Examining the process of economic liberalization in China reveals a consistent 
effort to support to encourage competitiveness, within which the PLA businesses had to 
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operate. The data on China’s economic performance supports above conclusion. World 
Economic Forum’s growth competitiveness rank suggests China’s increasing economic 
competitiveness. 
World Bank data also suggests incremental improvements in the GDP growth, 
capital inflows, and domestic credit to the private sector. 
Table 3: China’s GDP Growth, Domestic Credit to Private Sector, FDI inflows (1980-
2015) 
China 1980 1990 2000 2015 
GDP growth $ 191.15 
Billion 
$360.859 
Billion 
$1.211 Trillion $11.065 
Trillion 
Domestic 
Credit to 
Private 
Sector (% of 
GDP) 
 
52.627 
 
86.2 
 
111.123 
 
152.552 
FDI (net 
inflows) 
$ 430 Million 
(in 1982) 
$ 3.487 Billion $ 42.095 
Billion 
$242.489 
Billion 
 
From 2010 to 2012, 90% of the Chinese exports were produced by the private 
sector. In addition, it was private sector that produced two-thirds/ three-quarter of Chinese 
GDP in the same period. While agricultural sector employs 33% of the labor force, service 
sector and industry employ 36.1% and 30.01% respectively. 9.2% of the GDP production 
is provided by agricultural sector, whereas service sector produces 48.1% and industry 
produces 42.7% of the GDP by 201612. China has also registered advancements in the 
domain of new technologies and research and design.  
                                                
12 Eckart, Jonathan, “8 Things You Need to Know About China’s Economy”, World Economic Forum, 
June 23, 2016. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/8-facts-about-chinas-economy/ 
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Table 4:World Economic Forum, China’s indicators of Competitiveness in the last 
decade 
 2004/2005(out 
of 104 states) 
2005/2006 (out 
of 117 states) 
2017(out of 134 
states)13 
Company spending 
on R&D 
72 (93) 31 (35) 25 
Firm-level tech. 
absorption 
37 (48) 37 (42) 60 
FDI and Tech. 
transfer 
44 (51) 57 (65) 59 
 
Due to reforms, China registered both “extensive growth” and “intensive 
growth”—increased factor input, and growing productivity and efficacy. IMF analysis 
challenges the conventional wisdom attributing the growth mainly to capital increase and 
labor inputs. While these factors contributed to the growth, “improvements in productivity 
and efficiency” were essential to the success of Chinese reform. Restructuring of resources, 
a shift away from agriculture to the more productive sector of manufacturing was central 
to growth. Non-state sector development, as well as marketization, has also boosted 
productivity. The declining share of SOEs in industrial production, and the increasing role 
of non-state enterprises, demonstrate the impact of opening and gradual marketization. 
Therefore, growth has not been solely a result of capital accumulation but also caused by 
“productivity gains resulting from sectorial reallocation, market-oriented reforms, 
technical progress, and external opening” (1997, 123-124).  
 Scholars emphasize the significance of competitiveness and contribution of non-
state actors to Chinese economic production. Cao (1996) argues that economic 
                                                
13 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index: China, 2016-2017 edition, 
http://reports.weforum.org/pdf/gci-2016-2017/WEF_GCI_2016_2017_Profile_CHN.pdf 
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advancement, whether at regional, sectorial, or enterprise levels, was determined 
predominately by market dynamics. For instance, a cluster of profitable businesses with 
various ownerships, i.e. state-owned, collectives, funded by foreign partners, townships, or 
enterprises owned privately, all shared the strategy of utilizing competitive market forces. 
Adjusting to market alterations, and meanwhile extricating oneself from state’s designated 
tasks, allocation of fixed-priced materials drove the success. Marketization encouraged 
innovation and helped enterprises to reify their capacities; evidence from China illuminates 
the vigor of market-oriented policies in pursuit of actualizing a socialist market economy 
(Cao, 1996, 3-4). 
Yusuf et al. (2006) also concluded that small profit-maximizing units controlled 
three quarters of Chinese economy in the early 1980s. This process of reform also 
fashioned macroeconomic stability during the initial years. There were low levels of price 
increase and inflation. The state provided pensions and benefits for SOEs’ workers, and 
suppressed urban industrial labor growth.  The banking system did not suffer from the 
burden of unprofitable assets. If SOEs could not return their capital loans to the banks, the 
state covered. The Chinese state also did not have any international debts during initial 
years, and hence, was for the most part macro-economically stable (Yusuf et al. 2006, 52-
53).  
The ultimate outcome has been (i) the emergence of a private sector operating along 
with the public one with the private sector producing 90% of China’s exports by 201514, 
                                                
14 Tsai, The State of China’s Economic Miracle,144. 
http://nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/free/091715/AsiaPolicy20_BookReview_Roundtable_July2015.pdf 
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(ii) the dominance of mainly small or mid-sized level businesses in this domain, and (iii) 
gradual property rights’ reform delaying/or limiting opportunities for state-level colossal 
cliental networks’ formation. In this economic environment, firms’ operation under new 
conditions depended on their ability to maximize profits. While PLA’s businesses grew 
drastically post-liberalization, under conditions of emerging market economy, PLA as an 
economic actor as well had to abide by rules of the new system. Hence, based on the 
conclusions from Chinese economic policies, what were the implications of these reforms, 
the gradual movement towards a competitive economy, for the PLA’s economic activities 
and the question of the political control?  
The Political Control of the PLA 
This section tests hypothesis number one (H1) on political control of the PLA. If 
the economic liberalization and privatization led to the establishment of a competitive 
market economy, the PLA had limited opportunities to translate its economic power into a 
political one. The outcome was increased civilian control. The independent variable is the 
specific nature of economic liberalization, and subsequent competitiveness, discussed in 
the last section. The increase in the civilian control of the PLA is the dependent variable. 
Since the PLA’s businesses were unable to compete as profitable enterprises in an 
increasingly competitive economy, the PLA could not leverage its economic power for 
political gains. In a relatively competitive economy, the PLA became dependent on the 
civilians’ demands, divested its businesses, and returned to barracks.  
Regarding Chinese civil-military relations, scholars observed changes in the 
civilian control of the PLA in the late 90s and early 2000s. There is a consensus suggesting 
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an observable increased civilian control over the PLA and a reduction in the PLA’s political 
clout in the following decade of liberalization. There has been an increase in the degree of 
the civilian control along two dimensions: responsiveness and military’s assumption of 
governmental positions. My dissertation, specifically, focuses on the success of divestiture 
as a critical event signaling an increasing PLA responsiveness to their civilians’ demands.  
Historically, Chinese militaries engaged in agricultural or industrial production to 
fund themselves. This tradition of self-financing continued in the Maoist era15; PLA 
participated in the economy to fund itself and to assist with the implementation of 
developmental projects (Mulvenon 2001, 36). However, under Deng’s leadership since 
1978, the scope of PLA’s economic engagement changed; the PLA businesses proliferation 
in diverse economic sectors. Hence, the PLA’s decision to divest its businesses in the 1998 
was a puzzling political outcome, especially given both the historical tradition of militaries’ 
participation in the economy, as well as the PLA’s transformation into an economic 
conglomerate. Contemporary reports on divestiture indicated a politically risky decision. 
Analysts of Chinese politics (1999) characterized it as “one of the biggest gambles” 
(Lawrence and Gilley 1999, par. 1) of Zemin’s career, as well as “one of the most painful 
and acrimonious initiatives” of his rule.  
In examining changes in China’s civil-military relations (CMR), scholars have 
studied political variables, such as inter-elite relations, Chinese Communist Party’s 
institutionalization, state capacity-building, and professionalization of the military as 
                                                
15 Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune, 36. Securing resources for the Korean War, reducing budgetary pressures 
on the state, and Mao’s usage of the military as a means for development justified PLA’s participation in 
the economy.  
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determining variables. In explaining the divestiture, scholars draw on the above approaches 
and offer political explanations for the PLA’s divestiture. In my research, I depart from 
those explanations that underscore the role of above-mentioned political variables in the 
success of divestiture. Instead, I put the locus of explanation on economic variables. I do 
not dismiss the roles of political institutions, state-level changes, and professionalization, 
but I argue that the success of divestiture—and succeeding increased political control over 
the PLA—was a consequence of economic policies discussed in the previous section. In 
this section, I explain why the PLA was not successful in transforming its economic role 
into a political one and increasing its leverage over the civilians. Or in other words, I 
explain how economic considerations played a crucial role in the PLA’s decision-making 
process pushing it to forgo its businesses in 1998. 
By testing the H1, I illustrate that the most determinant cause explaining the PLA’s 
compliance with divestiture was the cost-effectiveness of maintaining its businesses in a 
newly emerging competitive economy. The political variables of PLA’s 
professionalization and transformation of elite relations were parallel developments that 
contributed to the PLA’s compliance with the divestiture. Hence, the evidence suggests 
that the PLA’s economic behavior, i.e. its willingness to divest is businesses, was a 
consequence of economic policies, and the PLA’s economic cost–benefit considerations. 
The outcome was increased civilian control and the PLA’s return to the domain of defense.  
As mentioned before, in order to explain PLA loyalty to the Chinese Communist 
Party, especially after termination of Mao’s, and to an extent Deng’s personalistic rules, 
approaches to the study of CMR place the locus of explanation on political variables. 
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Kiselycznyk and Saunders (2010) categorize Chinese CMR analysis into traditional, 
combination, and contemporary approaches. The traditional approaches (1989-1995) 
include the factional model, symbiosis, professional, and party control 1989-1995. The 
combination approach (1995-1997) merges the above models. Finally, contemporary 
approaches (1998-2003) focus on the PLA’s social or economic linkages, but offer no 
analytical models (Kiselycznyk and Saunders 2010, 11). The factional model examines 
elite factions’ rivalries, while coalition models underscore cooperation by considering the 
party and the military as functionally separate institutions. Party control models also focus 
on Chinese institutions, specifically on institutional peculiarities determining the CMR. 
The symbiosis model16 hypothesizes the functional inseparability of the two institutions, 
and their ambiguously delineated boundaries due to elites’ movement across institutions in 
earlier decades of the CCP rule. 
To explain the change from symbiosis to an increasing bifurcation of elite relations 
in the mid-90s, scholars studied professionalization as an independent variable. For 
example, Kiselycznyk and Saunders (2010) summarize works of Harlan Jencks, Ellis Joffe, 
and Paul Godwin. These scholars challenge Huntington’s view on professionalism and 
argue that in the case of China, PLA has been a “political force” but its main motivation 
has been retaining its institutional interests. Labeling it “political quiescence17”, the PLA 
has primarily been concerned with improving its defense capabilities. These scholars 
                                                
16 Kiselycznyk and Saunders, Civil Military Relations in China, 13. Also known as “dual elite role” or 
“interlocking directorate”.  
 
17 Cited in Kiselycznyk and Saunders, Civil Military Relations in China, 15. A characterization offered by 
Jencks.  
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identify the party-army relations as a “red versus expert” relations (cited in Kiselycznyk 
and Saunders 2010, 15). When explaining the divestiture of 1998, the scholars also draw 
on above CMR models to explain the PLA’s behavior.  
For example, Lee (2006) uses the bifurcation model to explain the success of 
divestiture. Lee (2006) uses Huntington’s notion of subjective control but with a caveat—
“strategic subjective control”. Strategic subjective control suggests a shift from subjective 
personal control to an institutional subjective control coupled with professionalization of 
the PLA. Deng exercised subjective personal control. Professionalization in Chinese 
context meant development of institutional mechanisms, bifurcation of civilian and 
military institutions, rather than adoption of democratic normative values. Hence, “Pulling 
in” of the PLA into the economy in 1979 during Deng, and its “pulling out” during Zemin 
in 1998 illustrated civilian elites’ ability to utilize the military in times of transition (Lee 
2006, 440-449). While my dissertation does not dispute the gradual bifurcation of China’s 
civil-military relations, it challenges the view that assumes a professionalizing PLA would 
prefer to focus on defense only. Why would not an economic conglomerate retain its 
businesses if it was generating enough profits to fund its defense-related activities?  
Explanations based on professionalization thesis do not address four relevant 
matters: (i) initial negotiations between the civilians and the military included a promise 
by the government to offer a compensation package to the PLA in return for divesting its 
businesses, (ii) the civilians began the process of divesting businesses in the mid 1980s—
a process known as rectification. The rectification campaign was not as successful as 
divestiture due to resistance from the military. Unless one can prove that the PLA’s degree 
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of professionalization changed dramatically within a decade, one cannot attribute a causal 
relation between professionalization and divestiture. (iii) PLA’s involvement in economic 
activity was in accordance with Chinese militaries’ tradition of self-sufficiency. What 
change forced the PLA to break from its tradition of self-financing? (iv) Ultimately, if 
professionalization was the cause for divestiture, then why were there reports of tensions 
between the civilians and military leaders over divestiture?  
I argue that the PLA’s willingness to divest its businesses was not mere 
subservience to civilian leaders’ needs but a strategic choice made in accordance with the 
broader consensus on encouraging competitiveness. Given China’s steady progress 
towards global economic integration, and an incremental but consistent process of 
liberalization despite political or economic obstacles, one can conclude there was a 
consensus within the society and among the elite to continue the path towards 
marketization. In the context of this consensus, the PLA’s mid- and small-sized ventures’ 
inability to compete effectively was deemed economically costly.  
The state’s assertiveness in fostering competitiveness, discussed in detail in the 
previous section, the requirement of competiveness to succeed in this new economic 
system, and limited opportunities for asset-stripping made the PLA’s businesses reliant on 
market forces for profitability. In the context of the emerging competitive private sector, 
running parallel to the public one, as well as carefully executed privatization that gradually 
transformed the property rights, the PLA fell short of efficiently performing the two tasks 
of defense and economic production. Divestiture was the logical outcome, despite the poor 
compensation package. There is ample evidence supporting this conclusion.  
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For example, PLA’s firms’ annual revenues increased from 1986 to 1995 by 20 
percent on average. This growth however declined to 5.5 percent from 1994 to 1996. PLA’s 
ability to fund itself also declined since 1990.  Their after-tax profits (as percentage of 
defense expenditure) was 3.34% in 1985. Those profits reached to 12% in 1989; from 1990 
to 1992, PLA’s profits were about 11%. However, by 1996, the profits fell to 7.36% 
(Cheung 2001, 150). The PLA firms’ performance began to decline.  Two-third of PLA 
factories were registering losses. Although the service industry was the most profitable 
sector, it comprised only 40% of the PLA profits, while firms in this sector were prone to 
corruption and tax evasion (Cheung 2001, 151). 
Reports indicated both low levels of productivity and presence of corrupt practices. 
For example, with regard to PLA firms’ competitiveness, Mulvenon (2001) reviews PLA 
firms’ sector-level productivity. The government was concerned for decentralized and 
uncoordinated nature of PLA businesses, as well as the their “poor integration”, which led 
to low output. For example, Larger PLA enterprises in the late 80s produced one-third less 
than other SOEs (Cheung 2001, 42-44). In the agricultural sector, despite regulations and 
organizational reforms to improve PLA firms’ agricultural production, the overall profit 
was low. Since this sector was not as lucrative, the crime in this economic domain was 
relatively lower too (Mulvenon 2001). However, both corruption and misconduct at various 
levels were detrimental for PLA businesses’ profitability. Discussing the PLA businesses’ 
losses, Karmel explains, “the high profits and taxes from some businesses… [were] almost 
certainly eaten away by high expenses and losses.” While one-third of state businesses 
registered losses, the PLA’s enterprises’ profits were less than average relative to other 
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state-owned ones, with more than 40 percent of its businesses losing money in the 1990s 
(Karmel 1997, 110-111). 
Cheung (2001) divides PLA businesses’ growth into two periods coinciding with 
the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), and part of the Eight Five-Year Plan (1991-
1993). From 1986 to 1990, the government encouraged emergence of new PLA enterprises, 
which facilitated a fast growth of service sector firms in the coastal regions; the regional 
military units owned these firms and earned seven times more profits (also paid taxes) in 
1990 than they did in 1985. Like township and village enterprises (TVEs), 90 percent of 
these firms were small-sized (low capital and small labor size) and primarily mushroomed 
in the regions. Producing cheap labor-intensive goods, these firms were primarily 
autonomous with low government support. Due to lack of adequate government 
monitoring, however, in a few years, these firms began engaging in illicit activities, 
specifically smuggling of illegal goods.  
Furthermore, competition in the market economy created new demands. Local 
businessmen and regional governments expected the PLA to compete fairly and to give-up 
its monopolies. An evidence of such change in attitudes was local Shanxi Province’s local 
government’s demand to end PLA’s monopoly over mines. PLA owned overall 150 major 
mines and sold its products either to the government or in the market. Officials of Shanxi 
Province, however, demanded the Central Government to stop PLA’s price manipulations. 
To resolve the tensions, the Central Government ordered the PLA to transfer more than 
sixthly mines to the local officials (Mulvenon 2001, 94).  
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Ultimately, various PLA companies and enterprises competed with one another 
over market share. Mulvenon (1997) questioned the conventional wisdom that considered 
the PLA’s enterprises as part of “a larger commercially-oriented strategy”. He identified 
three kinds of businesses in China: defense-industrial companies18, military companies19, 
and civilian ones. Military businesses were run by non-civilians. The bureaucracy20 in 
charge of the defense-industrial companies is distinct, unlike the popular belief. These 
businesses are bureaucratically separated; their profits allocations are disjointed as well. 
The author suggests that even military-related companies competed for market-share in 
both China and the US, and should be viewed as competitors rather than cooperators (1997, 
5-9).  
Mulvenon’s conclusion implies that PLA’s corporate activities were uncoordinated 
and competed over market share. “There is little centralized coordination among the 
literally thousands of businesses with military affiliations”, reported the BBC, describing 
how individual or retired officers, or even civilians run these ventures, and the GLD was 
unaware of the actual numbers of these businesses. June Teufel Dreyer, an expert on 
Chinese politics, referred to the PLA as an entrepreneurial army resembling “feudal 
                                                
18 Mulvenon, Professionalization of Chinese Officer Corps, 5-9. Defense industrial companies were civilian 
and accountable to ministers, or the Premier as the head of the government’s State Council.  
 
19 Mulvenon, 1997, 5-6three General Departments (Staff, Political, and Logistical), military regions and 
districts, reserve or active-duty personnel of three branches of military, as well as Strategic Rocket Forces, 
are authorized to engage in regulated economic activities. They pay taxes to General Logistics Department 
(GLD) and reinvest their profits on improving themselves. 
 
20 The Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) was founded 
in 1982 to centralize supervision over defense-industrial companies and respond to the Central Council and 
Central Military Commission, which made many believe that defense-industrial companies’ proceeds are 
directed to the PLA. 
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Chinese warlords”. ‘It’s not a state within a state, but fiefdoms within a state’, states Dreyer 
in an interview to BBC21. Uncoordinated and market-reliant, PLA businesses were 
pressured to operate as profitable firms. The PLA started generating income but it also 
began grappling with corruption and losses, especially at lower levels. The presented data 
thus far suggests unprofitability and uncompetitive nature of the PLA businesses operating 
in an increasingly competitive economy. Unable to compete effectively, the PLA’s 
complied with the civilians.  
Scholars also have cited the costliness of maintaining the PLA businesses as a 
justification for divestiture. For example, Bingman (2009) analyzes SOEs’ costliness. He 
states that the SOEs, including the PLA businesses, were extremely incompetent and 
operated with deficits; the money spent on maintaining these businesses diverted resources 
from in the military. Additionally, there was a system of subsidies keeping these PLA 
businesses afloat. The businesses that were profitable produced civilian goods. Hence, it 
was reasonable to divest them by returning them to the competitive civilian sector 
(Bingman 2009, 98). In agreement with Bingman’s assessment, my central argument also 
suggests that the PLA’s inability to profit from its businesses was the reason behind its 
willingness to divest its businesses. The implication of this economic behavior on civil-
military relations was increasing PLA’s dependence on the civilians for both funding and 
legitimacy.  
                                                
21 “Business, the Economy: China’s Army Goes Out of Business”, bbc.com, December 15, 
1998.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/235592.stm 
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The divestiture campaign was a direct response to the dangers of corruption on 
functionality of market and competition. Since the central government collected revenues 
through tariffs, and relied on taxation money collected from SOEs, smuggling impacted 
the state budget (Yang 2004, 115). The conflict of interests between central and local 
governments led the central government to begin a crackdown on illicit activities in 1990s, 
particularly under Zemin after the CCP meeting in mid-July 1998. Like other institutions, 
the PLA was also ordered to put its house in order. (Yang 2004, 118). The extensive and 
heavy-handed crackdown was set in motion by employing the whole machinery of the 
state. The purpose of the crackdown was not solely saving the state revenue. The civilians 
led by Zemin were concerned about the role of businesses run by the military, the police, 
the judiciary, and various government and party institutions since they impeded market 
functionality. the process of marketization due to utilization of their privileges or because 
of existing corruption. For instance, even in 1989, Wang Mengkui, a State Council advisor 
warned about the dangers of corruption in the PLA both for morale and for its impact on 
the development of market institutions (Yang, 126). Yang argues that the character of 
divestiture, its “swift implementation,” illustrated the primacy of political decision-making 
and civilian elites’ assertiveness (Yang 2004, 134). In addition, the divestiture was in line 
with an effort to transform “the Chinese state into a regulator state and creating a fairer 
economic environment22” (Yang 2004, 143).  
                                                
22 Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, 143-144. This was due to the government’s push to further 
decrease the supervisory role of the ministries over SOEs; instead of sectoral agencies, the macro level 
agencies assumed the role of supervisors and regulators, which meant decreased role of the central 
government agencies over regulation and ownership. For example, 4 asset management companies and 18 
enterprise groups were a result of combining 1546 PLA ventures in provinces, along with 50 governmental 
institutions.  
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 In explaining the reasons behind the success, Yang offers three explanations: 1- 
low levels of opposition from PLA leaders, 2- a compensation package offered to the PLA 
decreased incentives for resistance, and 3- an increased competitive environment made it 
less attractive to maintain businesses for the PLA. The PLA’s inability to compete under 
market conditions had diminished their profitability; hence, their contribution to the 
defense budget was in decline. Although firms that were linked to the General Logistics 
Department— such as Sanjiu Group and Poly Group— were successful, the rest, especially 
small ones, were not profitable (Yang 2004, 140-141). Yang concludes the following: 
“the declining profitability of businesses in an exceedingly competitive business 
environment appears to have provided the single most important incentive for the 
military and other institutions to give up their commercial operations that have quite 
often become a financial burden” (Yang 2004, 141).  
 
In agreement with Yang’s argument, this chapter has illustrated how the process of 
economic reform conditioned the PLA’s economic behavior, both its expansion into new 
economic domains and its decision to retrench from economic domain. The PLA’s 
increasing responsiveness was a result of its growing independence on civilians following 
its inability to maintain its businesses effectively.  
There are alternative accounts that explain the PLA’s return to barracks. For 
example, Jencks (1989) points to the older generation’s resistance to reforms, but 
emphasizes the determining role of young, professional, and less-politicized military 
personnel (266). In his analysis, however, Jencks also acknowledges the problem of low 
profitability; he explains that concerns over low profitability of the PLA’s businesses 
existed prior to Zemin’s leadership. From 1978 to 1985, the PLA removed itself from 
construction and police work in order to focus exclusively on defense. It was in the mid-
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80s that lower level units entered into production, profitability became imperative, and 
problems emerged. Economic production became the PLA’s major preoccupation, and it 
even became susceptible to the illegal activities of local authorities and SOEs (Jencks 1989, 
265). While generational change could be a plausible reason for the PLA officers’ 
compliance with the divestiture, it doesn’t take into account new officers’ decision-making 
logic. After all, the new generation had experienced a new PLA, the one involved both in 
the economy and defense. Additionally, Jencks, himself, focuses on the economic loss as 
an important dimension of in Chinese CMR. Even if the generational change impacted the 
PLA’s decision-making process, it does not exclude the importance of PLA businesses’ 
unprofitability as a deciding factor.   
Mulvenon (2007) also challenges the following schools of thought in explaining 
the divestiture: one stresses Zemin attempts to reaffirmed civilian control over the PLA; 
the other underscores the military leaderships’ discontent with corruption as a motivating 
force for divestiture. The first school offers its evidence based on Zemin’s choices, and his 
attempt to create his own cult of personality, for instance being named “a supreme leader” 
by military officers (Mulvenon 2007, 225). The second school studies the bargaining 
process between the two distinct institutions of the military and civilians 23. In disagreement 
with above explanations, Mulvenon (2007) maintains that divestiture questioned the 
bargaining process. Despite common belief, the civilians did not hold their end of the 
                                                
23 Mulvenon, The PLA in the New Economy: Plus Ca Change, Plus C’est la Meme Chose, 225-226. This 
explanation sees the divestiture as a bargain between military and civilian leaders whereby (i) PLA 
enterprises had to be transferred to local and regional governments in a one-time process, and (ii) PLA yearly 
budget had to increase. 
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bargain24. The PLA received less than expected in compensation both in absolute and 
relative terms; the compensation did not cover the PLA enterprises’ losses (Mulvenon 
2007, 227). This is a significant conclusion: first, it suggests increased dependence of the 
PLA on the civilians. Secondly, by highlighting PLA’s demands for compensation, it 
undermines those arguments that underscore the role of PLA’s professionalization as a 
determinant variable. If professionalization was the reason behind compliance, why were 
there reports of tensions between civilians and military elite? 
Not only was the process of divestiture kept relatively secret, interviews with PLA 
leaders indicated “heavily strained” relations between civilians and the military.  There 
were two main reasons behind the PLA’s dissatisfaction: damage to the PLA’s reputation 
due to publicized information on corruption and a poor compensation package25 (Lawrence 
and Gilley 1999, par. 2-3). For example, US intelligence reported tensions between premier 
Zhu Rongji and the PLA after Zhu commented on smuggling by Tiancheng, an important 
company owned by the PLA’s General Political Department. Zhu pointed to the company’s 
failure to pay 50 million renminbi in sales and import taxes (Lawrence and Gilley 1999, 
par. 7). there were also fears of serious tensions between civilians and the PLA, which were 
expected to emerge over Taiwan policy or other security-related issues, such a Chinese 
                                                
24 Mulvenon, The PLA in the New Economy: Plus Ca Change, Plus C’est la Meme Chose, 226. Mulvenon 
explains that sources suggested a compensation of RMB 15-30 billion per year, but two months later, the 
same sources suggested RMB 50 billion. US sources suggested a negotiation between civilians offering RMB 
1.2 billion and military demanding $ 24 billion. Whereas, GLD claimed yearly RMB 4-5 billion in addition 
to double digit budgetary increase. 
 
25 Lawrence and Gilley, Bitter Harvest, par. 3. “compensation… this year were based on a wildly low estimate 
of 3.5 billion renminbi ($422.7 million) in annual profits from the companies, or less than 4% of the military's 
annual allowance from the government.” 
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weapons’ proliferation policy or its foreign policy in South China Sea territorial disputes 
(Lawrence and Gilley1999, par. 6). Experts also expressed concerns regarding Zemin’s 
decision. Huang Jing, a Utah State University expert on Chinese economics, states that “I 
am a person who is generally positive on PLA reforms, but in this case, I think Jiang has 
lost more than he gained.” (Lawrence and Gilley 1999, par. 6). 
Furthermore, the divestiture campaign was not civilians’ first attempt to limit the 
PLA’s business activities. Concerned with problems associated with low productivity and 
corruption, the Chinese state adopted measures to address both inefficiencies and 
corruption in the 80s. For example, In the industrial sector, series of reforms aimed at 
making firms competitive and reliant on the market forces. The reforms, however, failed 
to improve the situation because the PLA firms still relied on subsidies; their labor force 
was also inefficient. Furthermore, PLA firms’ competition over raw material and market 
share contributed to what Mulvenon characterized as “underindustrialization and serious 
waste” (2001, 91-92).  
As in the broader efforts to direct the process of reform, PLA smuggling was 
addressed by new regulations. To address corruption in the PLA, the state embarked on a 
process known as rectification in 1988–1990 that prohibited the following activities by 
military units: import of restricted commodities, production and sale of low quality 
commodities, utilization of military equipment for economic production purposes, using 
infrastructure for smuggling, unapproved usage of personnel for economic activities, price 
distortions, and operation of business by active-duty or retired personnel (Cheung 2001, 
43). Additionally, Civilian elites, as well as the General Logistics Department began 
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adopting measures to address illegalities and inefficiencies. For example, in the late 1980s, 
the Central Military Commission (CMC) prohibited military departments from 
participating in commercial activities, specifically those involved in trade. In 1989, among 
other economic activities26, the military was banned from importing restricted commodities 
(equipment, cars, electrical appliances, accessories). (Cheung 2001). Several attempts 
aimed at limiting the military’s economic activities, however, failed in effectively curbing 
illicit activities.  
Therefore, evidence of rectification campaign in the 80s and existence of tensions 
between the civilians and the military over the divestiture in 1998 undermines the 
professionalization thesis.  Additionally, while in some places PLA handed over its 
businesses, in other cases, it tried to maintain the management and profits of its businesses, 
especially in strategic sector companies such as China United Airlines and Great Wall 
Telecom. Another strategy the PLA units used in order to keep their businesses was 
reclassification of military enterprises to non-military ones (Mulvenon 1-3). It is also worth 
noting that the divestiture never completed, but about 10,500 enterprises were transferred 
in one year impacting 70,000 workers. Nevertheless, there were still 10,000 PLA ventures, 
as well as SOEs, that remained under the PLA’s control in 2009. More importantly, 
Bingman explains that the divestiture took place in the context of valuing “competitive 
                                                
26 The production and sale of low-quality goods, utilizing military equipment for production, exploitation of 
military facilities for smuggling, unauthorized sell and lease of military farms, exploiting military vehicle 
licenses, bank accounts, and invoices, exploitation of profits, unauthorized labor and business services, 
misuse of privileges in taxation in order to buy off local businesses, haphazard expansion, purchasing high 
priced products, unlawful purchases, racketeering, or increasing prices, individuals. 
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contracting” under the conditions of a market economy, and that the PLA “dumped mostly 
the low-end debt ridden activities onto local governments” (2009, 98-100).  
Although Mulvenon dismisses the local media’s perception of tensions between 
civilians and the military over divestiture, but he, also, stressed the importance of the 
existence of negotiations between military and civilians over both a compensation package 
and defense budget. It appears that disagreements came from tensions within the military, 
with senior military leadership and combat units favoring divestiture whereas regional and 
district commanders and members of the departments of logistics and management of 
enterprises opposing it. Since the idea of compensation hinged upon what might be called 
‘the trickle-down theory of PLA economics,’ local military units were suspicious of 
receiving profits out of this deal. The PLA adopted measures to calm discontent by 
increasing rank and file wages by 10 to 25 percent. Regardless, military units resisted 
divestiture by folding their enterprises under other institutions or handing over the 
unprofitable ventures but meanwhile protecting the profitable ones (Mulvenon 1-3).  
Above discussed discrepancies in the PLA’s behavior suggests that it divested its 
businesses because of their lack of profitability as oppose to other political considerations. 
The proliferation of the PLA ventures at lower levels, and a privatization policy limiting 
prospects for capture of state resources, coupled with increasing economic competitiveness 
created conditions where the PLA’s firms’ survival depended on their profitability. The 
PLA’s smaller firms’ inability to compete did not leave the PLA with any choice but 
relinquishing its lower level business assets. The ultimate outcome was increased civilian 
authority.    
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Explanations that rely on political variables are fruitful for understanding the 
changing nature of CMR in China; however, they fail to fully explain the PLA’s economic 
behavior regarding submission to divestiture, which led to increased civilian control. The 
1998 divestiture was, in reality, a culmination of previous rectification campaigns. 
Moreover, the PLA’s continued compliance despite the poor compensation package was 
also puzzling. These approaches offer explanations for PLA decision to divest but fail to 
account for the causal mechanism behind the decision-making process, that is the role of 
economic considerations in decision making. 
The specifics of economic reform, i.e. the focus on trade liberalization, 
decentralized center-regional relations, and the gradual reform of property rights, produced 
two significant outcomes: the emergence of small- and mid-sized ventures in the regions 
and a private sector parallel to the state, and the reliance of newly emerged enterprises on 
playing market rules for productivity. These developments impacted the PLA businesses 
as well, since not only did lower-levels units begin expanding, they also focused on 
profitability as a goal. Divestiture targeted the lower-level economic ventures to curb the 
effects of illegal smuggling, as well as low profitability, in the regions. Since the reform 
process had created dispersed and uncoordinated PLA businesses—or in other words, there 
were considerable numbers of lower-level businesses and the PLA businesses did not 
operate as unified entities—the PLA’s top brass did not have incentives to sanction the 
continuation of regional units’ operation.  
Therefore, the consensus between military and political leaders to focus on 
professionalization of the PLA was part of the decision-making equation regarding the 
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divestiture, but the fact that PLA’s economic performance in the regions was poor 
ultimately decided the outcome. In the absence of opportunities for economic expansion, 
the PLA did not have enough economic reason, or leverage, to pursue economic activities. 
Subsequently, it did not have enough incentive to resist divestiture and transform its 
economic power into political power. The PLA’s compliance might have been partially 
influenced by the political determinants of professionalization and party–military 
bifurcation, but the determinant cause was the absence of or gradual decrease in 
opportunities for economic expansion outside of market mechanisms.  
The Functional Control of the PLA 
This section tests hypothesis number two (H2) concerning the impact of economic 
policies on the functional control. According to H2, if gradual economic integration 
generates income for the state, the economically active military (the PLA) will have fewer 
opportunities to turn itself into an economic interest group, and the subsequent outcome 
would be a possible increase of the PLA’s functional control. By examining available data 
on the Chinese military doctrine, defense expenditure, weapon procurement, organizational 
restrictions, and recruitment policies, this section examines PLA’s functional capabilities.   
 With regard to integration, the PLA’s record has been mixed. Military doctrine has 
undergone changes for decades to match the demands of a changing international 
environment, but the actual capacity to carry out new tasks has not met expectations. 
Military doctrine has transformed from “people’s war” (1935-1979), to “people’s war 
under modern conditions” (1979-1985), “limited war” (1986-1991), “limited war under 
high technology conditions” (1991-2005), and ultimately “limited war under high 
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technology and information conditions” (Mulvenon 2007, 84).  Doctrinal changes 
demonstrate the Chinese leaders’ ability to asses and adapt to the international security 
environment. Since mid 1980s, along with economic liberalization process, the military 
doctrine also echoed China’s shift of attention to procurement of new technologies. A 
change from a people’s war doctrine to preparedness to conventional wars under new 
technological conditions suggest a shift in planning and priorities.      
For example, since the Gulf War of 1991, China manifested a new direction in its 
doctrine by investing in new technology, especially electronic warfare and 
countermeasures, ballistic missile systems, early warning and command systems27. 
Correspondingly, the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National 
Defense (COSTIND) pressed for improving China’s industrial base. The PLA began 
reorganizing and learning new skills, and adopted what Shambaugh names “flexible 
response”—that is the PLA’s attempt to improve capabilities that would allow it to face 
conventional war, nuclear war (or WMBs), air-to-air or coastal and naval battles, and force 
deployments in the peripheries (Shambaugh 2002, 69-72). Similarly, Chase et al. (2015) 
point out the impressive transformation for a military that was referred to as “junkyard 
army,” characterized by low quality weaponry, personnel, and training, as well as by 
rampant corruption (13-14). 
Hence, the data illustrates the overall success of economic reform and its 
contribution to GDP growth; the growth enabled civilians to invest in military 
                                                
27 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 69. The new doctrine was known as “limited war under high-
technology conditions”. 
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modernization without heavily burdening the state. The quality of the functional control, 
i.e. the nature of weapons and ability to trade-offs in mobility, has also increased. China 
has invested in the production of new weapons as well as in weapons procurement. It’s 
ability to utilize those weapons, i.e. the skills aspects of  functional control, however, has 
not kept pace. Therefore, while budgetary increases, as well as investing in China’s 
industrial base, have led to its overall technological modernization, the training of soldiers 
to utilize new equipment has been slow. 
China’s Military-Industrial Complex (CMIC) is the main provider of the weaponry 
to PLA’s ground-forces, air-force, navy, and missile forces. For example, since 1960s, 
China has masterfully produced short and mid-range, and intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. Production of competitive surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles in the 
1980s was another accomplishment. However, overall, the CMIC hasn’t been successful 
in production of modern weaponry (Shambaugh 2005, 85). Bitzinger (2000) also elaborates 
Chinese Industrial Complex’s capabilities to produce and utilize advanced military 
technology. The industrial complex has incrementally advanced for the past two decades, 
but the overall progression has been limited since some areas of technology have been 
developing relatively better than others (Bitzinger 2000, 9-10).  
Improvements in the civilian technologies, specially advancements in science and 
technology, has also benefited the military from overall advances in tech and science. In 
the domain of the defense solely, China has aimed at producing “long-range precision-
strike, command, control, communications, computing, and intelligence (CI), information 
warfare, and area denial”. With regard to other technologies, such as commercial dual-use 
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technologies in areas of aerospace, shipbuilding, and microelectronics, China purchases 
them from Russia, Israel, and some Western states (Bitzinger 2000, 11-16). These findings 
suggest that overall economic development has assisted China in enhancing its functional 
capabilities. Therefore, there is clear evidence of increasing functional control prior to and 
post economic liberalization. China’s ability to produce competitive weaponry occurred in 
the aftermath of its modernization plan—following economic liberalization.  
Examining functional capabilities reveals a consistent effort on the civilians’ part 
to address the inefficiencies. For example, two factors of institutional reorganization and 
marketization contributed to the shift in military production in 2001. Establishment of PLA 
General Armaments Department in 1998 and demotion of Commission on National 
Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) allowed for new 
supervisory body to introduce successful reforms. More importantly, modifying the CMIC 
from a state-owned and heavily subsidized organization to that of sensitive to market 
mechanisms was another major step. The process has been incremental (mainly since 
2004), but introduction of contract-bidding was imperative in reforming the CMIC’s 
procurement process (Shambaugh 2005, 87). Economic liberalization policies, not only 
increased state’s budget and its ability to invest in the military, they also sanctioned growth 
of an industrial base capable of producing weaponry.  
Analysis underscores the importance of continued economic success on improving 
military capability. Projecting the PLA’s modernization process through 2025, Chase et al. 
(2015) list slowing economic growth, social instability, and possible violence in Tibet as 
some of the factors that could possibly change the current trajectory. Since economic 
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growth and the subsequent growth of the defense budget, without burdening the GDP and 
government spending, were imperative in the success of the modernization project, RAND 
predicts that a decline in growth, as well as negative externalities of growth, could be 
detrimental to defense spending and modernization plans (2015, 21-22). Therefore, 
economic policies and economic growth are imperatives in creating suitable conditions for 
increasing functional capabilities.  
With regard to skill and training, however, China is not as efficient as modern 
armies. It appears that increase in functional control has been linked to changes in the 
strategy, weapons procurement, and modernization due to the economic growth. But the 
actual capacity in utilizing those new resources is weak. Chase et al. (2015) examine “two 
incompatibles” and “two gaps” prevalent in Chinese discourse on PLA efficacy since 2006. 
The “incompatibles” are (i) the gaps between the level of modernization and the capability 
for winning a local war in the information age, and (ii) between the military’s current 
capability and its historical mission.  
The two incompatibles and two gaps assess the same issue from different angles, 
i.e. the former states the problem while the latter identifies the root causes. The problems 
include an incongruence between training and required skills to win in combat in an 
“informatized” age; organizational and structural problems, as well as personnel’s 
inaptness to carry out the tasks of modern warfare; obstacles for force development due to 
structural inefficiencies; and ultimately ineffective logistics. In terms of the PLA’s ability 
to carry out historical tasks, with the exclusion of force development, the related areas of 
training, organization, and logistics lag behind (2015, 69-72).  
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Despite disadvantages28, as mentioned before, Chinese authorities have been 
adopting measures to address systemic weaknesses, which indicates a willingness to invest 
in functional capacity. For example, in order to address its shortcomings in the quality of 
personnel, PLA accepts graduates from science and engineering schools, and programs to 
pay for student loans in return for joining the PLA has been put in place. Higher education 
requirements for admission, and better pay and benefits are other strategies (Blasko 2012, 
Kindle Locations 2012, 5499-5501).  
In conclusion, the PLA’s functional capability has improved post-liberalization. 
Economic growth has generated funds for the state to invest in  military modernization. It 
has also strengthened the industrial base, which has contributed to weapons production 
programs. The state’s capacity to invest in the military’s capabilities has also meant that 
the civilian and military leaders were responsive to the changing international security 
environment, and adapted its military doctrine. 
The Social Control of the PLA 
According to hypothesis number 3 (H3), if gradual economic reform reduces 
opportunities for transformation of militaries into economic interest groups, social control 
would either remain the same or increase. As a dependent variable, social control refers to 
militaries’ values and their compatibility with societal norms, both domestically and 
                                                
28 Bitzinger, Going Places or Running in Places?, 28-30. Listing the impediments to utilizing new 
technologies, Bitzinger also elaborates technical, structural, and cultural categories. The author names “weak 
system integration capabilities” and “limited workforce expertise” as two main technical issues, while 
“overcapacity” (redundancy in production), “lack of sufficient capital”, “the highly compartmentalized, 
vertically integrated, and secretive nature of the Chinese arms industry” as cultural obstacles. “Heavily 
centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and risk-averse corporate culture” constitutes the cultural problem; in 
addition to managerial problems, the ‘SOE mindset’ hinders capacity to achieve competitiveness.  
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internationally. Militaries’ social control is measured by observable changes in military 
values and attitudes. Therefore, the social control changes if the military’s values either do 
not reflect the collective values of the society or transform in accordance to changes in 
societal values. This section argues that during the period of illegal smuggling in the 1980s, 
the PLA’s values did not reflect the overall values of the communist revolution, as well as 
traditional values of the PLA. However, since the PLA could not transform itself into an 
economic interest group, it has been able to maintain its commitment to both communist 
and traditional Chinese values pertaining to militaries’ position in society.  
In terms of the PLA’s military culture, a Report by Kaufman and Mackenzie (2009) 
explains PLA’s cultural transformation. Both Chinese traditional military thinking and 
teachings of Marxism-Leninism contributed to the PLA’s culture. From Marxist-Leninist 
thinking, the PLA concludes the importance of “party-army principle”, “mass 
mobilization”, “broad consultation, limited participation”, and “voluntarism”. There is a 
belief in prominence of morality vis-à-vis material capability, and calling itself a “people’s 
army”. Hence, PLA defines a moral obligation to treat people humanely and its personnel 
with kindness. PLA perceives itself morally superior to average citizens and is expected to 
garner populations’ support by modeling socialist morality and behavior29. If the PLA 
prided itself on being the “people’s army”, its illegal smuggling and corruption in the 1980s 
illustrated how the liberalization and privatization complicated the above aspect of the 
social control.  However, throughout decades of communist rule, the PLA has remained 
                                                
29 These moral obligations have been codified in “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of 
Attention”, and “Servicemen’s Moral Standards”. 
		 72	
loyal to the values of communism and, when necessary, has sided with the ruling elite and 
their social constellations that favored early revolutionary values. 
There is also consistency with Chinese traditional values of humanitarianism and 
the PLA’s practices.  Drawing on Confucian tradition of “Soldiers must be righteous, 
violence must be directed at the right targets” (cited in Wenjuan 2013, 6), the PLA is trained 
to value humanitarianism in its conduct (Wenjuan 2013, 6). Hence, the PLA’s social values 
have not changed post-liberalization. Wenjuan (2013) argues that both the Chinese 
government and the PLA have been implementing measures in compliance with 
international humanitarian law (IHL). Not only does China have a tradition of 
humanitarianism, it also has both ratified and undertaken legal measures to implement IHL.  
China is signatory to Hague Convention (ratified in 1917), Geneva Convention 
(ratified in 1956), Additional Protocol I & II (ratified in 1983), The Hague Cultural 
Property Convention (2000), Treaties on the Use of Certain Weapons (ratified in 2000), 
and Geneva Gas Protocol (ratified in 1952). It promotes further expansion of these 
protocols; it also supports Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons 
Convention, and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. (Wenjuan 2013, 8-15).  
China has adopted legal measures domestically to implement the above-mentioned 
protocols.  For example, article 67 of National Defense Law of PRC sanctions the military 
to comply with international treaties. “Export Control of Dual Use Biological Agents and 
Related Equipment and Technologies Regulation” and “Export Control of Chemical 
Products and Related Equipment and Technologies Regulation” are among other 
legislature enacting compliance with conventions. In addition, it has actively supported 
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international criminal justice cases , has a history of complying with the Geneva 
Convention during its wars, and has incorporated international humanitarian law’s 
education into the PLA’s curriculum (Wenjuan 2013, 8-15).Therefore, PLA’s loyalty in 
upholding humanitarian values suggests that despite its economic activities post-
liberalization, the PLA did not transform its social values.  
Therefore, in terms of social control, China’s economic reform policies have not 
changed the PLA’s social values. The PLA remains a professional army loyal to the CCP. 
As a professional institution, it does assert itself in areas relevant to its expertise but it does 
not operate as an economic interest group.  
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that a relative success in establishing a competitive economy, 
gradual privatization coupled with reforming regulatory frameworks, limited opportunities 
for asset-stripping. Although there was corruption in the form of illegal smuggling, 
economic actors and primarily the PLA did not have opportunities to capture state 
resources. Moreover, state’s commitment to establish market mechanisms manifested itself 
in its persistence in reforming regulations regarding PLA businesses. Under conditions of 
an emerging market mechanisms, the PLA businesses were also expected to operate as 
profitable firms. However, PLA was not successful in maintaining its economic production 
effectively. Its firms registered losses and could not compete with an emerging private 
sector. The outcome was PLA’s subservience to the civilian demands by divesting its 
businesses in 1998. Unable to profit economically, the PLA became more dependent on its 
civilian counterparts for both funding and legitimacy.  Furthermore, unable to transform 
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itself into an economic interest group, the EAF’s functional and social controls have 
increased and remained the same respectively. 
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Chapter 4: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: An established but non-
Domineering Economic and Political Player 
 
Introduction 
As a consequence of Mahmood Ahmadinejad’s privatization and economic 
liberalization policies from 2004 to 2013, businesses of Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) expanded into new sectors of the Iranian economy, including finance, trade, 
and oil and gas. Not only did the IRGC become a more visible economic player a result of 
this expansion, it also amassed a considerable degree of political leverage that culminated 
in the so called “election coup” in 2009 that brought Mahmood Ahmadinejad into power30. 
Subsequently, many analysists and politicians, including then U.S. secretary of state, 
Hillary Clinton, warned about Iran’s transformation into a military dictatorship31. 
Furthermore, many cautioned that the Iranian economy was becoming militarized. Belying 
these speculations, the IRGC failed to dominate Iran’s economy or politics. It did, however, 
succeed in establishing itself as a significant economic and political player. The IRGC is 
                                                
30 “The Leaders of Iran’s ‘Election Coup’,” pbs.org, last modified June 18, 2009, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/06/the-leaders-of-irans-election-coup.html 
 
31 “Clinton: U.S. sees Iran moving to military dictatorship,” cnn.com, last modified February 15, 2010, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/02/15/clinton.iran/  
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not the most dominant actor but it has amassed enough leverage to engage in the process 
of bargaining with the ruling elite.  
This chapter will illustrate how Iran’s uneven liberalization process since 1989 both 
conditioned the IRGC’s economic role-expansion and constrained its ability to completely 
dominate the economy, and consequently, the political arena. On the one hand, 
privatization policies facilitated the proliferation of crony-networks, including the IRGC 
businesses, in a semi-public economic domain that operates parallel to the private and state 
sectors. On the other hand, haphazard economic planning failed to establish a competitive, 
diversified economy. In this uncompetitive economic system, the survival of the IRGC’s 
businesses did not depend on their profitability; this uncompetitive economy created 
conditions that facilitated the maintenance of the IRGC businesses.  However, competition 
among the crony-networks operating in the semi-public domain constrained the IRGC’s 
ability to capture the state completely. The outcome has been the establishment of the 
IRGC as an economic actor that has enough leverage to engage in negotiations with the 
dominant elite but has been unable to gain sole control of Iran’s economy and politics. The 
rest of this chapter will explain Iran’s economic trajectory, the IRGC’s position in Iran’s 
economy, and its economic behavior, and finally the impact of economic policies on three 
dimensions of military control.  
Economic Conditions and the IRGC’s Economic Behavior 
When Ahmadinejad came to power, Iran had already undergone two decades of 
inconsistent and unorganized liberalization and privatization. This uneven economic 
trajectory impacted the economic power of the IRGC in three ways: (i) the acceleration of 
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privatization since 2004 provided the IRGC with opportunities to capture the state 
resources, (ii) the economic system characterized by overall lack of competitiveness meant 
that the IRGC could keep its businesses despite their unprofitability, and ultimately (iii), 
the IRGC, unlike the case of Egyptian Armed Forces, failed to dominate Iran’s economy 
and politics. Iran’s caveat, compared to China and Egypt, lied in the existence of 
competition among the crony-networks operating in Iran’s extensive semi-public economic 
sector; established and consolidated throughout decades of haphazard privatization, these 
crony-networks checked the IRGC’s economic ambitions. The rest of this section will 
delineate two parallel developments: the trajectory of IRGC’s economic role expansion 
and the overall economic processes that conditioned and constrained the IRGC’s economic 
behavior. 
The IRGC’s Economic Expansion 
 
It was during Rafsanjani’s presidency (1989–1997) that the IRGC became an 
economically-active military. Rafsanjani—who assumed office in the aftermath of the Iran-
Iraq war (1980-1988)—focused on combined goals of economic liberalization and 
reconstruction32. Known as the “Reconstruction Era33”, the government focused on 
rebuilding Iran’s war-torn economy by addressing inefficiencies of central-planning and 
undertaking massive developmental projects. To implement his modernization plans, 
Rafsanjani ordered the IRGC to engage in economic reconstruction projects; it was a 
                                                
32 Karshenas and Hakimian, Dilemmas and Prospects of Eco. Reform & Recon. In Iran, 44-45. The 
economic liberalization aimed at reforming price controls, quantitative trade restrictions, and to unify the 
exchange rate.  
 
33 یگدنزاس نارود 
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strategy to both demobilize the IRGC in the aftermath of war and to utilize its capacities 
for economic development34. 
The scope of the IRGC’s economic activities changed with its expansion into new 
economic sectors concomitant with the acceleration of liberalization and privatization since 
2004–2005. This period corresponded to the final two years of Khatami’s presidency 
(1997-2005) and primarily the period of Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2013). The 
IRGC expanded into new economic sectors, such as oil and gas, and finance. Although the 
data is inconclusive, the estimates suggest that the IRGC businesses produced at least one 
third of Iran’s GDP by 201035—during Ahmadinejad’s first tenure. According to the 
WikiLeaks cables, the IRGC’s total assets by 2010 were about $180-$250 billion36. While 
there is no available data on the total assets of the IRGC before privatization, local analysts 
estimated that Rafsanjani’s sold $7 billion worth of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) during 
his privatization plan, whereas by the beginning of 2005, the government sold $50 billion 
worth of assets, the majority of them to the IRGC37. 
It is worth noting that in the cases of China and Egypt militaries became 
economically-active during the periods of central planning. The IRGC’s economic role-
expansion, however, occurred during Rafsanjani’s liberalization period when the 
                                                
34 Mobilized during the Iran–Iraq war (1980-1988), the IRGC has operated parallel to the Islamic Republic 
of Iran Army, the regular military.  
 
35 Borger Julian, and Tait, Robert. “The Financial Power of the Revolutionary Guard”, thegaurdian.com, 
February 15, 2010.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/15/financial-power-revolutionary-guard 
 
36INSIGHT- IRAN- List of IRGC firms- IR2, The Global Intelligence Files, Wikileaks.com, February 13, 
2010. https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/?viewemailid=1116599 
 
37 Ganji, Akbar. “Iran: The High Cost of the IRGC’s Economic Might”, nationalinterest.org, December 4, 
2013. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/iran-the-high-cost-the-irgcs-economic-might-9495 
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government intended to curb inefficiencies caused by economic nationalization that was 
adopted post 1979 Revolution. Despite this seemingly different context, my research 
accounts for Rafsanjani’s presidency as a period of central planning for three reasons: (i) 
the emphasis of the government was primarily on state-led reconstruction, (ii) the 
liberalization process was short-lived, caused a short-term debt crisis, and was reversed, 
and (iii) Article 44 of the constitution, adopted post-revolution, allocated the control of key 
industries to the state sector38; That meant the government had limited options for 
privatization. In addition to the above-mentioned developments, it was with the leadership 
of Rafsanjani that Iran’s semi-public sector grew with significant implications pertaining 
to the IRGC’s economic power in the following decades. 
Therefore, regarding to both overall economic planning and the IRGC’s economic 
role-expansion, Rafsanjani’s period resembled periods of central-planning in Egypt and 
China. Similar to the cases of the People’s Liberation Army and the Egyptian Armed 
Forces, the IRGC was primarily involved in economic development projects. The IRGC, 
in 1989, with Khomeini’s approval, established Khatam Al-Anbia39, its engineering 
company. Its commanders assumed managerial positions in the firm. The reason for 
Khatam Al-Anbia’s establishment, according to the supreme leader’s representative, was 
                                                
38 “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, Iran Human Rights Documentation Center. The 
Constitution’s Article 44 classified the economy into three sectors of state, cooperatives, and private. While 
the state assumed management of large-scale industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, 
power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and 
telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads, etc. The private sector entailed agriculture, animal 
husbandry, trade, and industry that supplemented the state sector. 
http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/english/human-rights-documents/iranian-codes/3017-the-constitution-of-
the-islamic-republic-of-iran.html?p=19 
	
39 ایبنلاا متاخ یگدنزاس هاگرارق 
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utilization of the IRGC’s war-era machinery and equipment for reconstruction projects40. 
In an interview with Entekhab newspaper in 2014, Rafsanjani justified his decision to 
assign the IRGC economic projects. Specifically in reference to Karkheh Dam’s project, 
Rafsanjani stated that “…[the IRGC] had acquired machinery for the [Iran-Iraq] war. It 
had bought bulldozers, trucks, loaders, and cranes required for Karkheh Dam’s 
embankment, and accomplished the task easily and quickly. It did a quick job but did not 
own anything.” 
 The extensive nationalization of industries, sanctioned by the Article 44 of the 
constitution, marginalized the private sector. Since 2004, however, the Guardian Council41 
issued a directive permitting privatization of “foreign trade, banking, insurance, power 
generation for domestic consumption and export, telecom and postal service, railway, 
airlines, and shipping” 42. In 2005, the supreme leader, Khamenei, also sanctioned43 
acceleration of privatization by Ahmadinejad’s government (since 2005). This 
privatization, however, did not lead to the growth of an independent private sector. On the 
contrary, Ahmadinejad’s privatization became detrimental for the private sector’s growth 
since it did not focus on selling the SOEs to the private actors. By 2013, the sale of 
                                                
40 “Shedding Light on IRGC’s Extensive Economic Activities,” dw.com, August 20, 2007. 
http://www.dw.com/fa- ir/ نارادساپ-هاپس-میظع-یداصتقا-یاھتیلاعف-رب-یوترپ /a-2745386  
 
41 “Guardian Council,” bbc.com. An influential clerical body in charge of monitoring passage of bills in the 
parliament to assure their consistency with teachings of Islam. It has veto power over Parliament’s 
decisions. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/guardian_council.stm 
 
42 Mostashari, Ali. “Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in Iran: Panacea or Prescription for Disaster,” 
Payvand.com, May 11, 2004. http://www.payvand.com/news/04/nov/1043.html
 
43	“General Policies of the Supreme Leader Regarding Artilce 44 of the Constitution,” Ministry of Interior, 
n/d. https://moi.ir/Portal/file/?226759/ ياھتسایس-يلك-ھیغلابا-ماقم-مظعم-يربھر-رد-صوصخ-لصا-44-نوناق-يساسا .pdf 
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government assets constituted $ 80 billion, but only 17 percent had been sold to the private 
sector; the rest had been transferred to the IRGC and other crony-networks44. 
Encompassing transfer of SOEs to regime affiliates, including the IRGC, Ahmadinejad’s 
privatization plan became infamous as “pseudo-privatization45” or “customization46” 
(ekhtesasi-sazi).  
There is a consensus among analysts and journalists in the Iranian media that 
Ahmadinejad’s pseudo-privatization conditioned the IRGC’s expansion into new 
economic domains such as finance, banking, oil and gas, and manufacturing. Embracing 
Khamenei’s privatization proclamation, Ahmadinejad accelerated privatization in Iran. He 
claimed that the sum of privatization prior to 2005 had been $3 billion while under his 
presidency abound $30 billion were transferred via the Tehran Stock Exchange. Iran’s 
Privatization Organization47 provided similar numbers. Reportedly, Ahmadinejad prided 
on “Iran’s speed of privatization compared with other state-runeconomies, which, 
Ahmadinejad said, had taken twenty years to achieve what Iran had achieved in five” 
(Alfoneh 2010, 3).  
In this context, newspapers reported on the IRGC’s assumption of new economic 
projects on non-bidding basis. For example, in 2007, the IRGC won several big projects: 
                                                
44 Ganji, Akbar. “Iran: the Cost of the IRGC’s Economic Might,” The National Interest, December 4, 2013. 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/iran-the-high-cost-the-irgcs-economic-might-9495?page=3 
 
45 یزاس یصوصخ ھبش 
 
46 یزاس یصاصتخا 
 
47 “Short History”, Iranian Privatization Organization, en.ipo. ir. An organization established in 2004 to 
assist with privatization. However, its mission expanded significantly since 2008 by adoption of “Law on 
Implementation of General Policies of Article (44) of the Constitution". 
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the Asaluyeh natural gas pipeline, completion of Tehran’s Metro, and the pipeline for 
fifteenth and sixteenth phases of the South Pars oilfield. Those three projects totaled $7 
billion and were awarded without a bidding process. The construction of Development of 
Shahid Beheshti Waterfront, worth $341 million, was another project granted to the 
IRGC48. Brigadier General Abdol-Reza Abed-Zadeh announced completion of 1220 
projects in mining and other industries, and management of another 240 projects49 by 2007.  
The IRGC became active in the financial sector. The IRGC-affiliated lending funds 
were turning into financial institutions, expanding their monetary activities and later 
transforming to accredited banks50. The first IRGC bank started its operations in 2009. 
Ansar Finance and Credit Institution was established after the Iran–Iraq war and began 
lending, while under Ahmadinejad it became a financial institution and then a bank. Some 
of these organizations engaged in banking for decades. Their activities were not 
transparent. Under Ahmadinejad, they became established financial institutions, changing 
their names to conceal their military ownerships.  
The IRGC also expanded to strategic sectors. Kaveh Omidvar (2010)51 highlights 
the negative impact of sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and argues that the retreat of foreign 
companies, such as Shell, Repsel, and Total—due to the difficulties of doing business in 
                                                
48 Shedding Light on IRGC’s Extensive Economic Activities,” dw.com, August 20, 2007. 
http://www.dw.com/fa- ir/ نارادساپ-هاپس-میظع-یداصتقا-یاھتیلاعف-رب-یوترپ /a-2745386 
 
49 Ibid 
 
50 “Iran’s IRGC Establishes a Bank”, bbcpersian.com, September 23, 2009. 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/business/2009/09/090923_ka_bankansar_sepah
 
51 Omidvar, Kaveh. “IRGC: Sanctioned in the World, Encouraged in Iran,” bbcpersian.com, June 21, 2010. 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/business/2010/06/100621_l01_sepah_khatam_sanctions 
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Iran, —opened space for local companies. Faced with rising criticism for his inability to 
attract investors for the South Pars Oil Project, Ahmadinejad decided to hand the South 
Pars project over to state and semi-public institutions, the IRGC obtaining the highest 
shares. 
Lack of transparency makes it difficult to measure the growth of businesses but it 
is safe to assume that the majority of financial institutions and manufacturing companies 
emerged during the recent decade, once the IRGC began expanding its businesses. Some 
of those organizations such as Khatam Al-Anbia were established during Rafsanjani’s era. 
Majority of the affiliated companies, however, were founded or expanded recently. The 
following tables contain lists of IRGC-owned or IRGC-affiliated companies. They do not 
offer timelines for companies’ emergence, but they illustrate the extent of the IRGC’s 
economic engagement52.  
Table 5: IRGC Companies 
 
Financial Institutions Engineering Some Companies 
under Sanctions 
Basij Coopertaive 
Foundation; Ansar 
Financial-Credit 
Foundation, 
Armed Forces Retirement 
Organization, Mehr 
Financial-Credit 
Foundation 
(formerly Basijis 
Benevolent Fund), and 
Mehr Economic 
Investment., Sepah 
Cooperative Foundation, 
Khatam Al-Anbia 
Construction Base (KA) 
KA’s Ghorb Nooh 
KA’s Hara Institute 
KA’s Sahel Institute 
KA’s Makin Institute 
IRGC’s Ground Forces’ 
Construction Base and 
Ghaem Base 
South Region’s Base of 
Islamic 
Republic’s Military 
Imensazan Consultant 
Engineers Institute, 
Gharargahe Sadandegi 
Ghaem, Omran Sahel, 
National Iranian Oil 
Company, Mehr Bank 
Mehr-e Eqtesad-e 
Iranian Investment 
Company 
Ghorb Karbala 
Tehran Gostaresh 
Company 
Rah Sahel Institute 
                                                
52 INSIGHT- IRAN- List of IRGC firms- IR2, The Global Intelligence Files, Wikileaks.com, February 13, 
2010. https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/?viewemailid=1116599 
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Ansar Financial-Credit 
Foundation, Mehr 
Economic Investment and 
SATA (Armed 
Forces Pension Fund) 
 
Deep Offshore 
Technology Company 
Fater Engineering 
Institute 
Pouya Air 
Rahab Institute 
Sahel Consultant 
Engineers 
Naftiran Intertrade Co. 
(NICO) 
Tidewater Middle East 
Co. 
Sepasad Engineering 
Company 
Sepanir Oil and Gas 
Engineering Company 
Makin Institute 
Hara Company 
Oriental Oil Kish 
Iran Marine Industrial 
Company, SADRA 
Syrian Arab Airlines 
 
 
Table 6: IRGC-affiliated Companies53 
                                                
53 Ghaseminejad Saeid. “Sepah’s Role in Iran’s Economy,” roozonline.com, July 28, 2010. 
http://www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem/article/-49b7caea7c.html 
 
54 There are investors in each company that overlap with previously-listed companies as well.  
Bahman Group Company 
Investments 
Pasargad Bank 
 
Saipa Co. 
National Iranian Investment 
Co. 
Bahman Investment Co. 
Bahman Leasing Co. 
Bahman Diesel Co. 
Mellat Insurance Co. 
Bahman Brokerage Co.54 
Pars Arian Investment Co., Pasargad Insurance 
Co., Pasargad Bank’s Electronic Payment Co., 
Pasargad Bank’s Financial and Investment Co., 
Pasargad Banks’ Brokerage Co., Pasargad 
Leasing Co., Pasargad Bank’ Leasing of 
Machinery and Equipment Co., Aryan 
Construction Management Co., Iran’s Credit 
Consulting Company, Pasargad Mass Production 
Development Co., Aryan’s Saman Construction 
Co., Pasargad Aryan’s Support Services Co., 
Pasargad’s Financial Service’s Labor’s Supply 
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It is worth noting that the IRGC’s expansion into the Iranian economy has been an 
incremental process that has continued under Khatami’s presidency as well. However, the 
IRGC’s economic expansion under Ahmadinejad differed in two significant ways: the type 
of economic activities, and their scope. First, while under Khatami the IRGC was mainly 
involved in smuggling or covertly assuming economic projects, under Ahmadinejad this 
process became transparent and was ‘legitimized’ due to the newly adopted privatization 
policy. Second, the scope of the IRGC’s expansion under Ahmadinejad was distinctly 
different to that of Khatami’s.  
For example, while Khatam Al-Anbia’s economic role was a public knowledge in 
Iran, the extent of the IRGC’s involvement in the economy was not known until mid-2000. 
The IRGC’s illegal economic activities during Khatami’s presidency, those in the ports and 
at Payam Airport were the most scandalous. The speaker of the Sixth Parliament (2000–
2004), Mehdi Karroubi, announced that the IRGC had established sixty waterfronts in the 
south of Iran, unlicensed. Following Karroubi, another Sixth Parliament member, Ali 
Ghanbari expressed regrets since “one-third of state imports…[came in] unofficially via 
Services, Pasargad Energy Development Co., 
Middle East Mining and Mining Development 
Co., Pasargad’s Andishenegar Trade 
Development Co., Pasargad’s Tadbirgaran Co., 
Pasargad’s Ayandenegar Commercial 
Management Co., Eight Urban Building Co., 
Pasargad Currency and Exchange Services Co., 
Pasargad’s International Trade Development 
Co., Construction Company for expansion and 
Modernization of Industries (MANA), Iranian 
Zarand Steel Co., Khavar-Mianeh Aftab 
Derakhshan Trading Co., Iranian Sirjan Steel 
Co., Middle East Industry Standard Engineering 
Co., Pars Hafez Investment Co. 
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illegal markets, the underground economy, and waterfronts55”. Another illegal project 
occurred in Karaj’s Payam Airport for postal services. Khatami’s minister of intelligence, 
Ali Yunesi, provided data on smuggled goods amounting to 150 billion Iranian Rial 
confiscated at the airport in 2005. Under Khatami, however, the growth of the IRGC’s 
economic empire was not as extensive. As Ali Afshari, an activist and a contributor to 
foreign and domestic news outlets wrote of the IRGC’s growing economic power in 
Roozonline, “During Khatami’s presidency, this expansion came to a stop, but during 
Ahmadinejad’s term, large economic projects in the country were handed to the Guards.”56 
During Ahmadinejad’s rapid privatization, the private sector either could not 
compete with the IRGC or was marginalized in the absence of relevant laws and 
regulations. For example, Iran Marine Industrial Company’s main shareholder is IRGC. 
Khatam Al-Owsia, on no-bidding basis, took over the development of 14th and 15th phases 
of South Pars project, removing Shell and Opsel from the project, as well as local 
companies. By 2012, Khatam Al-Anbia and Khatam Al-Owsia were granted total of 51 
contracts, equating $17 milliard. Khatam Al-Anbia has been established since Revolution 
and has been involved in construction projects; its activities, however, expanded into oil 
and gas and pharmochemicals since 2006. By 2012, it oversaw 30, high level and low level, 
oil and gas projects in Iran. 
                                                
55 Ibid 
 
56Afshari, Ali. “Ahmadinejad and the Guard: Battle Between Former Allies”, Roozoinline.com, January 15, 
2013. http://www.roozonline.com/english/opinion/opinion-
article/archive/2013/january/15/article/ahmadinejad-and-the- guards-battle-between-former-allies.html  
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Another significant shortcoming was lack of political will in passing laws that 
would direct privatization and encourage the growth of a productive private sector. For 
example, Kamal At’hari, in an interview broadcast on Radio Zamaneh in 201057, criticized 
Iran’s subsidy reform and underscored the need to create economic institutions prior to 
implementation of reforms. Targeted subsidies coupled with price liberalization were 
expected to optimize resource allocation. In the absence of institutions encouraging 
production, research and design, and the division of labor, price liberalization would not 
yield expected results. Criticizing the pace of privatization, At’hari argued that the Fourth 
Five Year Economic Development Plan’s shock therapy was a populist policy58. If global 
market forces determine prices, the economic system should be capable of competing in 
global markets. He argued that liberalization should be gradual, i.e. there should be a period 
of building institutions and structures, preparation of the private sector, and innovation. In 
Iran, institution-building goals identified by the third and fourth development plans have 
not been actualized. 
Prior to Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the IRGC either performed economic 
reconstruction projects or was involved in illicit activities. It was after Ahmadinejad’s rapid 
privatization that it became an established and accepted economic actor. Prior to 
privatization, many IRGC officials consistently rationalized IRGC’s economic activities, 
                                                
57 This is Vulgar Economism,” Radiozamaneh.com, December 25, 2010. 
https://www.radiozamaneh.com/29793  
 
58 Ramazani, Alireza. “Does Rouhani Want to Scrap Iran’s Five Year Development Plans?”, al-monitor. 
Com. Since 1979, Iran five Five Year Economic Developmental Plans in order to develop Iran and improve 
its economy, October 21, 2016. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/iran-five-year-
development-plans-rouhani-scrap.html 
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but only in those areas that the private sector could not undertake developmental projects. 
IRGC’s mission was to serve the state and its reconstruction needs. Majority of its work 
was expected to serve underdeveloped regions59. While Khatam Al-Anbia officials claimed 
that its activities have been limited to major projects that cost more than $100 million 
(implying that Khatam Al-Anbia was not competing with the smaller business and the 
private sector), the data published in Khatam Al-Anbia’s website suggests that the IRGC 
has taken over many smaller projects costing less than $100 million60, and hence, has been 
impeding private sector’s ability to take over smaller projects.  
Therefore, both the civilian leaders and analysts, such as the former Speaker of the 
Majlis (parliament) criticized the privatization program’s inability to boost private sector’s 
growth. For instance, the Majlis’ Strategic Research Center reported that only 19% of the 
SOEs were purchased by private economic actors in the years between 2005 to 2009. 
12.5% went to the “public” sector, and 68.5% went to the cooperatives (bonyads) (Alfoneh, 
2010, 3). “The state sector’s privileges, monopolies, and unlimited access to investment 
capital frustrate[d] private-sector involvement”.  
Masoud Behnood, a renowned Iranian journalist, also referred to the growing 
dangers of the IRGC’s economic role expansion. Citing a report by the newspaper 
Sarmayeh, Behnood discussed how private-sector managers were concerned with the 
IRGC’s presence in development projects, the existence of conditions favoring Khatam Al-
                                                
59 “Eleven Questions Regarding IRGC’s Economic Activities,” Entekhab.ir, December 1, 2012. -رد-شسرپ
دروم-تیلاعف-یاھ-یداصتقا-اپس-85773/11 /http://www.entekhab.ir/fa/news
 
60 Ibid 
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Anbia over private-sector companies, and the detrimental role the IRGC’s was playing by 
creating obstacles for private-sector growth61.  
If one monitors the process of privatization in recent history, as Razaghi (2013) 
argues, it becomes evident that privatization has never been an instrument directing 
economic development and the creation of a strong productive private sector. On the 
contrary, it has been a strategy to remedy the state’s budgetary constraints (Razaghi 2013, 
133). Additionally, the strategy to privatize has taken the shape of a mere transfer of SOEs’ 
ownership without a comprehensive reform package to encourage productivity. The most 
significant outcome of privatization has been transfer of ownership from the state to the 
IRGC operating in the semi-public sector, or at times the private sector, but without 
changes in managerial composition of already-inefficient industries. Furthermore, 
privatization has not been coupled with effective labor law reform, which left companies 
with bloated payrolls to preserve their employees. Privatization also has led to tax evasion 
or reduction in taxation for privatized SOEs. The state not only sold state companies 
cheaply, but also imposed their inefficient management on new owners, which made it 
difficult for those companies to pay taxes (Razghi 2013, 131).  
This pseudo-privatization, and subsequent economic expansion of the IRGC, 
sparked criticism; the militarization thesis gained traction among analysts who warned 
about the growing economic dominance of the IRGC—militarization of Iran’s economy62. 
                                                
61Behnood, Masoud “US Sanctions’ Aim is IRGC’s Khatam Al-Anbia,” bbcpersian.com, 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/story/2007/10/printable/071026_ka-mb-us-iran-sanction-khatam.shtml
 
62 Hen-Tov, Elliot, and Gonzales, Nathan. “Militarization of Post-Khomeini Iran: Praetorianism”, 2011.  
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Political developments after Ahmadinejad’s presidency (post-2013), as well as analyses of 
scholars (Harris 2013, Mohseni 2016) challenged the conventional wisdom regarding the 
militarization of Iran’s economy and politics. Unlike expectations of analysts, the IRGC 
did not become the most dominant actor in Iran’s economy or politics. It did however 
establish itself as an economic player. Unlike China’s PLA, the IRGC maintained its 
businesses. Unlike Egypt, it could not outcompete its contenders, or execute a government 
take-over to expand its economic assets. Why did the IRGC establish itself as an economic 
actor but fail to become a dominant player?  
The answer lies in understanding two interrelated economic conditions: (i) Iran’s 
overall reform strategy—haphazard liberalization and privatization—fostered an 
uncompetitive economic system where survival of the military businesses did not hinge 
upon their profitability but their relationship with the government instead. (ii) Existence of 
crony-networks operating in the semi-public domain limited the IRGC’s possibilities to 
take over the Iranian state/government.  
An Uncompetitive Economy 
Outcomes of three presidents economic reform projects illustrate Iran’s inability to 
foster competitiveness throughout decades. Rafsanjani’s policy of economic reform 
focused on trade liberalization and initially boosted private consumption, but a macro-
economic instability reversed the course of reform. During liberalization, due to easier 
access to foreign credit, both the public and private sectors received more investments. 
However, increased government’s spending on reconstruction projects during the period 
of high oil revenues in the 1980s was coupled with an increase in both consumption and 
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import of intermediate and capital goods. When oil prices plummeted in 1992, Iran 
experienced a shortage of foreign exchange and suffered a heightened short-term debt crisis 
(six-fold debt increase from 1989-1993). Iran’s inability to attract long-term credit pushed 
the government to renegotiate its debt payments, and to reinstate tighter import controls 
(Karshenas and Hakimian 2000, 48–50).  Instead of liberalizing the economy, the state 
implemented control over trade, continued its multiple exchange rate system, and 
maintained price controls.   
In addition to sanctioning IRGC’s economic role-expansion and an attempt for 
liberalization, albeit unsuccessful, Rafsanjani’s period was also notable for the expansion 
of crony-networks. The revolutionary forces of 1979 revolution, with Khomeini’s order, 
confiscated assets of the deposed Shah and his affiliates and formed revolutionary 
foundations known as bonyads. These bonyads operated in a semi-public sector63 and as 
Saeidi characterizes them were “giant private monopolies with no governmental discretion 
over their operations” (2004, 480). They were bulwark of the Supreme Leader and the 
religious clergy, were unaccountable, enjoyed privileges64 such as tax cuts or easy access 
to credit, and were used to implement populist policies (Saeidi 2004, 484–485). Consisting 
of primarily conservative elite factions (Islamists and clergy), a few of these famous 
bonyads are Panzdah Khordad Foundation, Islamic Revolution’s Martyrs Foundation, 
Islamic Revolution’s Housing Foundation, Foundation of Oppressed and Disabled.  
                                                
63 Also known as paragovernmental or parastatal sector. 
 
64 Saeidi, The Accountability of Paragovernment Organization, 485. They had easy access to fiscal and 
monetary sources, preferential exchange rates, and obtained income from religious charities. 
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When Rafsanjani’s economic reform project included privatization of the SOEs, 
those elite that were already benefiting from bloated public and semi-public sectors 
opposed his policies. Instead of privatizing, Rafsanjani’s government engaged in sale of 
SOEs to their ex-owners or capitalists, which led to the transfer and sell of those SOEs to 
regime-affiliates, i.e. religious loyalists65 (Amirahmadi 1996, 12-13). It was during this 
time that the semi-public sector’s bonyads, such as the Imam Reza Foundation and the 
Foundation for the Oppressed expanded, with assets reaching $12 billion (Clawson 2008, 
par. 22). Rafsanjani’s policies had two implications pertaining to competitiveness: (i) those 
crony-networks that expanded during this period contained economic ambitions of the 
IRGC when rapid privatization in 2004/2005 facilitated IRGC businesses’ growth. (ii) 
Rafsanjani failed to implement meaningful reforms that would assist private sector’s 
growth.  
This process of uneven liberalization and privatization continued under Khatami 
(1997-2005) and Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) and led to an economic system crippled with 
inefficiencies and lack of competitiveness. Perhaps the most intriguing economic 
innovation under Khatami was government’s circumvention of the article 44 of Iranian 
Constitution by permitting private enterprises to operate in sectors not subject to 
constitutional limitations. Hence, the privatization during Khatami focused on facilitating 
                                                
65 Farazmand, Privatization and Public Enterprise Reform, 185-187. In 1991, the government approved 
privatization of 391 out of 770 SOEs via “transfer to government employees, transfer to stocks to general 
public, corporate bidding, and the like”. Through implementation, however, the state transferred SOEs to 
special groups, an outcome incompatible with the goals of privatization. From 1989–1993, privatization 
transferred public shares via bidding (30%), and stock market (70%). During the initial two years, private 
sector purchased 100% of the stocks, but the trend changed in the following years with state-related 
organizations securing higher shares.  
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development of new businesses rather than an extensive sale of SOEs (Harris 2013, 53). 
This process was coupled with a financial reform supporting private sectors’ financial 
activities with establishment of private banks as his main accomplishment (Valadkhani 
2001, Alizadeh 2003, Amuzegar 2006, Harris 2013). Along with supporting private sector 
growth, Khatami also adopted policies of trade liberalization via tariff reductions, corporate 
and individual tax reforms, and offered incentives to foreign investors (Alizadeh 2003, 
276-277). 
In addition, with regard to privatizing the SOEs, Khatami promised to reform 
prevalent methods of privatization. For example, Khatami forbade the negotiated sale of 
the SOEs and established the “Privatization Organization” to regulate privatization 
process. Prior to Khatami, in an unregulated environment, the privatization encompassed 
transfer of SOEs to regime-affiliated groups. For example, lack of relevant labor laws led 
to either layoffs or falsified bankruptcy claims by new owners who abused the system to 
receive benefits. Khatami’s regulations mandated up to 15% sale of shares with discounts 
to the workers of the privatizing companies. The rest were sold through the stock market 
or on a bidding basis66.Continuing the reforms, the state was barred from investing in new 
companies.  In addition, a new law demanded bonyads’ sale of their shares to the private 
sector after three years in order to prevent monopolization by bonyads. As a result, Panzdah 
Khordad, Mostazafan, Shahid, and Sandogh bonyads sold parts of their shares to the 
public67. 
                                                
66 Mehrzad, Ruzbeh. “What did Khatami Do to Iran’s Economic Cure?” bbcpersian.com, January 31, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/business/story/2005/07/050731_ra-iran-privatization.shtml 
 
67 Ibid 
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Despite his attempts, Khatami—who was notable for his political reforms rather 
than for his economic policies—failed foster competitiveness. First, the state remained 
heavily dependent on oil and its expenditure grew from 24.5% of GDP in 1999 to 27.2 % 
in 200468. Additionally, government’s strategy of supporting private businesses by offering 
them subsidies exacerbated the economy’s reliance on the oil revenues (Karshenas and 
Hakimian 2005, 76). Therefore, although Khatami boosted the private sector and made 
significant changes, Ahmadinejad inherited an economy that suffered from the same 
structural problems—undiversified, uncompetitive, and oil-dependent.    
Proposing an ambitious economic plan, President Mahmood Ahmadinejad’s Fourth 
Five Year Economic Development Plan (2004/2005-–2009/2010) was expected to improve 
annual GDP growth, per capita income, and employment, and meanwhile reduce inflation, 
economic disparities, the Gini coefficient, and poverty. It also proposed to diversify the 
economy by increasing non-oil exports to 10.7 percent, along with state retrenchment— a 
10 percent reduction of the national budget to GDP ratio and a 5 percent reduction of 
government employment (Amuzegar 2010, 114–115). The results were disappointing 
though. Challenging Ahmadinejad’s false claims regarding the nation’s economic 
performance, Amuzegar explains that “a combination of structural weaknesses, resource 
misallocation, and worsening business climate produced stagflation” (emphasis added) 
(Amuzegar 2010, 117).  
                                                
68 Azad, Shirzad. “The Politics of Privatization in Iran,” Rubin Center: Research in International Relations. 
http://www.rubincenter.org/2010/12/azad-2010-12-05/  
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The state struggled with inflation and unemployment; it also failed to boost 
productivity, specifically its low labor productivity. Investment rates also decreased 
because of a drop in capital returns caused by lack of competitiveness internationally, 
short-term trades’ lucrativeness and speculations in the stock-market, and banking 
systems’ inadequacies impeding domestic financing, offshoring prospects, and changing 
regulations (Amuzegar 2010, 116). Additionally, state did not align currency’s value with 
rising inflation resulting in over-valuation, and subsequent decline in competitiveness of 
domestically produced goods. Coupled with increased importation of intermediate and 
capital goods, foreign direct investment and non-oil exports dropped, and Iran experienced 
capital flight (Amuzegar 2010, 116-121). Therefore, similar to both Rafsanjani and 
Khatami, Ahmadinejad’s economic liberalization and privatization also did not contribute 
to an overall competitiveness. On the contrary, productivity declined, while cronyism, 
including the IRGC businesses, thrived.  
Available data from World Economic Forum and the World Bank also supports 
above conclusions regarding the lack of competitiveness. The World Bank’s data suggests 
that Iran registered volatile annual GDP growth rates fluctuating between the highest rate 
of 13.6 in 1990 and the lowest rate of -6.6 in 201269. These radical fluctuations in growth 
rates are also evident during each presidency (Rafsanjani 1989-1997, Khatami 1997-2005, 
Ahmadinejad 2005-2013)70. Based on the World Economic Forum data, after decades of 
                                                
69 GDP Growth (annual %), The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IR  
 
70 In 1988, a -6.1 rate increased dramatically to 13.6 during first years of Rafsanjani’s presidency but it 
dropped again to -1.5 and -1.7 in 1993 and 1994 during the years of debt crisis. During Khatami, growth 
has been mainly positive but with fluctuations, and during Ahmadienjad, especially his second term the 
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attempted reforms, including structural adjustment policies, Iran is ranked 76 out of 138 
states in 2017 for its global competitiveness71. The World Economic Forum does not 
provide data from the earlier decades of Iran’s performance in order to compare the degrees 
of change in competiveness. However, given decades of economic liberalization, Iran’s 
ranking in terms of its competitiveness would be expected to have been higher than it is 
today. 
Table 7:World Economic Forum, Iran’s Competitiveness Index (134 states, by 2017) 
Goods 
Market 
Efficiency 
Labor 
Market 
Efficiency 
Financial 
Market 
Development 
Technological 
Readiness 
Business 
Sophistication 
Innovation 
111 134 131 97 109 89 
 
Three consecutive presidents’ policies also did not originate a strong independent 
private sector. Despite attempts to privatize the SOEs, the public sector remained bloated 
an inefficient. Ironically, the government’s size compared to the GDP during three 
presidencies of Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad has been 22%, 53%, and 66% 
respectively indicating an incremental growth of the public sector despite attempts to 
privatize (Vaezi 2014, 51). With regard to the strength of the private sector, indicators of 
technological readiness, business sophistication, and innovation show Iran’s 
underdevelopment in terms of its private sector’s capacity72. 
                                                
growth has been negative. GDP Growth (annual %), The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IR 
 
71 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index: Iran, 2016-2017 edition. 
http://reports.weforum.org/pdf/gci-2016-2017/WEF_GCI_2016_2017_Profile_IRN.pdf 
 
72 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index: Iran, 2016-2017 edition. 
http://reports.weforum.org/pdf/gci-2016-2017/WEF_GCI_2016_2017_Profile_IRN.pdf 
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Table 8: Iran’s Technological readiness, Business sophistication, Innovation 
Technological Readiness Business Sophistication Innovation 
Firm Level 
Technology 
Absorbtion 
Exports Local 
Supplier 
Quality 
Production 
Process 
Sophistication 
Capacity for 
innovation 
Company 
Spending 
on R&D 
124 119 103 78 108 89 
 
The World Economic Forum and the World Bank do not offer data from earlier 
decades of Iran’s economic performance. However, the recent data illustrates the overall 
uncompetitive nature of Iran’s economy, its private sector’s weakness, and public sector’s 
inefficacy despite two decades of economic reform processes.  This overall lack of 
competitiveness and state’s inability to establish market mechanisms has created 
conditions conducive to operation of the IRGC businesses.  
 How did this lack of competitiveness impact the IRGC’s businesses? First, the 
IRGC’s substantial economic expansion occurred in the absence of a strong private sector 
that could have challenged the IRGC’s economic power. There are two rationales behind 
this conclusion: first, while the privatization aimed at supporting emergence of an 
independent private sector, the IRGC’s economic expansion had negative consequences on 
private-sector development. Therefore, one possible conclusion is that the private sector in 
Iran never had the capacity to challenge the IRGC’s economic aspirations. In other words, 
absence of domestically or internationally competitive private interest groups, and their 
social constellations, made it less costly for the IRGC to enlarge its economic empire. If 
decades of economic liberalization and privatization had made the Iranian economy a 
competitive one, the IRGC would have logically faced greater competitors from domestic 
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and international markets and the destabilizing costs of its economic role-expansion would 
have arguably been higher when it aimed at expanding its businesses since 2004.  
Secondly, If Iran’s overall economy is uncompetitive, and the IRGC is estimated 
to produce one-third to two-third of Iran’s GDP, then the IRGC’s businesses are 
uncompetitive as well. Anecdotal evidence supports this conclusion. For example, in 2016, 
there was a disagreement between IRGC and the executive branch of Rouhani over South 
Korean Hyundai Heavy Industries deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines 
Co.. The Korean company assumed responsibility to build ten container ships. The press 
and analysis speculated that IRGC’s behavior was a result of its nervousness regarding the 
opening of Iran’s economy and introduction of competitors. As an analyst in RAND, 
Alireza Nader stated, “[t]hey are worried about competition internally”, “[t]hey want to 
make sure for any given deal, they get a part of it.”73 First Vice President Eshagh Jahangiri 
responded claiming the contract had been signed in 2008 but the production stopped 
following the sanctions; after Iran’s Nuclear Deal, Hyundai agreed to continue the project. 
While the head of Khatam Al-Anbia, Ebadollah Abdollahi, complained about South 
Korea’s history of signing contracts and not completing them, government officials blamed 
IRGC for its history of not completing projects on time74. IRGC’s complaints about foreign 
or domestic competitors suggests that a competitive marketing economy poses a threat to 
                                                
73 Gambrell, John. “Revoluiontary Guard Faces New Foe In Iran’s Opening Economy”, www.apnews.com, 
December 15, 2016. https://www.apnews.com/d1cee287b4194fa0bd1a85eca8911d75 
 
74“Jahangiri Reacts to IRGC’s Criticism of a Shipbuilding Contract with South Korea,” Radio Farda, 
December 12, 2016. http://www.radiofarda.com/a/f8-jahangiri-sepah/28171416.html 
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military businesses. In addition, civilian elites’ criticism of its economic performance 
implies the IRGC’s incompetence.  
The evidence of IRGC’s anxieties for losing its economic power illustrate how its 
economic activity is contingent upon an economic system operating based on cronyism 
and selective protectionism. A most stark example supporting this view was IRGC’s 
advantageous economic position during international sanctions. Mehdi Karoubi, an 
oppositional presidential candidate in 2009, explained that “part of the state and IRGC 
pursue sanctions because sanctions help them obtain huge and astronomical profits75”. For 
example, post-sanctions, IRGC succeeded in replacing foreign investors in the gas and oil 
sector. In addition, analysis criticized IRGC’s role in limiting private sector growth. 
According to reports in the Iranian media, IRGC found strategies to circumvent the 
sanctions, but its ability to do so was linked to the linkages it had with political or security 
elite in the government. Subsequently, continuation of sanctions was deemed beneficial for 
these elite groups and IRGC76.  Therefore, while IRGC strives in a closed, uncompetitive, 
and undiversified economy, the introduction of foreign and domestic competitors threatens 
its economic power.  
Therefore, lack of competitiveness created conditions conducive to the IRGC’s 
business operations. Although the IRGC established itself economically, it could not 
completely militarize Iran’s economy.  Why? 
                                                
75 “IRGC: Sanctioned in the World, Encouraged in Iran,” dw.com, October 24, 2013. 
http://www.dw.com/fa-ir/ دوس-و-نایز-هاپس-زا-اھمیرحت-ھیلع-ناریا /a-17179679 
 
76 Ibid 
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A Competitive Semi-Public Domain 
Examining Iran’s political economy post-Ahmadinejad, following the election of 
Rouhani (2013–present), suggested that the IRGC was not the most dominant economic 
player.  For example, in 2016, Rouhani refused to grant Khatam Al-Anbia with 10 projects; 
he also annulled the contract that had granted 50% of Iran’s telecommunications company 
to IRGC-affiliated companies77. In the summer of 2016, IRGC agreed to Rouahni’s plan of 
shifting its focus on development projects in rural and bordering regions. As The Wall 
Street Journal78 concluded, this agreement indicated Rouhani’s attempt to control IRGC 
and contain its unrestrained expansion into the economy. Some also argued that it implied 
a bargain between the president and IRGC whereby the IRGC would remove itself from 
lucrative sectors such as oil and gas and finance—sectors needing foreign capital 
investments— in return for IRGC’s engagement in rural development projects79. Examples 
of negotiations and tensions between the elite in power (primarily the executive branch) 
and IRGC implies that unlike speculation, IRGC’s economic expansion has been limited 
in the aftermath of Rouhani’s presidency. The IRGC is an established but not the sole 
economic player.  
                                                
77 Alfonhe, Ali. “Iran's 'Reformist' President Is Shielding The Revolutionary Guards, businessinsider.com, 
January 12, 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com/rouhani-is-shielding-the-powerful-revolutionary-guard-
from-his-anti- corruption-campaign-2015-1  
 
78 Faucon, Benoit, Meichtry, Stacy, and Fithc, Asa. “Iran’s Government and Revolutionary Guards Battle 
for Control of Economy,” wsj.com, https://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-government-and-revolutionary-
guards-battle- for-control-of-economy-1463584510  
 
79Lob, Eric, Habibi Nader. “There is a Battle Over Islamic Revolutionary Guard Cops Business Empire,” 
washingtonpost.com, January 5, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/01/05/theres- a-battle-in-iran-over-the-islamic-revolutionary-guards-corps-business-
empire/?utm_term=.1a6287e02e63  
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Scholars also have challenged the militarization thesis. Harris offers the most 
intriguing analysis on outcomes of liberalization and privatization policies in Iran, and 
particularly during Ahmadinejad. By analyzing the reforms in pension funds and Iran’s 
Social Security Organization, the Justice Share Program, and the IRGC’s economic 
activities, Harris disputes the militarization thesis. Although the privatization did not lead 
to the growth of an independent private sector, it did transfer economic activity from a 
relatively transparent public sector into the semi-public domain; Harris (2013) names this 
semi-public domain a “parastatal subcontractor state” populated by interest groups such as 
bonyads and the IRGC. 
BBC80 reported in 2013 that Gen. Ramazan Sharif, Director of Public Relations and 
spokesman for the IRGC, considers companies affiliated with the ‘Nationalist-Religious81’ 
political front as its economic competitors. According to Ramazan Sharif, IRGC assumed 
economic projects with the Supreme Leader’s permission and that “70 to 80 percent of its 
competitors are large companies affiliated with Nationalist-Religious groups. While no one 
criticize the National-Religious groups, everyone condemns IRGC”. While IRGC’s claim 
might be false (there is no clear evidence supporting or falsifying this claim), the mere fact 
that IRGC either complains or justifies its economic projects is a testament to the existence 
                                                
80“IRGC: Our Main Competitiors are National-Religious Groups,” bbcpersian.com, September 17, 2013. 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2013/09/130917_l45_sepah_revolutionary_guard_melli_mazhabi 
 
81 “Iranian nationalists who also believe in an enlightened interpretation of Islamic teachings”, Sahimi, 
Mohammad. “The Nationalist-Religious Movment: Part 1: Patriots and Mosaddeghists,” pbs.org, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/06/the-nationalist-religious-movement-part-1-
patriots-and-mosaddeghists.html#ixzz4jpt4RKRL 
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of disagreements among the elite, as well as IRGC’s inability to pull enough leverage for 
its economic projects.  
While the economic activities of bonyads is not transparent, based on public 
pronouncements of IRGC commanders and other elite in Iran, one can conclude there exists 
competition among various elite-networks over assumption of economic projects in Iran. 
For example, in 2015, Deputy Representative of Supreme Jurisprudence (Khamenei’s 
representative), Abdollah Haji Sadeghi, stated that “if IRGC enters the domain of the 
economy, it is not for personal or economic benefits but to protect the revolution”, and that 
“the governmental elite should know that IRGC is not competing against ministries even 
if it enters a specific domain because its goal is to consolidate the Islamic Republic’s 
position82”. Such statements signal the IRGC’s need to justify its economic activities, and 
attain the support of dominant civilians. 
While Khamenei has defended IRGC’s economic activities, Rouahni implicitly 
criticized its corruption. Corrupt economic activities, however, are not IRGC’s monopoly. 
A massive portion83  of Iran’s economic activities have been monopolized by other 
religious and state-affiliated groups, such as Bonyad Astan Qods-e Razavi. Furthermore, 
these bonyads and the IRGC cooperate in carrying out economic tasks, such as joint-
projects performed by Barekat Bonyad and the IRGC84. These joint projects show the 
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IRGC’s economic inability to carry out economic tasks alone due to economic or political 
considerations. 
Further evidence of competing crony-networks was Ahamdinejad’s constant threats 
to expose economically corrupt elite in Iran, as well as his harsh attacks against the previous 
president, Rafsanjani and his economic-network. In 2011, Ahmadinejad threatened to 
expose the corruption of his opponents as a tactic to silence them. He threatened to expose 
only 25% of them and promised to keep the rest to himself out of his consideration for the 
regime. According to Duetsche Welle’s analysis, Ahmadinejad’s strategy was to signal to 
Khamenei that he would not expose the Supreme Leader’s economic corruption, but 
meanwhile referred to three different groups as possible targets: 1-United Principalists’ 
Front 852- Resistance Front86, and 3-groups within IRGC and other security forces 
conspiring to remove Ahmadinejad from power87. Elite infighting, criticisms over the 
management of economic assets, and threats to expose one another implies the existence 
of competition among these crony network, as well as their shifting alliances. What were 
the implications of this competitive system on the IRGC’s political control? 
The IRGC’s economic and political expansion under Ahmadinejad concerned 
analysts of Iranian politics who discussed Iran’s transformation into a military dictatorship 
with the IRGC as the main political and economic player. Given the changing nature of 
                                                
85 Spearheaded by Larijani (former speaker of the Parliament), Ghalibaf (former Mayor of Tehran and 
presidential candidate), and Mohsen Rezaei (former IRGC Commander) 
 
86 Consisting of Radicals like Mesbah Yazdi 
 
87 These groups supported Ahmadinejad’s election initially and used him to expand their power, later the 
relationship between changed; his supporters began criticizing Ahmadinejad.  
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civil-military relations, this outcome seemed plausible. However, the IRGC was unable to 
assume an all-encompassing role in Iran’s domestic politics. The next section will explain 
why, despite its aspirations, the IRGC failed to dominate Iran’s politics. 
The Political Control of the IRGC 
The growth of IRGC businesses was also coupled with its ambitious pursuit of 
political power. In fact, those that warned about militarization of the Iranian economy were 
also concerned about the militarization of Iranian politics. Unlike speculations, and despite 
IRGC’s attempts to amass political power, IRGC failed to dominate Iran’s politics. Why? 
Utilizing a political-economy framework, this section tests hypothesis set forth in this 
dissertation: (H1) if Iran’s rapid economic liberalization failed to establish a competitive 
economy, there is a higher likelihood for the IRGC to establish itself as economic actors, 
and subsequently, transform its economic power into a political one. In testing the case of 
Iran, this section will illustrate that the (H1) applies to the case of the IRGC but with a 
caveat: the uncompetitive nature of Iran’s economy has facilitated the IRGC’s 
establishment as a political player. However, the IRGC relies on factions of the elite with 
linkages to the government who could provide the IRGC with new economic projects. 
Consequently, the IRGC is relatively dependent on the civilians and is constrained by the 
elites and elite-coalitions in different times. 
This section will develop two interrelated arguments: First, the IRGC’s political 
power increased following its expansion into the economic domain. Prior to privatization, 
the IRGC obeyed Iran’s Supreme Leader’s demands. Post-privatization (since 2005), 
however, it has become an established political player; its agenda is sometimes at odds 
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with the Supreme Leader’s interests. Furthermore, due to the uncompetitive nature of Iran’s 
economy, the IRGC garnered enough economic leverage to pressure the government for 
economic and political gain. Secondly, despite its attempts to dominate Iran’s politics, the 
IRGC has been unable to become the most dominant political actor; the economic-political 
elite networks in Iran constrain the IRGC’s political ambitions as well. In other words, the 
limitations of the IRGC’s economic power has had significant implications for its ability 
to leverage its economic power into a political one—the IRGC’s is dependent on at least a 
faction of the civilians to expand its economic power.   
Did the IRGC’s political autonomy change as a consequence of liberalization and 
privatization? Yes. The degree of IRGC’s political autonomy increased. It became, and at 
times acted, more independent of the Supreme Leader.  Due to the politicized nature of the 
IRGC in Iran, the line between civilian and military controls has always been blurry. 
However, there is an observable change in the nature of the IRGC’s interference in politics. 
The IRGC has changed from a military that engaged in acts of arbitration to a military 
operating as an independent player at times. In other words, prior to privatization, the IRGC 
arbitrated among the civilian elite by siding with the Supreme Leader and advancing his 
political agenda.  Post-privatization, it became a player that at times challenged the 
Supreme Leader; the political coalitions or infightings either helped or constrained the 
IRGC’s political maneuverability.    
Historically, the IRGC was instrumental in consolidation of the theocratic right88 in 
Iran. During the initial years after the 1979 Revolution, the revolutionary elite used the 
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IRGC to suppress their opponents89. Article 150 of the Constitution cemented IRGC’s role 
as the “protector of revolution90”. Article 109 appointed the Supreme Leader as the supreme 
commander of the Armed Forces91. By codifying the role of Velayat-e Faqih (the 
Guardianship of Jurisprudence92), the constitution demands IRGC’s allegiance to Velayat-
e Faqih (Ottolenghi 2011, Kindle Locations 192-195). Hence, the constitution provides an 
institutional mechanism for civilian control of the IRGC, although that control is limited 
to the office of the Supreme Leader.    
Existence of an institutional mechanism to supervise the IRGC, however, did not 
mean that the IRGC remained apolitical. On the contrary, the unintended consequence of 
the IRGC’s subjugation to the office of the Supreme Leader was its politicization by 
Khamenei; he utilized the IRGC to advance his own political agenda (Alfoneh 2008). For 
example, the IRGC became a stark critique of Rafsanjani’s economic liberalization and 
Khatami’s political liberalization policies. Opposing Rafsanjani’s liberal agenda, then 
IRGC commander, Mohen Rezaei, publically warned about dangers of economic 
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liberalization in 1996 (Alfoneh 2008, par. 22).  During Khatami, the IRGC became more 
politically vocal and sided with the conservative elite, including the Supreme Leader, who 
loathed Khatami’s political liberalization agenda. The IRGC became notorious for 
meddling with Khatami’s reformist agenda, such as suppressing student protests in 199993, 
issuing a public ultimatum94 to Khatami, and criticizing his reformist agenda95. However, 
these interferences in politics were sanctioned by Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. 
Takeyh analyzes the role of IRGC in Iranian politics and concludes that the IRGC 
“functioned very much as a political entity” (2009, 22-23).  But he also draws attention on 
the IRGC’s adherence to conservative elite’s ideology. This attitude was evident in IRGC’s 
commander Safavi’s remarks regarding 1999 Student Riots. While emphasized the 
apolitical nature of IRGC, he also discussed IRGC’s adherence to a ‘political line’, 
referring to the hardliner ideology of Khomeini’s revolutionary values (Takeyh 2009, 24). 
Safavi’s remarks exemplified IRGC’s ‘responsiveness’ to the Supreme Leader as the main 
figure protecting the values of the 1979 Revolution. This loyalty was best exemplified by 
Commander Safavi’s labeling of reformists as ‘hypocrites’ who, he thought, threatened the 
Islamic Republic. Following the arrest of Kharbaschi, a reformist and pro-Rafsanjani 
Mayor of Tehran, Safavi stated: 
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 “[w]e do not interfere in politics but if we see that the foundations of our system 
of government and our revolution is threatened…we get involved. When I see that 
a [political] current has hatched a cultural plot, I consider it my right to defend the 
revolution against this current. My commander is exalted leader and he has not 
banned me [from doing this]” (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007, 22).  
 
The nature of IRGC’s political involvement however, took a different turn under 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Since Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the IRGC began to serve its 
own institutional interests, including its economic interests. First, the quality of the IRGC’s 
interference in politics changed from arbitration to intervention in the electoral process, as 
well as assumption of governmental institutions. The most striking change in the civil-
military relations, however, was the IRGC’s contentious relationship with the Supreme 
Leader, and the emergence of neo-principalist faction in the Iranian politics that opposed 
the conservative clerical establishment, including Khamenei.    
First, in collaboration with the conservative elite, and presumably Khamenei’s 
son96, the IRGC intervened in Iran’s presidential election in 2009. Ahmadinejad was 
brought into power for the second term in what became known as an ‘election coup-d’état’. 
The IRGC and IRGC-affiliates also began controlling significant governmental institutions 
such as ministries of Commerce, Defense, Economics, Intelligence, Interior, Islamic 
Guidance, and Oil. Furthermore, an IRGC commander also ruled the Iran Armed Forces 
General Command (the regular military) (Ottolenghi 2011, 689). 
                                                
96 Sahimi, Muhammad. “The Man in the Shadow: Mojtaba Khamenei”, July 16, 2009. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/07/the-man-in-the-shadow-mojtaba-
khamenei.html 
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Additionally, the most important sign of changing IRGC’s political power was the 
rise of “neo-principalists” or “neo-fundamentalists”. While prinicpalists97 were traditional 
conservative right wing elite, the neo-principalists98 were a new group consisting of 
Ahmadinejad and middle-rank IRGC members (Ahdiyyih 2008, par. 17). Safshekan (2010) 
considers neo-principalists as “political manifestations of IRGC”, and challenges the 
conventional wisdom assuming IRGC loyalty to the clergy. He argues how IRGC has been 
challenging the clergy not only by questioning the legitimacy of clerical governments prior 
to Ahmadinejad, but also by attacking prominent clerical establishments like Rafsanjani 
and Nateq-Nouri99. In a process qualified as “de-legitimizing the clergy”, Safshekan argues 
how Ahmadinejad talked about his relationship with Mahdi100 ; it was a strategy to break 
the clerical monopolization of having a relationship with Mahdi (Safshekan 2010, 552-
553).  
IRGC’s lack of responsiveness to the conservative camp, and the Supreme Leader, 
was also evident in the increasing polarization between the IRGC and conservative clergy. 
The press reported on examples of elite reshufflings as signs of disagreements between 
them. For example, Ahmadienjad’s dismissal of Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejehei, then 
Minister of Intelligence and Khamenei’s trustee, signaled tensions between the two camps. 
                                                
97 Safshekan, The Ayatollah’s Praetorians: Guard and 2009 Elections, 549. Safshekan distinguishes 
between the neo-principalsts and ex-IRGC leaders such as Mohsen Rezai, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and 
Ali Larijani, who have entered politics and identify as principalsts, but are not formally connected to IRGC. 
 
98 Ahdiyyih, Mohebat. Ahmadinejad and the Madi, par. 13.This new clique drew on Hojjatieh teachings, 
was supported by a powerful cleric in the Assembly of Experts, Mesbah-Yazdi. His pro-Mahdi teachings 
influenced Ahmadinejad, and IRGC.  
 
99 Former Minister of Interior, Former Chair of the Parliament, and a presidential candidate in 1998 
 
100 In Shiavism, Mehdi is redeemer of Islam who will rule the world before the Day of Judgment 
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Ejehei was believed to possess information with regard to the 2009 elections that could 
undermine Khamenei’s power (Smith 2011, 5). According to a report by the Tehran 
Bureau, both cases of Mashaei and Ejehei “were meant to be IRGC’s high command’s 
signals to Ayatollah Khamenei that they were in control and that he should toe the line—
their line”101. It seemed that not only did Ejehei not keep Ahmadinejad in the loop by 
directly reporting to Khameneni instead, but his ministry’s reviews contradicted IRGC 
claims regarding Green Movement’s qualification as a ‘velvet revolution102’. The Ministry 
of Intelligence’s report also considered Mashaei, and commander of Basij, cleric Taeb as 
“security risks”, and subsequently undercut IRGC commander’s accusations103. The above 
confrontation, and similar incidents, signaled a change in the relationship between both the 
Supreme Leader and his affiliated conservative clergy and the IRGC.  
 Why did the IRGC’s responsiveness to civilians, precisely the Supreme Leader and 
conservative elite, decline? The rapid privatization led to the expansion of the IRGC’s 
economic power, and subsequently, an increase in its political weight. The IRGC’s capacity 
to both assume economic projects and preserve its businesses was a function of state’s 
inability to foster economic competition. Not only did the privatization facilitate the 
IRGC’s economic rise, the lack of economic competition made the IRGC more 
independent of the civilians. Therefore, although there is an evidence of creeping growth 
                                                
101 Sahimi, Mohammad. “Showdown Between Khamenei and IRGC”, pbs.org, July 28, 2009. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/07/showdown-between-khamenei-and-
irgc.html 
 
102 A reference to color revolutions in the post-communist states. 
 
103 Sahimi, Mohammad. “Showdown Between Khamenei and IRGC”, pbs.org, July 28, 2009. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/07/showdown-between-khamenei-and-
irgc.html 
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of IRGC’s role in the Iranian politics, a radical transformation of the civil-military relations 
occurred during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, following the acceleration of privatization. In 
other words, one should distinguish between the intentions and the capacity to act. Even if 
one argues that the IRGC manifested aspirations to enhance its political influence, it 
became capable to actualize those political goals during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and 
more specifically in the aftermath of privatization policies.  
The IRGC’s political expansion was not decoupled from its economic aspirations. 
Some argue that the IRGC grew into political and economic power due to the support it 
received from Ahmadinejad as well as the Supreme Leader. Although that’s an accurate 
observation, what the analyses miss is the reason behind the IRGC’s economic expansion. 
If a political power, in this case the presidency and the Supreme Leadership, had the goal 
to elevate the IRGC politically, why grant it with economic projects too? Moreover, why 
implement privatization policies and reinterpret the constitution in order to give the IRGC 
economic projects? It seemed that if co-opting the IRGC was the ultimate goal, it would 
have been logical to transfer SOEs from one sector of the government to another (to the 
IRGC) by maintaining the article 44 of the Constitution rather than declaring an economic 
reform project and facing ample criticism from both the elite and the public. The IRGC’s 
economic role-expansion was a consequence of the type of privatization implemented in 
Iran; it was an unintended consequence of privatization. Consequently, a transformation in 
the IRGC’s corporal interests also was an unintended outcome of this policy. That’s why 
both the conservative elite and the Supreme Leader have been cautious with the IRGC. 
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There is evidence of tension, and hence negotiations, among the IRGC and various factions 
of the civilian elite who ultimately limited the IRGC’s political ambitions.  
The militarization of Iran’s political thesis proved wrong once Hassan Rouhani was 
elected president in 2013. During the early stages of the presidential election in 2013, there 
were speculations regarding both the Supreme Leader’s and IRGC’s preferred candidates 
for presidency, which implied existence of disagreements both within the IRGC and 
between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader. IRGC commander Jafari, as well as several 
high rank commanders along with Khameni’s son and office of the Supreme Leader formed 
one faction who supported candidacy of Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and secretary 
general of the Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili. Another group consisted 
of IRGC officers, who were reputable for being uncorrupt and professional. They 
supported a former IRGC commander of the air force, and then mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf. 
The last group were those IRGC members who amassed wealth following the privatization 
projects sanctioned by Khamenei. They rallied behind the previous IRGC Commander, 
Mohsen Rezaei104.  
The election of Rouhani signified an important outcome in terms of IRGC’s power 
in Iran, that it was not the dominant actor. Even since his election, Rouhani has been trying 
to limit the IRGC’s economic and political power. For example, as Business Insider 
reports, Rouahni embarked on an anti-corruption campaign that focused on Ahmadinejad-
era economic scandals. Under the slogan of “equality under the law”, Rouhani succeeded 
                                                
104 Sahimi, Mohammad. “IRGC, Opposition Split Over Whom to Support in Iran’s Presidential Election,” 
muftah.org,  Jun 8, 2013. http://muftah.org/irgc-opposition-split-over-whom-to-support-in-irans-
presidential-elections/#.V4da0Ff3_ww 
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in passing a bill in the parliament that removed tax-exemptions for several bonyads105 as 
well as for Khatam Al-Anbia. Rouhani’s criticism of IRGC’s power triggered its reaction 
when the IRGC condemned the president for “insulting the nation”. In response, 
government officials praised IRGC and stated that it posed no threat to private sector 
growth. Business Insider considers Rouhani’s setback in this case as an example of the 
Supreme Leader’s ability to balance the power between IRGC and the executive branch. 
This incident offers two conclusions. First, IRGC does not have an independent leverage, 
despite its attempts to take-over the Iranian economy. It still needs support of the elite in 
power to have access to state resources. Secondly, ample examples of public 
pronouncements by IRGC and other government officials indicates the existence of 
tensions, along with a process of bargaining and negotiations among the political players 
in Iran.  
In discounting Iran’s militarization thesis, scholars of Iranian politics underline 
political variables as the most determinate factors driving IRGC’s behavior (Thaler et al. 
2010, Sohrabi 2011, Ottolenghi 2011, and Mohseni 2016). Mohseni (2016) underscores 
both inter-elite relations and republican features of institutional engineering106 as 
determinant factors and concluded that Ahmadienjad’s election was a function of “internal 
transformations within the confines of the same system of multiple contentious power 
                                                
105 Astan-e Qods-e Razavi, Setad-e Farman-e Emam, Bonyad-e Mostazafan 
 
106 Mohseni, Power and Change in Iran,  Kindle Locations 1265-1266. Iran’s unique institutional engineering 
highlighted the significance of “decision-making centers” and their role as veto-players. Within a system of 
checks and balances, veto-players blocked policies, and hence, obstructed the general transformation of Iran’s 
institutions. In other words, the possibility for a change from a theocratic government to a military one, via 
institutional transformation, was minimal due to the existence of checks and balances and multiple power 
centers.   
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centers that had been established with the revolution”.  Contrary to the thesis of power-
mobilization, alterations in institutions and power dynamics should not be confused with a 
regime change (Mohseni 2016, Kinle Locations 918-919). Similarly, others have discussed 
the networked characteristics of Iranian politics and the existence of multiple power centers 
fostering competitiveness rather than monopolization of power (Thaler et al. 2010, Sohrabi 
2011). Ottolenghi (2011) identifies a symbiotic relationship whereby “IRGC takes 
advantage of its influence and capabilities in one realm in order to increase its involvement 
in another. Its growing economic clout is both an end in and of itself and a tool to advance 
other agendas.” (Ottolenghi 2011, Kindle Locations 952-953). Above explanations stress 
the role of multiple centers of power in constraining  the IRGC’s behavior.  
The IRGC’s adheres to the values of revolution and has constitutional mandate to 
protect revolution, and thus, is an ideological military. In its history, IRGC has branded 
itself as an ideological guardian of Islamic Revolution and has created an institutional 
identity around this ideology. It has intervened in politics on ideological grounds, 
especially during Khatami’s reform movement. The IRGC has maintained this loyalty, 
even during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, but it has also grown increasingly calculating and 
requires compensation in return for its loyalty. This transformation is evident primarily 
after the privatization policies of Ahmadinejad and IRGC’s growth as an economic player. 
Since Ahmadinejad’s period, the IRGC has been leveraging its accumulated economic and 
political leverage to further its corporal interest, disregarding the long-term consequences 
of those activities on Iran’s economy. For example, both the former Speaker of Majlis, 
Larijani, and Ahmadinejad praised Khatam Al-Anbia and supported the IRGC’s takeover 
		 115	
of oil projects to signal that they would compensate IRGC for the losses caused by 
sanctions on the nuclear program (Alfoneh 2010, 1-2).  
However, Recent public pronouncements between president Rouhani and 
commander in chief, Abdollah Abdollahy107, illustrate existence of a contentious 
relationship between the two. While Rouhani108 criticized the transfer of economic assets 
to what he called a “government with guns”109, the commander underscored the IRGC’s 
superior capacity to carry out economic tasks compared to foreign investors or the private 
sector110. Constant debates about the economic role of the IRGC indicates civilians’ 
inability to completely contain the IRGC but also the IRGC’s inability to completely 
override the civilians’ demands. 
While primary explanations of Iranian politics highlight the role of political 
variables, such as Iran’s republican features of institutional engineering or its network-
based politics, I underscore the importance of economic policy-making in understanding 
the IRGC’s behavior. I do not disagree with political explanations. In fact, my argument 
draws on the literature about Iran’s network-based economic and political character and 
underscores the constraints the IRGC faces in pursuing its economic and political agendas. 
My argument deviates, however, by highlighting the political implications of a change in 
the IRGC’s capacities as a consequence of the privatization under Ahmadinejad. In the 
                                                
107 The head of the IRGC’s engineering company, Khatam Al-Anbia 
 
108 “Rouhai’s Criticism of Transferring the Economy to the “Government with Guns”, www.dw.com, 23 
June, 2017.  http://www.dw.com/fa-ir/ داقتنا-یناحور-زا-ندرپس-داصتقا-ھب-تلود-اب-گنفت /a-39377726 
 
109 A reference to the IRGC 
 
110 “IRGC Commander: I Have a Serious Complaint Against Rouhani’s Government”,  www.dw.com, July 
7, 2017. http://www.dw.com/fa-ir/ رادرس-هاپس-زا-تلود-یناحور-ھیلاگ-دیدش-مراد /a-39603856 
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absence of competition and due to pseudo-privatization, the IRGC amassed a degree of 
economic power that allowed it to carve out its own unique space in the Iranian politics. 
Subsequently, it established itself as an economic and also a political player that regularly 
negotiates with the civilians and sets forth new economic demands. 
Despite establishing itself as an economic and political player, the IRGC needs to 
partner with the civilian elite to further access the state resources. After all, its capture of 
state resources has become a stark topic of criticism by Rouhani’s government.  In order 
for the IRGC to be able to continue its economic expansion, the IRGC needs the support 
of elite-linkages to obtain new projects. If the executive branch chooses to dismiss its 
demands, the IRGC enters into a process of bargaining, and succeeds if it is able to gain 
support of the Supreme Leader or a different elite-network.  
The Functional Control of the IRGC  
Hypothesis number two suggests that if the state is successful in opening to the 
global economy, and subsequently generating money, there should be a higher likelihood 
for state increase of military spending; the outcome would be a probable increase in the 
military’s functional control. In contrast, incomplete liberalization and the state’s lack of 
sufficient income incentivizes the military to retain its income-generating businesses. A 
military that focuses on both tasks of defense and economic activity would have a lower 
prospect of increasing its functional efficacy.  In other words, H2 suggests that the state’s 
incomplete liberalization and its economic incompetence negatively impact the military’s 
functional capacities. The reasoning lies behind (i) the state’s inability to fund the military 
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and (ii) the military’s occupation with two simultaneous tasks of defense and income 
generation.  
Testing the second hypothesis, this section’s empirical evidence illustrates Iran’s 
incompetence in functional capabilities. Extrapolating from Iran’s doctrinal changes, as 
well as available data on indicators of functional control, it argues that incomplete 
economic liberalization resulted in the IRGC’s inability to advance its military capabilities 
noticeably. Drawing on Brook and Stanley’s (2007) operationalization of military 
effectiveness, this section assesses the indicators of integration, responsiveness, skill, and 
quality. Integration refers to consistency between tactics, logistics, and strategic plans with 
political goals, whereas responsiveness signifies to the modification of forces to address 
adversaries’ weaknesses and new threats. Skill and quality refer to personnel’s training and 
nature of weaponry. 
First, the data suggest that Iran has not been generating sources of income and 
subsequently has not increased the defense expenditure. SIPRI111 data on Iran’s military 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP demonstrates a decline in military spending from 6.3% 
in 1988 to 2.6% in 1997, which coincides with Rafsanjani’s presidency. During Khatami, 
there was a slight increase in military spending from 2.6% to 3.3% in 2005, whereas during 
the term of Ahmadinejad, military spending fluctuated unevenly between 3.0% to 3.6%, 
with the final years reaching as low as 2.3%.  A lack of transparency makes it difficult to 
assess whether the money was spent on the regular military or the IRGC. SIPRI speculates 
                                                
111 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 
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that, with the exception of year 2012, the figures based on the Central Bank indicate 
inclusion of the IRGC’s budget in the data. Nevertheless, the data suggests that Iran has 
not been increasing its military budget dramatically, at least officially.  
The rest of this section will illustrate how the IRGC’s functional capabilities have 
not increased throughout decades despite its attempts to expand its military capabilities. As 
explained in the previous section, Iran’s incomplete economic liberalization, the state’s 
inability to generate funds, and low military spending have incentivized the IRGC’s 
maintenance in the economy. The inevitable consequence of this dual role has been lagging 
functional capabilities. Therefore, despite liberalization attempts, IRGC’s functional 
capabilities’ development has not been remarkable.  
The crux of Iran’s doctrine has been an instrumental assessment of Iran’s military 
capabilities vis-à-vis US and Israeli capacities and subsequent adoption of a “deterrence-
based doctrine that stresses raising an adversary’s risks and costs rather than reducing its 
own” (Ward 2005, 576). This doctrine looked for strategies to circumvent conventional 
war and instead focused on irregular warfare, development of WMDs, and sponsoring 
terrorism. Paired with threats to internationalize conflicts via disruption of oil trade routes, 
these strategies’ goal was to pressure for diplomatic solutions to conflicts (Ward 2005, 
567). For example, following the US deployments in Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 
2003, Iran was forced to reconsider its strategic doctrine; the goals did not change but the 
methods did.  The evidence suggests Iran’s ability to assess its economic resources and its 
threat environment and plan accordingly.  
		 119	
In 2004, Vice-Defense Minister Mohammad Shafayi Rudsari announced that Iran’s 
defense strategy was “diverse,” would allow Iran to combat great powers, and would 
compensate for Iran’s weakness in ‘classic’ forms of military capability. In 2005, the IRGC 
announced its “mosaic doctrine” and reorganized its structure by creating 31 command 
centers in Iran’s provinces. The decentralization was expected to increase unit cohesion 
and local level commanders’ authority; it was expected to make infiltration of the US forces 
into Iran difficult1. Although Iran has been able to integrate its doctrinal developments and 
its political goals, other aspects of its functional capabilities lag behind.    
The IRGC’s tasks, especially in non-conventional warfare, have met the strategies 
of the military doctrine. For example, the IRGC’s Al Quds force involvement with Hamas, 
Hizbollah, and Iraqi groups in Afghanistan to engage in irregular warfare and defend Iran’s 
interest against US and Israel has been well-documented. It is estimated that 5000 men in 
the IRGC are assigned to unconventional warfare tasks. The IRGC has one special force 
division, plus smaller units, that have been prioritized for training to conduct operations 
abroad. In another example, the doctrine states that Iran should take advantage of Persian 
Gulf’s geography and the limitations that it offers for the enemies’ maneuverability. Iran 
should use islands to launch attacks, disrupt oil trade routes, and target enemy oil 
installations; due to the Gulf’s limited depth and width, Iran could use anti-ship cruise 
missiles and mines, conduct hit-and-run missions using fast boats, deploy submarines to 
the Gulf of Oman for initial defensive purposes, and employ electronic warfare.  According 
to Ward, a report published in 2004 explained the maneuver of Ettehad-83 where the navy 
practices electronic warfare, camouflage, concealment, and deception activities aiming at 
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an enemy; these practices seem to be compatible with the overall doctrine (Ward, 2005: 
568). 
Regarding organizational training and skills, the IRGC transformed itself from a 
disorganized revolutionary militia to a professional military institution by adopting 
military-like ranks and uniforms and valuing knowledge and skills for promotion rather 
than sole ideological loyalty; education level, experience, and managerial and 
administrative skills became important factors (Cordesman 1999, 37). However, as Ward 
argues, despite the attempts to create a coherent military doctrine, there seems to be either 
an inability or unwillingness to train and support the armed forces effectively (2005, 573). 
The effectiveness of the IRGC since 1988 has declined, with bureaucratization, corruption, 
careerism, and financial abuses as likely causes. “It is the elite elements of IRGC that give 
it real meaning” (Cordesman 2007, 4-6).  
In terms of training and skills, as well as weaponry capabilities, the data is 
contradictory. For example, some IRGC units operate as conventional army divisions, 
whereas other divisions are capable of conducting asymmetric warfare and convert 
operations, but the majority of the IRGC’s land force is trained to maintain internal security 
rather than external defense. Cordesman (2007) underscores the existence of 
inconsistencies in reports about the IRGC manpower capabilities and organizational 
structure. It appears that the IRGC’s claims about its capabilities do not match experts’ 
opinions. The evidence of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear program do not 
match the IRGC’s claims either. Although Iran’s air-force strategy includes the 
development of ballistic missile program and air defense due to its limited nature of 
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technology, it might threaten civilian targets rather than military ones. The limitations of 
Iranian armed forces, such as its immobility, an infantry that utilizes towed artillery, and 
the IRGC’s poorly trained reserve force, make it difficult to plan for conventional warfare 
(Ward, 2005: 571-573).  
Similarly, although Iran has acquired the capacity to build missiles with the IRGC 
in leadership position, the ballistic missile program has not produced impressive outcomes. 
By 2008, Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities consisted of short- and mid-range missiles, 
capable of protecting Iran against its enemies in the Middle East (Alexander & Hoenig 
2008, 176-177). In 1998, however, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat 
to the United States (Rumsfeld Report) determined Iran’s domestic missile program to be 
underdeveloped and dependent on foreign assistance. Different reports estimated that Iran 
possessed 300 domestically-produced Shahab1 short-range ballistic missiles in the 80s. 
Since then, Iran has tested updated versions of Shahab, but the results have not been 
impressive. Although there is disagreement among analysts regarding Iran’s missile 
capabilities (Alexander & Hoenig 2008, 182), there are reports of failed launches, such as 
the Iranian media’s reporting on photo-shopped fake images of missile tests portraying 
failed attempts as successful in 20081. It is safe to assume that Iran also lags in developing 
its defensive technological capabilities.  
This section marshalled evidence suggesting IRGC’s incompetence in conventional 
warfare, its reliance on unconventional strategies, poor equipment and training. Overall 
lack of development and weak industrial base impedes IRGC’s military production as well. 
Therefore, despite economic liberalization, Iran has failed to improve its economic 
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performance and generate funds for the state. The result has been state’s inability to 
increase defense spending and to invest in procurement of better weaponry, or investment 
in conventional capabilities.  
The Social Control of the IRGC 
The third hypothesis suggests that if economic liberalization conditions the 
maintenance of military’s economic activities, there is a higher likelihood for militaries to 
operate as interest groups. Subsequently, the social control would decrease. In other words, 
the commercialization of militaries (their expansion into new domains after liberalization 
and privatization) accentuates their corporal interests as economic actors, and hence, 
negatively impacts their social integration. Militaries, in their pursuit of self-interest, might 
dismiss previously accepted social values at times, or may adopt new social values 
corresponding to newly emerging values in the society.  
In terms of the IRGC’s social values, the liberalization and privatization 
complicated the social aspect of the military control. One the one hand, the IRGC has 
remained loyal to conservative values of revolution, despite a political liberalization during 
Khatami that challenged some of those fundamentalist or traditional political assumptions. 
On the other hand, in the process of protecting its economic interests, the IRGC has been 
undermining some of the economic and developmental values of the 1979 revolution, 
specifically alleviation of poverty and “defending the oppressed”112.   
Since Khatami’s presidency, there has been a shift among the elite and their social 
constellation in support of democratization, liberalization, and human rights. Although the 
                                                
112 نافعضتسم زا عافد 
		 123	
reformist elite in Iran remained loyal to Islamic values, they offered reinterpretations of 
Islamic teachings and sharia law, and championed the necessity to provide political and 
social rights in accordance with the universal human rights values. Prompting Iran’s 
conservative elites’ reaction, Khatami’s presidency became a battleground between pro-
democracy and traditional-Islamist forces and their respective social constellations. During 
these tensions, and up until today, the IRGC has consistently presented itself as the 
guardian of traditional revolutionary values. Therefore, in a sense, it has not changed its 
initial social values; its social values are still in accordance with values of a portion of 
population that favors islamist and traditional ideals of the 1979 Revolution. However, 
given the pervasiveness of Khatami’s reform movement, as well as the Green movement 
that rallied behind the reformist candidates in the 2010 presidential election, one can 
conclude that the IRGC has not incorporated values of the pro-democracy portion of the 
population.  
Additionally, the rapid privatization led to the transformation of the IRGC into an 
economic actor. The consequences of this change have been twofold: first, although the 
IRGC maintains the Islamic revolutionary values, in pursuit of its economic interest, it 
deviated from its initial responsibility of assisting the state in development. In other words, 
although the IRGC has been portraying itself as an institution that upheld revolutionary 
value of “defending the oppressed”, its behavior has not been reflecting a devotion to the 
revolutionary values of eradicating poverty. For an institution that portrays itself as the 
servant of the state, it has been undermining state’s attempts to facilitate economic 
development.  
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For example, the IRGC’s self-interested behavior was evident in the activities of its 
Mehr Finance and Credit Institution. Mehr provided housing and loans to the Basij 
members, had more than seven hundred branches, and were known as “the largest ‘Private’ 
Bank in the Islamic Republic”. However, this institution has been criticized for refusing to 
give out loans to disadvantaged groups and instead has been caught in large trades in the 
Tehran Stock Exchange through its subsidiary, Mehr-e Eghtesad-e Iranian Investment 
Company (Afloneh 2010, 3-4). Such evidence highlights a disconnect between the 
ideological convictions of IRGC and its actual behavior. The IRGC’s economic projects in 
strategic sectors, and the subsequent impacts it has on foreign capital attraction, is another 
example of IRGC’s negative influence on Iran’s economic development.  
There have also been rumors regarding the IRGC’s involvement in illegal activities. 
Sadri explains how the IRGC is believed to have monopolized the “smuggling of alcohol, 
cigarettes and satellite dishes, among other things in great demand” (Sadri 2009, 102). In 
fact, during a political rift between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, in 
retaliation, revealed information about the IRGC’s illegal smuggling of cigarettes. If the 
rumors were true, the IRGC engages in the import of alcohol and satellite dishes and 
simultaneously preaches Islamic values, condemns consumption of alcohol, arrests people 
for possession of alcohol, destroys satellite dishes, and criticizes the dissemination of 
Western values. The contradictory behavior illustrates how the IRGC operates based on 
the interests of its own corporation rather than a simple adherence to the values of the 
revolution.  
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Hence, the IRGC began behaving like a corporate entity seeking profit-
maximization. The IRGC is still ideologically Islamic and in line with traditional social 
values, but is also a self-interested organization with a network of beneficiaries and social 
constellations that exert pressure on the organization. Moreover, the IRGC’s self-interested 
behavior in the economic domain has undermined the state’s economic growth and 
prosperity. Therefore, the IRGC might claim that it is protecting the regime and serving 
the values of the 1979 Revolution, but its economic role expansion and subsequent 
behavior has hurt the state and the future of its economic development. 
Conclusion 
This chapter Seth forth three hypotheses: The haphazard or incomplete economic 
liberalization in Iran, has conditioned emergence of the IRGC as an established economic 
and political player. The outcome has been decrease in civilian control of the IRGC relative 
to the decade prior to the liberalization. Functional capabilities of the IRGC has not 
changed dramatically, whereas decades of engagement in economic activities has turned 
the IRGC into an economic interest group, and hence has reduced the social control.
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Chapter 5: Economic Liberalization and Egyptian Armed Forces’ Government 
Take-Over 
 
Introduction 
Decades of economic liberalization and privatization policies in Egypt culminated 
in the establishment of crony capitalism. Different from the state-led reforms in East Asia 
or China, the economic liberalization and privatization in the Middle East and North Africa, 
including in Egypt, led to “nomenklatura privatization” (Cammett et. al 2015, 280) or 
“capitalism from above113” and the emergence of crony capitalism in Egypt. These reforms 
have incorporated trade liberalization and rapid privatization in a context of incongruent 
regulations; they also focused on the task of reform as an objective rather than a strategy 
to achieve developmental goals, and hence, failed to direct the liberalization and 
privatization to boost Egypt’s private sector and support productivity.   
The Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) operated under the conditions of a rapidly 
liberalizing and privatizing economy. Like the cases of Iran’s IRGC and China’s PLA, the 
EAF also had a history of engaging in economic developmental projects under Nasser’s 
                                                
113 Drawing on King and Szelenyi’s (2005) and Harris’ (2013) classification of capitalist developmental 
models.  
		 127	
leadership. Since 1980s, and primarily under Mubarak’s privatization plan in the 90s, the 
EAF captured opportunities offered by rapid privatization and acquired new economic 
projects. The EAF expanded into new economic sectors, such as international trade and 
energy. The economic power struggle between the EAF and Mubarak-affiliated elite, more 
precisely Hosni Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak, ended when the EAF defected from the 
civilian elite during the 2011 Egyptian revolution.  
In this chapter, I illustrate how the economic liberalization and privatization during 
Sadat, and specifically Mubarak, led to the EAF’s rise into economic power; later the EAF 
transformed  its economic empire into a political power. I argue that the types of economic 
liberalization and privatization resulted in the EAF’s economic role-expansion and made 
it less dependent on the civilians. This changing balance of power between governing 
civilians and the institution of military became problematic once the civilians attempted to 
limit the EAF’s economic power.  In the absence of both economic competition and an 
independent private sector, economic tensions rose between the civilians and the EAF over 
Egypt’s future economic trajectory. The EAF resisted economic change. In the context of 
these rising tensions, the 2011 Revolution became a catalyst for the EAF to assert its 
independence from the civilians. The economic calculation played an integral part in EAF’s 
decision to defect from Mubarak’s regime.  
The next section will outline the economic liberalization and privatization under 
Sadat and Mubarak to illustrate the process through which Egypt facilitated the emergence 
of crony-networks, including the establishment of the EAF as an economic player. 
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Egyptian Economic Trajectory and the Rise of the EAF’s Businesses 
Economic liberalization since 1974 aimed to address inefficiencies of Nasserist 
command economy. An uneven process of trade liberalization, capital attraction, and 
privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) failed to establish market mechanisms. 
Instead of fostering private sector growth and economic productivity, Egypt struggled with 
macro-economic instability, capital attraction in unproductive sectors, and capture of state 
resources by crony-networks consisting of several state-linked business networks, 
primarily Mubarak’s affiliates, and the EAF. The economic liberalization and privatization 
did not stimulate economic competitiveness, private sector growth, and economic 
diversification. In fact, Egypt’s low economic performance coupled with the dominance of 
crony-networks, including the EAF, exemplified its lack of competitiveness.  
The EAF, similar to the IRGC and the PLA, entered the economic domain during 
the period of central planning. Nasser (1956-1970) assigned high rank officers the 
supervisory role over nationalization and import substitution industrialization policies and 
thus sanctioned the EAF’s entrance into the non-defense sectors of the economy114. Pan-
Arab nationalism and the prominence of statist developmental models colored Egyptian 
economic policymaking; the EAF became a major player, accepted both by domestic and 
international actors such as the USAID, to accomplish domestic industrialization and 
developmental projects. The EAF became involved in projects on land reclamation, 
infrastructure building, basic commodity provision, manufacturing of appliances and 
                                                
114 Joudeh, Safa. “Egypt’s Military: Protecting its Sprawling Economic Empire,” Atlantic Council, January 
29, 2014. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-s-military-protecting-its-sprawling-
economic-empire 
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electronics, and other industrial projects such as steel and fertilizers. Officers became 
managers and administrators in factories and SOEs (Marshall 2015). Seeing itself at the 
forefront of national development, the military obtained power over both use of public 
lands and public enterprises (Roll 2017, 2).  Hence, similar to Iran and China, the EAF 
engaged in developmental projects during the period of central planning; it also become 
active in industrial production.  
The EAF’s economic expansion into new domains has been a gradual process. 
However, the acceleration of the privatization process during Mubarak was the turning 
point in terms of the EAF’s capability to amass substantial economic leverage. This 
economic expansion occurred in an economy where selective protectionism had 
established state-linked businesses since the late 1970s and 1980s. In the absence of 
economic competitiveness, the crony-networks pressured the government to obtain 
economic resources. Once privatization accelerated, the EAF was offered ample 
opportunities to establish itself as an economic player too. Therefore, an interplay of weak 
private sector, an undiversified economy, and privatization that prioritized the sale of SOEs 
to strategic actors over to private ones, enabled the EAF’s economic rise. In the late 2000s, 
the EAF refused to privatize its businesses and finally outcompeted other crony-networks 
once the revolution destabilized Mubarak’s regime in 2011.   
El-Ghonemy summarizes four economic development periods in Egypt: market-
based economic policies that existed pre-1952 revolution, Nasser’s central-planning from 
1956 to 1970. Financial liberalization and structural adjustments from 1970 to 1990 that 
did not resolve Egypt’s economic problems, such as its bloated public sector, and 
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ultimately a stark shift to a new strategy of economic liberalization from 1991-2000 that 
focused on the goal of achieving technological advancement and competitiveness in the 
global economy (El-Ghonemy 2010, 74). The types of EAF’s economic role-expansion 
also corresponded to the above strategies. While during Nasser, the military was engaged 
in development and industrialization projects, since liberalization in 1973, the EAF’s 
economic projects increased gradually. However, it was under Mubarak that the EAF’s 
focus shifted away from economic developmental roles; in line with Mubarak’s policy of 
opening to the global economy, the EAF also diversified and entered global markets. 
Specifically, a privatization policy focusing on joint-venture formation enabled the EAF’s 
entrance into the global economy. The EAF began diversifying its businesses and 
commercializing by partnering with domestic and foreign private investors to access both 
finances and technology. The EAF’s international joint ventures operated in industries such 
as car manufacturing, hardware, and solar panels. In addition, the EAF became a 
shareholder in critical domestic projects such as privately owned cargo container facilities 
(Marshall 2015, 4-6). 
The modes of economic liberalization, and specifically privatization policies, 
explain the reasons behind the growth of crony-networks, as well as the EAF businesses 
and its ability to outcompete other economic players since 2001. Drawing on King and 
Szelenyi’s (2005) and Harris’ (2013) arguments on capitalist developmental models, I 
illustrate that the Egyptian rapid liberalization and privatization, in the absence of 
regulatory and bureaucratic reforms, established a state characterized by “capitalism from 
above”. In this system, as Harris (2013) would explain, preserving patrimonial 
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relationships took precedent over entrepreneurship; political exchange, rather than market 
exchange, determined the nature of economic relationships. The economic system suffered 
from a lack of industrial dynamism; its market mechanisms were weak, and capture of 
SOEs by the patrimonial networks was common (Harris 2013, 65-66). Under these 
uncompetitive economic conditions, the state-linked business elite, including the EAF, 
maintained the economic system that benefited them.  
Some of Sadat’s and Mubarak’s main economic liberalization policies 
encompassed trade liberalization, capital attraction, and industrialization. Embarking on 
trade liberalization, Sadat’s rapid trade approach created a balance of payment deficit. 
Sadat inherited an economy overburdened by ambitious development projects (1960-65), 
aid-dependency and a low rate of private savings (Amin 1981, 430). His strategy of rapid 
trade liberalization and utilization of short-term credits to finance projects exacerbated 
inherited budgetary problems; the outcome was import of ‘capital and intermediate’ goods 
for consumption rather than production. While the trade boosted the housing market, other 
industries such as cement, paper, cigarettes, tiers, and buses declined (Amin 1995). 
Ultimately, the Egyptian economy suffered a balance of payment deficit. Since the late 
1980s and 1990s, Mubarak also adopted his own version of trade liberalization, which also 
negatively impacted production since it did not account for the impact of product dumping 
on domestic manufactures. Similarly, Mubarak’s trade liberalization increased imports and 
weakened domestic production (El-Ghonemy 2010, 78-83).  
The experience of trade liberalization illustrates the inadvertent character of 
economic policy-making. Egypt’s liberalization and privatization attempts did not 
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encompass specific plans to meet state’s developmental goals. As Gillespie and Sotever 
(1998), Egypt liberalized “for its own sake, without viewing…[liberalization] as a means 
to and end”. This kind of undirected reform was evident in Egypt’s policies of capital 
attraction and industrial development plans as well.  For example, this lack of planning was 
evident in fluctuating net inflows of capital: in 1990, capital inflow to Egypt was $ 734 
million; in 2003, it was around $237 million. It hiked to $11.578 billion in 2007 and 
dropped to about $-482 million in 2010. 
Regarding capital attraction during Sadat’s rule, investments went to unproductive 
sectors. As evident in sharp fluctuations115, capital attraction efforts were vulnerable to 
inept planning and execution, and were exacerbated by political instabilities. This 
incompetence was primarily a result of decoupling economic liberalization from the reform 
of regulatory and institutional frameworks, a process whereby foreign investment was not 
directed to achieve developmental goals. For example, the state created free zones but did 
not adopt export-oriented policies that would boost competitiveness. The state enforced 
joint-venture formations with foreign companies, but because the domestic private 
companies were not large enough, the foreign investors were forced to work with the SOEs, 
which subsequently discouraged the foreign companies from investing in the domestic 
economy (Gillespie and Stoever 1988).  
                                                
115 “Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows”, World Bank Data, n/d. The data suggests that Foreign 
investment fluctuated radically at different periods. According to the World Bank data, there were 
substantial fluctuations of FDI (net inflows, BoP), with $ 1.216B in 1979 and $1.25B in 1989 as the highest 
points and then dropping to $295.571B in 1982. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=EG 
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Therefore, Egypt’s trade and capital attraction strategies did not promote exports, 
nor did they promote competitiveness in production. Its policies instead contributed to the 
establishment of an economically uncompetitive system. Due to the economy’s 
uncompetitive nature, the EAF businesses were able to survive and thrive. For example, 
the process of investment in unproductive sectors continued leading to investment in 
domains dominated by the EAF. The military’s position in profitable sectors were greater 
than other economic actors, and subsequently attracted more foreign investment. 
Additionally, military businesses have been able to establish partnerships with gulf 
conglomerates and western multinational corporations using the International financial 
institutions’ loans (Casabon 2015).  
Although both Sadat and Mubarak adopted industrialization strategies, neither 
succeeded in fostering private sector development. Sadat’s industrial policy retained 
Egypt’s rentier economy instead of boosting industrial production. Mubarak attempted to 
resolve inefficiencies of a rentier economy and Egypt’s bloated public sector. State’s heavy 
debt, however, hampered Mubarak’s industrialization plans. Under Sadat, Egypt’s GDP 
share of industrial production exceeded agricultural production by 1979 (30.5% for 
industry and 21% agriculture), but the main portion belonged to largely oil production. 
Along with an increase in the oil production (57.4% of GDP in 1983), the share of 
manufacturing in the industrial sector dropped from 79% in 1975 to 40% in 1983 (Algan 
2003, 160-161). Instead of an export-oriented strategy, Mubarak (1981-2011) also 
attempted to reestablish import substitution industrialization to boost industrial production. 
His plan offered protective tariffs to domestic industries and lowered their interest rates 
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and taxes. Mubarak, however, could not resolve the problem of domestic debt, partially 
due to the high political costs of cutting spending. Again, as has been discussed thus far, 
Egypt’s economic reform failed to foster productivity, competitiveness, and diversification 
of the Egyptian economy.  
Although Egypt registered GDP growth, it failed to improve its global 
competitiveness relative to China’s ranking. For example, the World Economic Forum’s 
data suggests that in the category of ability to encourage technological advancement, the 
rank of spending on research and design was 70 out of 104 in 2004/2005, whereas China 
ranked 26. Hence, the privatization in the late 90s and early 2000s, and the liberalization 
that focused on technological advancement, did not yield expected results. This is despite 
the fact that Egypt had a higher rank for FDI and technology transfers compared to China: 
Egypt’s rank was 44 while China ranked 52. Therefore, although Egypt opened its 
economy, it could not foster economic competitiveness. Egypt’s global competitiveness 
index fluctuated dramatically and did not indicate a consistent growth over decades either. 
Table 9:World Economic Forum116, Egypt’s Growth Competitiveness Ranking (1985-
2017) 
 
 
                                                
116 World Competitiveness Reports (1995, 2000, 2004/05, 2005/06, and 2015). 
 1995 (out 
of 48 
states) 
2000(out 
of 58 
states) 
2004/200
5(out of 
104 
states) 
2005/2006 
(out of 117 
states) 
2015 (out of 134 
states) 
Egypt 27 42 62 53 115 
Adjusted 
rank (out 
of 134 
states) 
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The above rankings highlight the outcomes of Mubarak’s implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) following constant renegotiations with the IMF and 
the WB. After the Gulf War in 1991, along with a promise for debt cancelation, Egypt 
agreed to a new package of the SAP policies (Amin 1990, 21).  While these policies117 
boosted growth, they also received ample criticism (Ansari 1987, Belev 2001, Sika 2013) 
since they addressed short-term fiscal problems instead of establishing market mechanisms 
and competition.  Instead of resolving structural inefficiencies, the regimes’ 
implementation of the SAP exacerbated political and economic instabilities. In Egypt, 
particularly, crony-networks emerged and consolidated their power in the 90s, with the 
EAF rising into power in 2000s (Casabon 2015).  
Therefore, the state, unable to implement the SAP effectively, constantly struggled 
with introduction of new workable policies. Privatization being one of those strategies, 
Egypt also experimented with various privatization policies, but these policies did not 
strengthen the private sector either. On the contrary, during privatization, as Wurzel (2004) 
discusses, Egypt experienced the growth of interest groups. Wurzel (2004) underscores the 
institutional context, i.e., the specifics of the rentier state, to explain the economic 
networks’ behavior in the context of privatization. To alleviate the state’s fiscal burden of 
indebtedness and inefficient state-subsidized SOEs, privatization was destined to alter the 
“power equilibrium” by favoring new actors vis-à-vis public actors. Instead, unlike 
expectations, privileged networks manipulated pre-reform conditions in their favor 
(Wurzel 2004: 104-105).  
                                                
117 The Washington Consensus.  
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As Nagarajan explains, not only did the SAP produce a “triangle of poverty,”118 it 
also facilitated the emergence of “conglomerates owned by politically well-connected 
families” instead of establishing a competitive market. “Osman, Bahgat, Seoudi, Mohamed 
Mahmoud and Orascom groups” were families that formed conglomerates and formed joint 
ventures with foreign partners (cited in Nagarajan 2013, 32). Sika, similarly argues, that 
the Washington Consensus has not produced the expected results. In the case of Egypt, 
liberalization and privatization contributed to “strengthening ties among the government, 
the ruling party, and the businessmen.” For example, the Investment Law 8 in 2005 did not 
lead to the establishment of a free market; on the contrary, deregulation and tax-
marketization conditioned the emergence of monopolies, whereby alliances between the 
government and the business elite led to the misuse of public resources (Sika 2013, 45-47).  
Shahid (2002) also assesses the reasons behind the success of some networks in 
capturing resources. The author underscores the impact of privatization in creating 
networks—a process through which state officials and former bureaucrats formed 
networks, captured the spoils of privatization, and sidelined the established business actors 
(Shahid 2002, 78). A new network consisting of state-business connections emerged in the 
90s whereby the businesses played a two-level game: preserving crony capitalism and 
competing over rents created by shifting policies (Shahid 2002, 78). These business elite 
consisted of mainly 32 businessmen involved in import substitution; they benefited from 
protectionism and could not compete in the international markets. They were further 
strengthened in the 90s because the privatization allowed them to both sustain and enlarge 
                                                
118 Unemployment, low wages, and income inequality. 
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their interests against exporters who suffered from a collective action problem. These 
networks sustained the uncompetitive character of the system—access to information, 
connections with the bureaucrats, and economic opportunities—because it benefited them 
and weeded out competitors (Shahid 2002, 98). EAF also operated as an economic actor, 
and subsequently benefited from the same privatization policies.  
In terms of the EAF’s economic power, scholars (Abul-Magd 2011, Casabon 2015,) 
have highlighted the linkages between privatization policies under Mubarak and the EAF’s 
economic growth. For example, Abul-Magd explains that Sadat’s privatization and import 
of consumer goods led to a partial downgrading of military power due to the privatization 
of a portion of military-controlled SOEs and facilitated the rise of new Sadat-affiliated 
crony capitalists as competitors with the military economic power. However, this period 
was short-lived and was reversed after the 1979 Peace Accord; the following years’ policies 
strongly contributed to the further expansion of the military’s economic clout accompanied 
by subsidies and tax exceptions for the EAF. Later, Mubarak’s privatization and 
liberalization project in 1992 did not include the privatization of military businesses. On 
the contrary, the military retained its businesses, and the corruption in the process of 
privatization benefited high-ranking officers who received positions in privatized SOEs119. 
Although since 1998 Egypt attempted to make the privatization reliant on market forces, 
the process did not result in the sale of SOEs to private actors. Instead, it mainly took place 
via the sale of SOEs to strategic investors (Shahid 2002). 
                                                
119 Abul-Magd, Zeinab. “The Army and the Economy in Egypt,” Jadaliyya, December 23, 2011. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3732/the-army-and-the-economy-in-egypt 
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Casabon120 (2015) also argues that although Sadat’s Infitah introduced market 
mechanisms and boosted US-Egyptian private sector growth, it was the privatization in the 
90s that entrenched the military’s role as an economic actor. Offering an estimate of the 
military’s share of the GDP as 40 percent, military businesses were part of a broader public 
sector whose enterprises benefited from “private oligopoly” system that originated post-
privatization. While SOEs privatized and the welfare state shrank, the oligarchy emerged 
with the aid of “state subsidies and almost exclusive access to bank credit”; furthermore, 
the state offered tax cuts to boost investment. In the context of capital inflight, the EAF 
businesses attracted international investments due to their dominance in the profitable 
sectors. Meanwhile, the tax system did not support smaller businesses. Smaller businesses 
were unable to grow and incapable of guaranteeing basic rights and benefits to laborers 
due to the lack of opportunities to borrow (Casabon 2015). Therefore, selective 
protectionism, instead of competitiveness, prioritized state-linked economic actors, 
specifically the EAF, over the private sector. 
There are radically different estimates on the EAF’s share of the Egyptian economy. 
Marshall and Stacher (2012) report that estimates vary between 5 to 40 percent or more 
(2012, 12). Other reports suggest fluctuations between 40 percent (Naguib Sawiris) to 40-
60 percent (Transparency International). Springborg, an expert on the EAF, offers an 
estimate of 10 to 40 percent121. If the EAF controlled about the 40% of the Egyptian 
                                                
120 Casabon, Christina. “Egypt’s Military Economy”, opendemocracy.net, July 29, 2015. 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/cristina-casabón/egypt%27s-military-economy 
 
121 Kholiaf, Dahlia. “The Egyptian Army’s Economic Juggernaut”, Aljazeera.com, August 5, 2013. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/20138435433181894.html 
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economy, and since 2012 has been acquiring more projects, it is safe to assume that the 
EAF has become a central economic player in the Egyptian economy. In an interview with 
Al Jazeera, Springborg, an expert on Egyptian military, stated that "The question isn't what 
sectors do they [the EAF] invest in, but rather: is there a sector that they don't invest 
in?" For example, Ministry of Military Production runs 14 companies that produce military 
equipment such as tank shells and ammunition, as well as civilian goods such as 
“fertilizers, sports equipment, cement, pasta and cars122”.  
Therefore, since Sadat, and following liberalization policies in 1970s, the EAF’s 
assumed new economic projects in building infrastructures (waterways, transportation, 
telecommunication, construction); it also became involved in real estate and housing, food 
self-sufficiency, and import of commodities (Roy 1992, 703). Furthermore, the 1979 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty led to cuts in defense expenditure, and the EAF was ordered 
to generate its own defense revenue123 (Harding 2016, par.3). Hence, transforming its 
military production into a civilian one, the Ministry of Defense-affiliated National Service 
Project Organization (NSPO) controlled the military’s economic production in the civilian 
domain, including the production of washing machines, heaters, clothing, pharmaceuticals, 
tourism etc.124  
                                                
122 Ibid 
 
123 Harding, Henry. “Analysis: Egypt's Military-Economic Empire,” Middle East Eye,  March 26, 2016. 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-egypts-military-economic-empire-35257665 
 
124 Stephen, LTC., Gotowicki, H. “The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society”, 1997.  
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/egypt/egypt.htm#26 
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The EAF is also affiliated with the Arab Organization for Industrialization the 
National Services Projects Organization (NSPO), and the Ministry of Military Production, 
as well as infrastructure-building semi-public or private companies. It also operates in 
strategically significant civilian sectors, such as airports. According to Transparency 
International, the businesses profit both the military institution and individuals. The EAF 
has been controlling most the public land (desert, agriculture, and urban: 94 percent of 
Egyptian land) and receives compensations from the government by auctioning the land 
and transforming military zones into civilian ones. Control over the coastline, categorized 
as a border, is another source of revenues following developments in tourism industry. The 
following table summarizes both the sectors of activity and known companies related to 
the EAF:   
Table 10: The EAF's Economic Role Expansion (Sectors & Companies) 
Sector Company name Notes 
Food 
Production 
The National Service Projects 
Organization (founded in 1979) 
Army runs chain of 
supermarkets 
representing 28% of 
population living 
below poverty line 
Energy Since 2016, Ministry of Military 
Production and Ministries of Petroleum 
and Electricity established a joint 
company to maintain state’s power-
stations 
Tharwa Petroleum Company 
Arab Organization of Industrialization 
formed joint ventures with a firm from 
UAE to invest in renewable energy 
Provision of 
electricity 
Veto power over oil 
and gas production 
since 2016 
 
Mixture of 
civilian and 
military goods 
Ministry of Military Production 
Arab Organization of Industrialization 
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Therefore, overall privatization strategies were irregular, the pace of privatization 
fluctuated, and the ultimate outcome was consolidation of crony-networks rather than the 
development of a private sector.  Similarly, even in 2000s, when Mubarak authorized 
Gamal Mubarak to embark on a rigorous economic reform project to strengthen the private 
sector, the reform produced mixed outcomes. A privatization program, overseen by Ahmad 
Nazif’s cabinet (2004-2011), aimed at creating a corporate sector capable of competing 
internationally. The program included banking privatization, reforms of trade and the tax 
system (tax cuts and restructuring administration), and liberalization of the financial sector 
in 2005. These policies led to an increase in growth, as well as an increase in FDI (8.1% of 
the GDP) in the energy, real estate, and tourism sectors, as well as a construction boom. 
However, from the mid-2000s, a combination of insider firms and ventures linked to Gamal 
Mubarak directed this process of reform. These ventures had the support of the state, were 
financed by international and Arab interests, and profited from the privatization process. 
These emerging businesses had positions in the governing bodies and were connected to 
one another, which gave them leverage over economic policies (296). Privatization did not 
resolve inequalities and did not alleviate poverty or unemployment. The “[c]rony nature of 
private-sector development” hampered private sector development and has empowered “a 
new class of capitalists connected to the state” (295-296).  
Construction 
and 
Infrastructure 
Armed Forces Engineering Authority Developmental 
projects 
+Building parks and 
ports in the Suez Canal 
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In 2008 Mubarak, adopted a new proposal to privatize 86 out of 153 public 
companies via “voucher privatization” and “mass privatization.125” Despite a history of 
privatization in Egypt, according to Saif, the problem was over a “highly publicized shift” 
in privatization after the adoption of new regulations in 2008. Citing Mubarak’s interview 
in Al-Ahram Weekly, where he defends “greater involvement of the people in managing 
public assets,” Saif expressed concerns regarding Mubarak’s attitude towards ownership, 
and public-private relations. Saif explained that the literature suggests that a mere transfer 
of ownership has not been the most important factor in successful privatization but rather 
coupling of the ownership-transfer with suitable regulation and increased competition. The 
author argued that allowing the public to partake in ownership would not facilitate wealth 
distribution. He anticipated, then, that what was required was the establishment of 
institutions that would thwart monopolies and their formation. Unlike Mubarak’s 
expectation, the author predicted the rise of “opportunistic businessmen” in the absence of 
a clear institutional mechanism to manage privatization, along with unclear goals such as 
the involvement of the Egyptian population to manage the SOEs.  
Liberalization and privatization strategies of Sadat and Mubarak (in 90s and in 
2000s) did not foster competitiveness. On the contrary, the state experienced emergence of 
business-elite that benefited from selective protectionism and hampered competition. What 
were the implications of this uncompetitive economy? In an uncompetitive unfair system, 
the military businesses benefited. First, the military utilized the cheap (forced) labor by 
                                                
125Saif, Ibrahim, Choucair, Farah. “Egypt's Privatization Initiative Raises Questions,” Carnegie 
Endowment, December 2, 2008. The IMF imposed SAP since 1991 contributed to the sale of 26% of the 
SOEs to Employee Shareholder’s Associations, 24% were privatized via stock market, 24% via liquidation, 
and 22% were sold to anchor investors. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/22479 
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conscripts who were employed in military businesses. It also benefited from a system of 
licenses and permits that favored the EAF in biddings for public contracts and facilitated 
creation of partnerships with private investors. While these public-private partnerships held 
the state reliable for losses, the EAF reaped the profits. Moreover, the EAF had an 
advantage over competitors due to its access to off-book subsidies. For example, the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) decided to increase the prices of fuel for 
industries that competed against EAF businesses while the EAF purchased subsidized fuel. 
Additionally, not only were military businesses not productive, they prevented the growth 
of small-sized private sector enterprises due to unfair competition.  
An example is EAF’s profiteering via imports without a necessity to create jobs or 
be productive. Roy (1992) identifies the EAF as a major contributor to the ‘secret economy. 
It manages lands, produces food for domestic consumption, engages in real estate 
development, speculations, and investments, provides for-profit health services to the 
civilians by utilizing its military hospitals; it makes textbooks, smuggles goods via free 
economic zones, uses military resources for private constructions, and reclaims lands (Roy 
1992, 704). This hidden economy utilized inadequacies of the public sector, and its 
operation had repercussions for wealth distribution. It created wealthy groups who did not 
necessarily invest in domestic projects but rather sent their capital overseas, benefited from 
corruption, and created a business environment un-conducive to production, innovation, 
and profitability. This economic system also created coalitions between the military and 
big businesses (Roy 1992, 709-710). These networks have created a self-perpetuating cycle 
of inefficiency whereby economic survival is a function of selective protectionism and 
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access to the state resources rather than of firms’ profitability and competitiveness in a free 
market economy. In turn, these economic actors, including the EAF, impede the 
development of a functioning market and an independent private sector. 
Abul-Magd (2011), in an article titled “The Army and the Economy in Egypt,”126 
raises the issue of transparency of the EAF’s economic activities. Not only have the EAF’s 
economic activities not been subject to public debate, the EAF also lacks sufficient 
expertise for economic tasks. Abul-Magd explains that the military has announced its 
engagement in profitable enterprises such as “selling and buying of real estate on behalf of 
the government, domestic cleaning services, running cafeterias, managing gas stations, 
farming livestock, producing food products, and manufacturing plastic table covers,” but 
there has been a taboo on public discussion around these activities, especially their 
contribution to the military budget. Although the defense-related activities’ budget was 
available to the public due to the demands of foreign donors (US aid) for transparency, it 
is the non-defense portion of the military budget that is kept secret. Abul-Magd argues that 
the military were an obstacle to liberalization policies (neoliberal model) not due to its 
convictions to a socialist model but due to its economic interests. Corrupt practices, such 
as forcing the purchase of army-produced food by the soldiers in remote areas, offering 
deals to civilian distributors to assist the military in selling its products, and a law 
permitting the military to take over public lands for defense or commercial purposes also 
became sources of profit.  
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As discussed thus far, new elite-business alliances emerged post-privatization, in 
the early 2000s. Although the EAF’s expansion into new domains occurred from the 1980s, 
the Egyptian economy, in the late 1990s, also faced the emergence of Gamal Mubarak’s 
network of businessmen whose ambition to monopolize and privatize threatened the EAF’s 
economic empire. Known for their neoliberal ideology, this new group challenged the 
ruling elite by seeking to expand their control within the National Democratic Party (NDP). 
This group challenged the EAF’s monopolies in some sectors; they emphasized 
privatization in sectors controlled by the state and the military, i.e., national banks and land 
reclamation projects (Salem 2013, par. 10-11) 127. The threat of the new business elite was 
later instrumental in the EAF’s decision-making process but also illustrated how the 
establishment of the EAF as an economic actor provided it with enough economic leverage 
to weed out its competitors when the opportunity presented itself. 
The EAF succeeded in securing economic assets over the course of rapid 
privatization and transformed itself into an economic actor. Once the state decided to target 
military-owned businesses, the military reacted by defecting and later executing a 
government take-over in order to expand its businesses. Hence, taking over the Egyptian 
political and economic system, under Gen. Sisi’s leadership, the Egyptian military was in 
a unique position to further expand its economic empire. Egypt’s economic liberalization 
and privatization led to the emergence of what Harris (2013) characterized as capitalism 
from above. The EAF’s economic expansion was also an integral part of this economic 
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developmental model. The next section will focus on the impact of these economic policies 
on the question of civilian control.  
The Political Control of the EAF 
This section tests the number one hypothesis regarding the impact of Egypt’s 
uncompetitive economy on increased political leverage of the EAF. (H1) suggests that the 
incomplete economic liberalization and inability to establish competitive mechanisms 
provided opportunities for the EAF’s consolidation of its businesses, and ultimately led to 
the EAF’s assumption of political power. Although the EAF, similar to the militaries of 
Iran and China, has been involved in the political sphere, the degree of civilian control over 
the military declined following the EAF’s further expansion into the economy. The 
economic interest played an integral part in the EAF’s decision to defect from Mubarak’s 
regime during the 2011 uprising, and later in its takeover of the government in 2013.  
Similar to other autocratic regimes, Egypt’s civilian control is also void of 
democratic institutional mechanisms of control. Since the 1952 Revolution, the Egyptian 
military has been an indispensable part of the autocratic rulers’ power calculation and has 
played an integral role in suppressing dissent. However, given the account of civilian 
control as a continuum in the present study, the degree of civilian control of the EAF 
changed in the aftermath of Mubarak’s liberalization policies. Although the line between 
civilian and military control has historically been ambiguous, the EAF’s responsiveness to 
the government changed in the aftermath of the privatization policies, specifically in the 
late 2000s.  
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It is imperative to note that in Egypt, similar to Iran and China, the military  initially 
obeyed the civilians’ orders. Although the EAF exerted influence, the scholars of Egyptian 
civil-military relations discuss its limited role in Egyptian politics. Droz-Vincent explains 
that the armies of Arab autocracies, despite their vital role, did not constitute the core of 
the autocratic regimes. Even in states where militaries were integral in forming new states, 
“there has been a creeping ‘civilianization’ or a ‘demilitarization’ of political systems” 
(2011, 2-3). The imperative has been state control via “a few networks of family members, 
high bureaucrats, political elites, economic cronies, and high officers linked to the president 
or king.” In these autocratic regimes, including Egypt, the army supported the rulers, 
especially during crisis. There was a degree of separation between military and political 
affairs in Egypt. Even though some officers exerted political power, the military as an 
institution maintained distance from everyday politics. The military portrayed itself as the 
protector of the state and engaged in tasks of external defense. Examples of the army’s 
involvement in crushing protests, such as the 1986 riots over salaries or the 1997 attacks 
of armed Islamists, according to the author, were exceptional moments rather than the norm 
(Droz-Vincent 2011, 3-4). 
For example, Frisch (2013) also describes Egyptian politics as a system consisting 
of an authoritarian leader, who in operation with a small group of family members, 
businessmen, and experts “severely limited the military influence” (2013, 182). This status 
continued under both Nasser and Sadat, and later Mubarak (during the 90s). Although the 
EAF had significant influence over the defense ministry, Mubarak, for example, attempted 
to weaken the EAF by enhancing the budget and power of the police and allocating the 
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task of internal security to intelligence agencies, the Egyptian Intelligence Services. 
Mubarak also kept top military officers away from the position of Prime Minister (Frisch 
2013, 183). Other scholars (Noll 2017, Droz-Vincent 2011) also underscore the limited 
political role of the EAF. Noll (2017) also points to the EAF’s low political profile until 
the 2011 uprising (2017, 2), which later led to the removal of Mohammad Morsi in 2013.  
Therefore, in assessing civil-military relations in Egypt, scholars underscore the 
contained nature of the EAF’s role in the political governance of the state.  Simultaneously, 
the discussions highlight the EAF’s economic privileges. While the EAF was a politically 
subservient military, its role as a political player changed in the final years of Mubarak’s 
regime. Understanding the EAF’s defection from Mubarak’s regime without an 
examination of its economic motives would be incomplete.  
For example, Noll (2017) states how Arab regimes have utilized various strategies 
to keep militaries loyal, such as permission for the Egyptian military to engage in tourism-
related activities in Sinai and coastal lands (Noll 2017, 3). Frisch (2013) also relates that 
the Egyptian state enabled the EAF’s substantial economic expansion, especially in the 
1990s. Frisch states that “the new more economic-oriented concept of national security was 
manipulated to enhance the Army’s privileged role in the state and its economy” (Frisch 
2013, 184). The increasing economic power became a major culprit for the civilians. The 
privatization in the 90s offered opportunities for networks with linkages to the state to 
expand their power; the state did not take measures to stop this process. On the contrary, 
the state facilitated this process by offering provisions to those groups, including the EAF. 
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It was when Mubarak’s regime decided to limit the EAF’s economic power that the 
EAF reacted. Although it succeeded in reducing the role of military in governing positions 
(reducing from 12 to 7 by 1989), attempts to curb the EAF’s economic power failed. For 
example, in 1991, Mubarak assigned Yusuf Sabri Abu Taleb to the position of Defense 
Minister. Taleb aimed to divest military businesses but was removed and replaced by 
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who protected and retained the military’s economic empire128.  
Furthermore, the EAF’s rise into power in Egypt is an economic story. Analysis of 
civil-military relations in Egypt highlight the EAF’s economic interest as a crucial factor 
in its decision-making. Albretch and Bishara (2011) discuss a change in the EAF’s 
behavior since Mubarak’s new wave of economic liberalization policies in 2003. The 
authors argue that although the EAF historically influenced Egypt’s politics and 
economics, it did not have a direct governing role; the EAF remained in the background 
and retained its privileges. After 2003, however, the EAF became distressed with the 
increasing power of Gamal Mubarak, Husni Mubarak’s son and his possible heir, as well 
as Gamal’s economic policies. Suspicious of Gamal Mubarak’s liberalization and 
privatization, the military supported state interventionism (Albretch and Bishara 2011, 18). 
Not only did rapid privatization and liberalization upset the public, the EAF capitalized on 
the situation to impede the process of reform. 
The EAF’s persistence in maintaining its economic interests post-2013 also 
supports the economic story. Under Mubarak, the EAF had a low political profile. 
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However, since the 2011 uprising and removal of Mohammad Morsi in 2013, EAF has 
shown a consistent commitment in protecting its economic interests via political means. 
Ever since, the Ministry of Military Production has been growing in importance, signaling 
Sisi’s priorities, which have been evident in his emphasis on the military’s role in Egypt’s 
national development as well (Noll 2017, 2). In September of 2016, Sisi spoke against the 
critics who considered the military’s economic activities as an impediment to fulfilling its 
defense role competently; he claimed that the military is assisting the government to 
“rebuild” the state129.  
For example, Aljazeera130 reports that on April 6th of 2012, grassroots groups 
initiated a campaign to boycott military products. As an activist state, “[j]ust like we’re 
trying to bring them down politically, now we’re also trying to do it economically and 
redistribute the wealth to the people.” There was anxiety among generals regarding a 
possible increase in oversight over the budget. The military tried but failed to ensure its 
autonomy from budgetary oversight by trying to pass constitutional declarations131. Other 
newspapers also offer similar insights. The Middle East Monitor132 published a report based 
on a local newspaper’s analysis of the EAF’s motives. The report argues that the military 
junta “worked with all of its strength to protect its lucrative economic interests that made 
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the military establishment a business empire and one of the most important factors 
influencing the country’s economy.”  
Moreover, measures have been taken to further reduce civilian control over the 
military budget. The 2014 Constitution assigns the National Defense Council, consisting 
of mainly military individuals, to control of the defense budget, eroding a civilian 
mechanism of control via parliament. In addition, important parliament committees and 
positions, such as the head of Defense and National Security Committee, were assigned 
from military intelligence services, eroding another mechanism of civilian control. There 
has also been evidence of increasing militarization of governmental positions ever since 
(Noll 2017, 6). It was in the context of threatened economic interests that the military began 
establishing itself as a political player. If one cannot distinguish the story of Egyptian 
revolution of 2011 from its broader economic context, it is safe to assume that the military 
as an economic actor operated to protect its interests.  
The discussion so far highlights one key theme in all analyses—the EAF’s 
economic interest as a motivating factor. Hence, any explanation underscoring political 
variables such as elite rivalries or the role of uprising must consider the EAF’s economic 
interests in decision-making. In fact, understanding the Egyptian revolution of 2011 
without studying the economic dimension would be incomplete. Scholars discuss the 
relationship of neoliberal economic policies to the 2011 uprising. Salem133 explains how 
Gamal Mubarak’s neoliberal agenda aggravated the anxieties of the public, leading to a 
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revolution that, if it succeeded in overthrowing the regime, would also negatively impact 
the military’s privileges. These economic policies also altered the balance of power among 
the ruling elite, incentivizing the EAF to intervene in 2011, resulting in a military-led 
transitional government and ultimately a constitution that under Morsi protected the 
military’s businesses (Salem 2013, par. 17).   
Similarly, Hanieh (2011) also analyzes the political crisis of Arab Spring by 
underscoring the significance of economic policies—neoliberalism. Beginning with 
Sadat’s Infitah, the neoliberal policies empowered state-sponsored capitalist classes of 
military officers and a commercial bourgeoisie involved in foreign trade. Mubarak 
accelerated this process. With a specific aim to boost private sector, the liberalization of 
agriculture and state sector retrenchment resulted in the transformation of social relations 
in rural areas and the deterioration of working conditions for privatizing SOE workers (11-
13). Growing disparities, whereby the state-affiliated elite benefited from privatization and 
the rest suffered gravely, led to waves of protests in Egypt in 1977 and later during 
Mubarak’s reign in 2006-2008.  
For example, Nagarajan argues that the IMF’s and WB’s evaluation of Egypt’s 
success relied on measuring “short-term fiscal parameters.” The policies were not 
conducive to long term growth but instead focused on supply-side economics, did not 
promote export-led strategies, and boosted the growth of the construction sector. In 
addition, SAP contributed to income disparity, growing inequality due to rising food prices, 
and stagnating wages (Nagarajan 2013, 31-32). Ghonemy (2010) also discusses the 
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consequences of short-term stabilization and long-term adjustment programs134 that aimed 
at alleviating the fiscal/monetary system and resource distribution, respectively. Although 
data suggests a dramatic growth in the private sector’s market share (from 9% in 1980s to 
67%), its growth resulted primarily from a shrinking public sector; meanwhile, the export-
promotion lagged. Unaddressed institutional barriers and lack of efficient infrastructure 
were among the factors impeding exports.  
Challenging the neoliberal thesis, Hanieh (2011) argues that the IMF and the WB 
misjudged the success and resilience of the Egyptian economy when they praised 
Mubarak’s attempts to implement the liberalization and privatization policies (Hanieh 
2011, 15). Furthermore, unable to mitigate the shocks of the 2008 global economic crisis, 
Egypt suffered due to a decreased demand in exports to Europe, massive layoffs in Middle 
Eastern countries, and a loss of revenue from remittances, as well as increasing costs of 
food and energy (17-18). In this context, the protests that overthrew Mubarak were not 
merely political demands but a result of decades of accumulated grievances in the 
economic domain (Hanieh 2011, 22). In this scenario as well, the EAF became an arbiter 
during an economic struggle between the disenfranchised population and a political elite; 
it did so not out of concern for the population but to protect its own economic interests in 
a crippled regime.  
Arguments criticizing the impact of neoliberal reforms on the social makeup offer 
two significant insights regarding the hypothesis of this section: first, decades of failed 
policies created a major cleavage between the poor and the elite, which resulted in uprisings 
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in 2011. Second, once the population began protesting in 2011, the EAF became pivotal in 
supporting the regime vis-à-vis protestors. However, given the history of tensions between 
the business elite and EAF over Egypt’s economic policy, and vulnerability of the regime 
to ongoing protests, the EAF defected from Mubarak’s regime, protecting its own 
institutional interests, primarily its economic interests, over the ruling elite. It did not defect 
in order to side with the population but to maintain its narrow economic interests.  
Despite a plurality of stakeholders—the political elite, public sector technocrats, 
public sector managers, private sector, interest-based organizations, and various identity- 
and interest-based actors—the political elite have historically benefited from the rentier 
economy. Comprised of a network of families, these elite exploited the national economy 
and internal finances and maintained their political power and also co-opted various actors 
by offering economic privileges. Hence, throughout privatization, maintaining this pre-
reform system of economic distribution helped preserve these alliances and networks and 
was in the interest of the state. Similarly, having established itself as an accepted economic 
player, the EAF reacted to a new wave of privatization policies targeting its businesses 
from 2003. The explanations for its defection from Mubarak’s regime in 2011 would not 
be complete without considering the role of its economic interests, along its struggle with 
Gamal Mubarak’s camp over economic policies.  
The Functional Control of the EAF 
This study assesses the impact of economic liberalization on the functional power 
of the EAF. Hypothesis number 2 suggests that if economic liberalization is incomplete, 
there is a higher likelihood for the military to turn into an economic interest group, which 
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would decrease the functional efficacy. Note that this study assesses changes in the 
functional control prior to and after economic liberalization. However, assessing H2 with 
regard to economic policies impact on the EAF’s functional power is challenging given the 
role of the US military aid and training. Separating the impact of economic liberalization 
on functional capabilities from the impact of military aid would be a problematic task.  
Testing four dimensions of functional control—integration, responsiveness, skills, 
and quality—this section will illustrate that despite the US military support, the EAF has 
not registered a remarkable improvement in its functional capabilities.  Given the lack of 
evidence and reports on Egyptian military’s functional power, as well as on the role of 
military aid, this section will argue that an absence of strong evidence suggesting a notable 
change in functional capabilities of EAF throughout decades could help extrapolate two 
relevant conclusions: (i) as the hypothesis would predict, the incomplete economic 
liberalization and subsequent transformation of EAF into a commercialized military has 
turned it into an interest group and consequently negatively impacted its functional 
capabilities, and (ii) even if lagging functional capabilities are the results of non-economic 
variables, one could conclude that economic liberalization did not have a positive impact 
on functional capabilities or had no impact, to say the least.   
First, Huntington’s (1964) argument of objective control and professional 
military’s obedience to the civilians does not apply to the case of Egypt given EAF’s role 
as governors of the state today. Hence, because the EAF has assumed political roles, the 
presumed relationship between professionalization and subsequent objective control does 
not exist. Given the EAF’s political role in governing the state, one could conclude that the 
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EAF has not undergone professionalization to an extent that would turn it into an 
exclusively professional military. Consequently, its functional capabilities have lagged 
throughout the decades. 
Since 1987 to 2012, the US provided $1.3 billion yearly in aid to Egypt’s military. 
Egypt has been the number two receiver of US bilateral foreign assistance after Israel. 
Despite US aid and military training, analysts highlight discrepancies between readiness, 
training, and weaponry. After 1973, the EAF underwent professionalization in terms of 
weapons’ acquisition and trainings. However, the outcome was deemed slow and 
incompetent. As Kechichian and Nazimek (1994-95) explain, the professionalization of the 
military institution followed the 1979 peace treaty (Kechichian and Nazimek, par. 1). This 
transformation has not been easy. First, despite $1.3 billion in yearly US aid since 1979, 
the transformation from Soviet to Western equipment was challenging, with 50% of the 
equipment belonging to the Soviet era by the mid-1990s. A change in weaponry was 
coupled with new training, especially via programs such as International Education and 
Training (IMET) provided in the aid package. The officers trained in the US acquired new 
skills; since the 1990s, new tactical concepts were introduced to the military. However, as 
Kechichian and Nazemik assess, “a cadre of Egyptian military leaders remained primarily 
Soviet-trained,” which resulted in their attempts to marginalize US-trained officers via 
mechanisms such as loyalty tests or limitations on promotions (par. 6-7).  
Reports of such inconsistencies between the quality of procured weapons and 
personnel’s ability to utilize them, or implement their skills, are not limited to the 90s. 
McGregor, in a report published in 2006, explains that although the EAF has been a 
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recipient of US aid and training since the 1979 Camp David Accord, the military’s 
personnel are mainly underpaid conscripts who do not pursue a career in the military. 
Relying on inexpensive manpower, the military has become bloated; there have been riots 
and defections as well. Importing modern technology does not translate into effective 
utilization of such equipment due to low education levels of conscripts from the regions 
(McGregor 2006, 283). According to CNN’s135 analysis of the WikiLeaks cables, there 
have been reports of mid-level officers’ discontent with their leadership; an account in 
2008 suggested that promotions were based on loyalty, and those officers who were 
considered too skilled were perceived as threats to the government.  
With regard to its strategy, Egypt since 1979 has adopted a defensive strategy. 
Stratfor136 (2015) reports that even after the revolution of 2011, the military has been 
primarily focusing on conventional capabilities despite its leaders’ awareness of threats of 
asymmetric warfare (insurgency and terrorism). The wars with Israel, albeit highly 
unlikely, are still part of the consideration (Khaled 2015, par. 9). A focus on conventional 
capabilities is in line with Egypt’s military tradition of preparing for large-scale wars, 
partially due to the military’s goal of exhibiting a positive image of itself (Khaled 2015, 
par. 11-12). There is a consistency, at least until 2011, in Egypt’s defensive approach. For 
example, in an interview in 1987, the then Minister of Defense and War Production 
announced, “military balance in relation to surrounding countries and deterrence” (cited in 
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Khaled 2015) as primary goals of Egypt’s military strategy, which was aimed at protecting 
its territorial integrity and economic interests.  
Assessing military effectiveness, Springborg (2013) offers three indicators: 
military objectives, professionalization and civilian control, and finally ‘security sector 
reform,’ referring to compatibility with the rule of law and human rights (100). For the 
purpose of this study, the third indicator belongs to the section of social control and will be 
discussed in the next section. With regard to setting a doctrine and professionalization, 
Springborg (2013) explains in terms of the “roles Egypt assigns to its military, they remain 
ambiguous, as there is no official national security policy, nor any documents or official 
proceedings that specify them” (2013, 100). Based on statements from the military, 
however, defense of the territory and external threats have been the main objectives of the 
military—defense against the regional states of Israel, Libya, and Sudan, as well as Iran-
connected Islamic extremism. Springborg (2013), similar to previous authors, also 
underlines Egyptian military’s “less impressive” capabilities regarding the “sophistication 
of its procedures, readiness, and its capacity to meet sudden or diverse threats.” The 
problems lie in the military’s focus on quantity rather than quality, as well as training 
(Springborg 2013, 101). Therefore, in terms of evaluating its political goals, its threat 
environment, and adopting a relevant strategy, Egypt has been consistent. The evidence on 
its capacity to meet those goals suggests a lack of efficacy.  
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For example, Dahsham137 (2012) contends that the Egyptian military has been 
“mysterious” about its businesses and military capabilities. Regardless, occasional reports 
in the Egyptian media alluded to the military’s deteriorating capabilities. Media accounts 
of sinking vehicles in the Suez Canal, failing tank engines during exercises, and hijacking 
of army vehicles by an unknown SUV are numerous. There is a low-level readiness among 
the army personnel in the Sinai. Another piece of evidence indicating low readiness was 
the killing of 16 personnel due to a militants’ attack of a bordering post; militants also stole 
a tank from the post. Dahsham (2012) also draws attention to the economic activities of the 
military as its main priority as opposed to focusing on the task of defense. He criticizes the 
army for its inability to protect its vehicles from years of “neglect and complacency,” which 
has created “a situation, in short, in which the army upper echelon is more concerned about 
what’s happening in the army-owned pasta factory than in basic training”138.   
There are other reports on the repercussions of economic activity on military 
professionalism. For example, CNBC reported on a cable by US ambassador, Margaret 
Scobey, that warns about the military’s opposition to Mubarak’s privatization plans139.  
There are reports of military officers assuming executive positions and spending their time 
in military-owned properties to foster allegiances within the military140.   
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Therefore, the evidence suggests that despite weapons’ procurement, due to the 
incompatibility of training with new technology, marginalization of trained officers from 
decisive positions, and bloated military personnel based on poor conscripts, the EAF’s 
functional capabilities are not impressive. Specifically, the EAF lags in the dimensions of 
skills and responsiveness. Moreover, the military’s focus on maintaining its businesses has 
turned it into an interest group concerned with maintaining its economic interests, albeit 
via political means, rather than focusing on the task of defense.  
The inability of the EAF to improve its functional capabilities throughout the 
decades offers the following conclusion with regard to H2. The present study examines the 
change in functional capabilities prior to and after economic liberalization. However, 
because the military’s functional capabilities, especially in terms of its skills, have not 
undergone striking improvement, it is safe to assume that neither military aid nor economic 
liberalization positively impacted the functional capabilities. In other words, if the direct 
military aid did not substantially improve the military’s professionalization in terms of its 
readiness, one can extrapolate that economic liberalization did not positively impact the 
military’s functional capabilities either. On the contrary, given reports in the Egyptian 
media, the EAF’s involvement with simultaneous tasks of defense and economic 
production has had a negative impact on its functional capability.  
The Social Control of the EAF 
Hypothesis number 3 suggests that if economic liberalization is incomplete, 
economically active militaries become economic interest groups and the outcome is 
decreased social control. With regard to the case of Egypt, the social control of the EAF 
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also changed as a consequence of the liberalization and privatization policies. While the 
EAF’s anti Muslim Brotherhood attitude illustrates its support of the former ruling elite, 
and hence social values of a portion of the population, its state takeover and grave human 
rights violations demonstrate its commitment to its narrow organizational interests, 
primarily economic interests.  
First, the Egyptian government, concerned with the rise of Islamism among the 
EAF’s conscripts, kept the EAF’s involvement with domestic insurgency and Islamic 
extremism in 1990s to a minimum.  in 1992, Chief of Staff Salah Halaby expressed 
concerns about the rise of extremism and terrorism and urged that the issue be resolved 
without the EAF’s intervention. To ensure the EAF’s separation from internal security 
concerns, Egypt relied primarily on domestic intelligence agencies with limited help from 
the EAF (Hashim 2011, 110-111). In line with civilian anti-Islamist attitude, the EAF has 
adopted the secular social values, rather than Islamist values in its decisions. The most 
striking example of the anti-Muslim Brotherhood, and anti Islamist values, was the EAF’s 
role in ousting Muhammed Morsi in 2013. Claiming to protect the secular portion of the 
Egyptian society from Islamism, after four days of anti-Morsi protests in July of 2013141,  
the EAF led by Al-Sisi ousted Morsi from power. Dismissing the results of the election, 
and hence the social attitudes of those supporting Muslim Brotherhood, the EAF portrayed 
itself as protectors and champions of secularism and democracy. In doing so, it sided with 
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Morsi’s opposition leader, Mohammed Al Bradei, the sheikh of Al-Azhar mosque, the 
Coptic pope, and leaders of Islamic Nour Party142.  
After the EAF’s takeover of the government, however, the evidence suggests the 
EAF’s focus on its narrow institutional interests as opposed to its commitment to values of 
the society. Not only does it not represent Islamist values, the EAF has been undermining 
both human rights and democracy. The Pew research data143 suggests that by 2010, 59% of 
Muslim Egyptians supported democracy, 22% preferred a non-democratic government 
only under certain circumstances, and 18% did not have a preferred form of government. 
Although the EAF toppled Morsi’s government in support of protestors in Tahrir square, 
its actions ever since either have not reflected values of the society or at best reflected a 
portion of the population. Ever since its dominance, the EAF has dismissed the general 
attitude of the society pertaining to human rights and democracy. By 2014144, 72% of 
Egyptians were unhappy with the country’s political direction. Pew also reports that by 
2014, 54% of Egyptians supported Sisi over Morsi although the data might be skewed due 
to misreporting. 54% value democracy and human rights indicating a decrease from 66% 
in 2013.  
There is ample evidence that the EAF violated human rights to maintain both its 
economic and political power, reflecting the EAF’s refusal to incorporate values of human 
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http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/22/key-takeaways-from-our-survey-of-egypt/ 
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rights into its practices. According to Human Rights Watch145, under General Sisi’s 
leadership, there have been numerous cases of torture and disappearance. Furthermore, in 
North Sinai, the military has been involved in extrajudicial killings during its pursuit of 
Islamic State. “Prosecutions, travel bans and asset freezing against human rights defenders, 
in addition to repressive new legislation” are other cases that violate civil and political 
rights; further violations include anti-union and anti-strike measures. 
Conclusion 
This chapter illustrated that a haphazard liberalization, rapid privatization, and 
failure to adopt laws to mitigate shocks of economic reform offered the EAF opportunities 
for capture of state resources. When the civilian elite decided to limit the EAF’s economic 
power by new privatization policies, the EAF had amassed enough economic leverage to 
challenge the civilians’ decision. Since the state had failed to establish a competitive 
economy and an independent private sector, the EAF was able to maintain its businesses, 
and leverage its economic power to gain economic power. Moreover, the EAF turned into 
an interest group, the outcome of which has been declining functional and social controls.  
                                                
145 “Egypt,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/egypt 
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Conclusion: Policy Implications and Future Research 
 
Three Cases: Findings 
This dissertation illustrated that a state’s ability to direct the process of economic 
liberalization and privatization determines its capacity to manage the influence of its 
economic interest groups, including its economically-active militaries. Implementation of 
a state’s reform agenda depends, to an extent, on its ability to remain independent of social 
and economic pressure groups. If the state directs its economic liberalization and 
privatization process, progressively liberalizes and reforms its regulations and 
bureaucracy, it has a greater capacity to direct the power of economic interest-groups that 
would either benefit or lose from the process of reform. Conversely, if state engages in 
uneven and haphazard economic liberalization, zigzags between various policies without a 
cohesive strategy, its prospects for mitigating both the shocks to the liberalization and the 
pressures of socio-economic interest-groups declines substantially. This dissertation adds 
to this research area by examining the impact of reform processes on those militaries that 
operate as economic actors.  
By comparing the three cases of China, Iran, and Egypt, the central hypothesis tests 
the empirical evidence for the impact of rapid versus gradual liberalization on militaries’ 
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political, functional, and social powers. Out of the three cases, China was the only case 
where there was a state-led liberalization strategy coupled with regulatory reform to meet 
arising changes. China was also the only state that was successful in managing an 
economically-active military’s aspirations, both via regulations and later via a divestiture 
campaign. The World Bank data on economic performances of three cases shows China’s 
unparalleled success compared to Iran and Egypt, both of which adopted unsystematic and 
chaotic economic liberalization policies. Compared to Iran and Egypt, Chinese GDP 
growth increased dramatically from the 1980s to 2010, indicating China’s success in 
fostering economic growth.    
Table 11: World Band, GDP Growth (Current US$) in China, Iran, and Egypt (1980-
2010) 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Iran 165.117 billion 205.514 billion 281.928 billion 467.79 
billion 
China 349.351 billion 829.562 billion 2.237 trillion 6.101 
trillion 
Egypt 52.6 billion 89.583 billion 136.381 billion 218.888 
billion 
 
In terms of the other economic indicators, China also performs outstandingly better. 
For example, China’s merchandise exports in 2010 amounted $1.573 trillion, whereas Iran 
exported $101.318 billion and Egypt $26.438 billion worth of goods in the same year.  
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Table 12:World Bank, Trade (Merchandise Export) in China, Iran, and Egypt (1980-
2010) 
 
Table 13: World Bank, FDI Net Flows (BOP, Current US$) in China, Iran, and Egypt 
(1980-2010) 
 
 
  In terms of capital inflows and private sector investments also, China is ahead of 
Iran and Egypt. Net flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China increased from 
$430,000,000 in 1982 to $243.703 billion in 2010. In comparison, Iran’s FDI was negative 
in the 1990s and grew to $3.649 billion in 2010. Egypt, on the other hand, performed better. 
Its FDI grew from roughly $548.290 million to $6.386 billion. While, growth of Egyptian 
FDI could be attributed to both its political position and Mubarak’s renewed commitment 
to implementation of WB and IMF policy recommendations, Iran performed better both on 
its share of manufacturing and its private-sector development. The data provided by Iran’s 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Iran 80.910.000 -361.950.000 193.575.000 3.649 billion 
China No-Data 
(430.000.000 in 
1982) 
3.487 billion 42.095 billion 243.703 billion 
Egypt 548.285.710.069 734.000.000 1.235 billion 6.386 billion 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Iran 12.338 billion 19.305 billion 28.739 billion 101.318 
billion 
China 18.099 billion 62.019 billion 249.203 billion 1.578 
trillion 
Egypt 3.046 billion 3.477 billion 5.278 billion 26.438 
billion 
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Central Bank146 suggests that Iran was number two in the region, raking above Pakistan, 
Egypt, Turkey, and Israel147 for its GDP share of manufacturing for 2004, and from 2005 
to 2007. 
 Table 14: World Bank, Private Sector (Domestic Credit to Private Sector, % of GDP) in 
China, Iran, and Egypt (1980-2010) 
 
Data on domestic sector development also points to China’s superior performance 
in the area of finance, with that state recording the highest percentage of GDP share of 
domestic credit to the private sector. Economic indicators in the cases of China, Iran, and 
Egypt suggest that China was the only case that has been able to register relative progress 
in its economic performance. Iran and Egypt have both lagged. Therefore, in China, gradual 
economic liberalization, alongside systemic legal–bureaucratic reforms, culminated in the 
establishment of relatively competitive economy. Export of goods, capital inflows, and 
private sector growth are indicators of such success.  
Out of all three cases, China differed markedly with an economically-active 
military that divested majority of its businesses by early 2000 and returned to barracks. The 
road to containing the military’s economic empire was uneven, with the state passing 
                                                
146 “Comparison of the Iranian Economy With the Countries in the Region,” Islamic Republic Central 
Bank, www.cbi.ir/page/6925.aspx 
 
147 Referred to as “Zionist Occupying Regime” in the document.  
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Iran 29.691 22.979 26.25 54.615 
China 52.627 86.2 51.953* 126.3 
Egypt 13.181 25.436 111.123 33.072 
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regulations and insisting that the PLA’s businesses operate based on market laws. In 
addition, decades of steady economic reform had conditioned the gradual establishment of 
market mechanisms and a private sector in which profitability was the measure of success. 
Under conditions of competitiveness, PLA firms could not compete effectively. They 
engaged in illegal smuggling instead. PLA’s agreement to divest was a result of its inability 
to both sustain its businesses and simultaneously engage in the task of defense effectively.  
The same was not true for Iran and Egypt. In both cases, haphazard economic 
liberalization provided opportunities for militaries to capture state resources. The state’s 
inability to implement effective regulations, along with the rapid sale of SOEs, facilitated 
the emergence of crony networks. In this context, economically active militaries leveraged 
their positions to further their economic interests. Once the states decided to limit the 
militaries’ economic power, the military had already amassed substantial economic clout 
relative to other economic actors, including the private sector. In the absence of laws 
encouraging market-based competition or discouraging selective protectionism, alongside 
the absence of an independent private sector, militaries had no incentives to pull out of the 
economy.  
While in both Egypt and Iran, economically active militaries remained both 
economically and politically active, the degree of civilian control varies. This divergence 
is explicable by underscoring the role of bonyads and crony networks in Iran’s semi-public 
domain. Formation of bonyads in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution created a semi-
public domain characterized by a plurality of competing economic actors. Competition 
among these bonyads in the semi-public domain to capture Iran’s state resources in limited 
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the IRGC’s attempts to take over the state. On the contrary, the EAF’s main rival was 
Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak; Gamal’s attempts to monopolize economic power 
antagonized the EAF, pushing it to capture of the state once an opportunity presented itself. 
Assessing Alternative Explanations 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and acceleration of globalization, scholars 
have been arguing about the pressure globalization asserts on states to liberalize their 
economies and politics. For example, race-to-the-bottom arguments, and transnational 
norm diffusion discussion by Bunce and Wolchik (2010) suggest that given market 
pressures and the diffusion of norms, liberalization of economics and politics is inevitable.  
Civil–military relations are not exempt from this process.  More specifically, arguments on 
the spread of democracy would suggest that a push for democratization should also 
democratize civil–military relations.  
Hence, an alternative hypothesis would link changes in civil–military relations to 
the degree of political liberalization states experience.  It anticipates that in states with 
greater degree of liberalization and economic integration, militaries are politically less 
autonomous, culturally more democratic, and functionally more capable. The empirical 
evidence from China, Iran, and Egypt disconfirms this hypothesis. Unlike China, Iran and 
Egypt had episodes of political liberalization. In fact, Presidency of Mohammad Khatami 
was distinguished for political and social liberalization, rather than economic reforms. 
However, among the three cases under study, China was the one that succeeded in 
increasing civilian control over the military.  
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Therefore, the evidence of increasing political power of the military in Iran and 
Egypt, especially given both regimes’ attempts at political liberalization suggests that the 
spread of democratic norms or pressure to liberalize might not lead to democratization of 
civil-military relations. In fact, in autocratic regimes, political liberalization takes the form 
of broadening the space for political participation of formerly excluded opponents, and the 
reform of civil and political liberties, rather than a comprehensive institutional reform of 
civil–military relations. The regime might implement security sector reforms that would 
introduce institutional mechanisms of monitoring (such as creating internal security bodies 
to monitor the military’s loyalty). The democratization of civil–military relations, however, 
is contingent upon regime change, not liberalization.    
Another alternative hypothesis relevant to the cases of China, Iran, and Egypt is a 
professionalization argument. Based on Huntington’s (1964) view of objective civilian 
control, professionalization of the military would be the determining variable explaining a 
change in civil–military relations. In fact, as discussed in the chapter on China, scholars 
underscore the professionalization of the PLA as an explanatory variable for changes in 
civil–military relations in China—an increasing degree of civilian control, or a change from 
a personalistic to an institutional form of control. On the contrary, lack of 
professionalization in Iran would explain the IRGC’s political behavior—its interference 
in politics. The same would apply to the EAF case in Egypt.  
In China, military and civilian leaders were alarmed by illegal smuggling and 
corruption in PLA businesses. The accounts regarding divestiture suggested both military’s 
top brass officers and civilians’ willingness to resolve corruption in PLA.  The PLA’s 
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officers’ emphasis on PLA’s need to focus on defense was interpreted as its professional 
attitude towards PLA’s responsibilities. However, timing of the divestiture, civilians’ fear 
of backlash by PLA, and civilians’ compensation package in return for PLA’s acceptance 
of divestiture illustrated that the situation was more complex. PLA had been undergoing 
modernization and professionalization, but its divestiture was not simply motivated by its 
values of professionalism. First, divestiture came after years of rectification campaigns 
aiming to regulate and restructure PLA businesses, not divest them. Secondly, there are 
contradicting accounts suggesting both PLA officers’ inclination to divest versus their 
resistance to divest. These inconsistent reports indicate existence of tensions within the 
PLA with regard to divestiture. Ultimately, the civilian leaders had to negotiate a deal with 
the PLA and offer a compensation package for its economic losses in addition to increasing 
the defense budget. Therefore, although professionalization is an important factor, it was 
not the most determinant cause explaining PLA’s divestiture.  
In China, military and civilian leadership were alarmed by illegal smuggling and 
corruption in PLA businesses. The accounts regarding divestiture suggest both the top brass 
and civilians’ willingness to resolve corruption in the PLA.  The PLA’s officers’ emphasis 
on primary task of defense was taken as a sign of their professional attitude towards the 
PLA’s responsibilities. However, the timing of the divestiture, civilians’ fear of backlash 
from the PLA, and civilians’ compensation of the PLA in return for its acceptance of 
divestiture indicated that the situation was more complex. The PLA had been undergoing 
modernization and professionalization, but its divestiture was not simply motivated by its 
concern for professionalism. First, divestiture came after years of rectification campaigns 
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aiming to regulate and restructure PLA businesses, not divest them. Secondly, different 
accounts can be used as evidence, some pointing to a willingness to divest and others 
showing resistance to divestiture.” These inconsistent reports indicate the existence of 
tensions within the PLA regarding the divestiture. Ultimately, civilian leaders had to 
negotiate a deal with the PLA and offer a compensation package for its economic losses in 
addition to increasing the defense budget. Therefore, although professionalization is an 
important factor, it was not the most determinant cause explaining PLA’s divestiture.  
Policy Implications 
This dissertation offers significant conclusions for policy-makers of international 
or regional organization, as well as United States’ foreign policy circles. It situates the 
study of economically active militaries in broader debates on states’ responses to the 
pressures of globalization. It draws attention to the impact of liberalization and 
privatization on an often-overlooked economic actor—economically active militaries.  
 The literature of political economy has already assessed the consequences of 
economic liberalization policies on domestic economies.  The convergence or divergence 
of economic systems as a consequence of globalization constitutes a central debate in 
economic liberalization literature. Liberal race-to-the-bottom arguments, as well as 
Marxist explanations, argue for the convergence of economies into deregulated liberal 
economic systems. Subsequently, failures of development are associated with either a 
state’s ineptitude in implementing neoliberal policies, or its inability to tackle the 
devastating effects of globalization. The opposing camp, as in Varieties of Capitalism (Hall 
and Soskice 2001), and the literature about divergent outcomes of economic liberalization 
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or globalization (Kohli 2009, Schneider 2010) emphasize the impact of domestic 
institutional peculiarities and political forces in mitigating the forces of globalization.  
In line with neoclassical race-to-the-bottom arguments, in the 1990s international 
financial institutions offered structural adjustment policies known as the Washington 
Consensus (WC). These policies aimed at promoting macroeconomic stability, exchange-
rate and price liberalization. They also promoted a market-based allocation of finances and 
labor, private-sector driven growth, trade liberalization and increased exports. They 
expected these to lead to state retrenchment and price reforms, which would encourage 
capital inflows, private sector development, and would improve productivity and 
competitiveness at the international level. The outcomes, however, occasionally did not 
match the expectations. 
For example, in criticizing WC policies, Cammett et al. cited scholars such as 
Polanyi (2001), Rodrik (2004), Stiglitz (2003, 2004), and Easterly (2011) who underscored 
the vital role of states in directing reform, as well as the need to adapt the reform strategies 
(modes of reform) to local conditions. For example, according to both Stiglitz (2003, 2004) 
and Easterly (2011), the WC’s failure to offer “local adjustments” impeded expected 
growth—“a governance failure to develop checks and balances needed to make markets 
work, and economic failures particularly associated with the growth-reducing effects of 
private monopolies and destabilizing effects of capital mobility” (Cammett et. al 2015, 
279). Unlike successful state-led reforms in East Asia or China, the authors refer to the 
WC-led “uncompetitive form of privatization” in the Middle East and North Africa, labeled 
as “nomenklatura privatization” that led the reallocation of public wealth to insider elites 
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(Cammett et. al 2015, 280).  As discussed in this dissertation, economically active 
militaries’ capture of state resources and their gradual increase in economic and political 
leverage was also an outcome of such rapid liberalization policies. 
Following crisis and failures, the “Post-Washington Consensus” emerged in the 
aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. It addressed the necessity of institutional reforms 
and a focus on political reform and governance, over mere economic liberalization; instead 
of perceiving the “state as the problem”, the post-WC advocated the need for strong states 
with regulatory capacity and the ability to provide public goods (Commett et al. 2015, 281). 
Extending this view to the reform of civil–military relations, this dissertation’s findings 
advise a more careful examination of the implications of liberalization not only on states’ 
development, but also on the balance of civil–military relations in countries with 
economically active militaries. Encouraging the states to reform their institutions should 
also incorporate recommendations for regulating military businesses. 
By examining changing power (political, functional, or social) of economically 
active militaries, this dissertation’s findings offer two areas of considerations for policy-
makers: (i) economic reform packages should incorporate the possible impact of policy 
recommendations on militaries with a history of engagement in the economic domain. (ii) 
The international organization or Western policy-makers should consider the security 
implications of militaries’ economic power. Policy-makers who offer recommendations for 
security sector reform and economic reform in developing states should collaborate.    
For example, donor states and organization after the Cold War required states to 
reduce military spending to receive money. The IMF and the WB spearheaded this change 
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for two reasons: their mandate prevented them from interfering in domestic politics. By 
reframing military spending as a fiscal issue, they could influence beneficiaries’ decisions. 
The IMF and the WB also adhered to the neoclassical economic model that prioritized 
capital investments in productive sectors to boost growth and considered military spending 
as “pure waste.” Since the late 1990s, the specific issue of military spending has become a 
part of a broader framework of security sector governance (Brozska 2003, 6-9). This 
dissertation’s findings suggest that the interrelation of military spending and civilian 
control is not straightforward. The case of China illustrated how the state’s ability to 
increase its defense spending and compensate the PLA served as a catalyst for both the 
PLA’s return to barracks and increased civilian control. Therefore, policy-makers should 
pay closer attention to the domestic dynamics of state–military relations to be able to offer 
nuanced, or at times even counterintuitive, policy recommendations that would assist the 
states in their both economic and security sector reforms.  
Future Research 
This research puts forth a framework to assess the nexus of economic policies and 
civil–military relations in those autocratic regimes where militaries have had a history of 
economic activity. The evidence tells a causal story that links the impact of the specifics of 
liberalization and privatization policies to militaries’ economic expansion and contraction. 
The future research could take six directions likely to improve our understanding of the 
interrelation of economic policy and civil–military relations: 
First, research should focus on collecting more detailed evidence on the specifics 
of micro-economic policies and their impact on militaries’ economic behavior in a smaller 
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time-frame. This dissertation examines specific policies to illustrate the overall economic 
success and failure of states to establish market economy, and its subsequent impact on 
militaries’ power. A more careful and comprehensive elaboration of micro-economic 
policies was outside of this dissertation’s scope. In order to postulate a more complete 
causal picture, future research should divide the study into both shorter time periods and 
look at more specific policy choices.  
For example, there is a consensus among scholars that the pace of privatization in 
Iran and Egypt was relatively fast compare to that of China. The rapid privatization also 
led to asset-stripping of state resources. This dissertation draws on the above-mentioned 
arguments on the pace of privatization to explain militaries’ opportunistic behavior as 
economic actors, specifically in Iran and Egypt. However, it would be valuable to conduct 
a microstudy of types of privatization arrangements, such as asset divestiture, outsourcing, 
or infrastructure partnership148, along the span of shorter time-frames, such as during a 
specific administration; it would help to identify micro-causal relationships between a 
detailed policy and a military’s behavior in a short span of time.  
A second area requiring further research is variation militaries’ business activities in 
different sectors. For example, military business productivity in the oil and gas sector as 
opposed to manufacturing. Was there a variation across time in a certain sector? Or were 
there variations across various military-owned companies in the same sector? The goal 
                                                
148 Poole J., Robert. “Privatization”, Library Economics Liberty. n/d. 
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would be to gather new evidence that would assist with testing the hypotheses set forth by 
this dissertation.  
In this same area, investigators need to improve the quality of data on the economic 
activities these militaries operating in a non-transparent autocratic regime is sparse or likely 
to be inaccurate. Available data is anecdotal or speculative. Accurate evidence on 
profitability or losses of military businesses is lacking. While there are general reports 
about their overall performance, the data is scant. Access to data, especially on militaries’ 
budget and business profits are the biggest challenge of such study. Therefore, the second 
direction should include collecting more specific data on militaries’ business activities.  As 
countries liberalize and begin opening their markets for investments, such data should 
become more available. Conducting interviews with officials, dissenting politicians or 
former military elites, would be another avenue to pursue. 
The third avenue for future research would be analysis of the fate of military businesses 
under current leaderships. For example, what happened to those PLA companies that had 
engaged in international trade? Or what has been happening to IRGC companies following 
the lifting of sanctions against Iran sanctions and Iran’s gradual opening to global markets? 
Assessing the negotiation process between the IRGC and the civilian elite in both the 
economic and the political spheres would be a logical continuation of examining the ability 
of this dissertation’s hypotheses to predict future behaviors.  
The fourth potential for research lies in assessing the relationship between 
militaries’ economic activities and both the provision of social services and regime 
durability. In other words, do militaries engage in contracting, job-creation, or provision of 
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services, especially in underdeveloped or rural regions? If yes, understanding the 
possibilities of those activities for establishing loyalty and subsequent regime stability, 
would be an important issue to study. Do militaries foster social constellations that they 
are able to leverage during a crisis?  
While China was relatively successful in demanding that the PLA divest, Iran and 
Egypt have not been able to push their militaries back to barracks. A fifth direction for 
research should examine whether there is a variation in the future course of economic 
liberalization in Iran and Egypt. If yes, how do the militaries of each country influence the 
process? In other words, given the enormous economic leverage the IRGC and the EAF 
have amassed, understanding the possible conflict of interests for the militaries, or their 
possible role in encouraging or discouraging economic as well as political reforms is 
crucial.      
Ultimately, this research offered a comparative case study to offer contingent 
generalizations about the political behavior of militaries, as well as their functional power 
and social attitudes following economic reforms. The hypotheses should be tested against 
evidence from other cases with economically active militaries to examine their validity. 
For example, Turkey has had a similar trajectory regarding its economically active military 
and economic liberalization. However, the attempted coup d’état in the summer of 2016 
has ended up with consolidation of power amounting almost to monopolization by 
President Erdogan. How would findings from this dissertation help us further our 
understanding of the interrelation of economic policies and civil–military relation.
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